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INSECURITY?
When It Comes To Workplace Surveillance Of Electronic Communications,
Employers Are Free To Establish The Rules Of The Game
by Philip L. Gordon, Esq.
Introduction
In May, 2001, when federal judges on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit learned that,
in at least one important respect, they were no different
from millions of clock-punchers worldwide, they were
outraged.' What was the startling revelation for these
usually imperturbable appellate court judges? Mere
bureaucrats in the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, a little known group of civil servants who
administer the federal court system, were monitoring the
federal judiciary's e-mail and Internet traffic, including the
traffic of these Article III judges. 2 'he perceived intrusion
upon the seclusion of judicial chambers so incensed
Judge Alex Kozinski that he took the highly unusual step
of publicly denouncing the chief of the administrative
agency in the Wall StreetJournal and discussed his views
on a nationally televised talk show.3
Ironically, in the years preceding this millennial
epiphany, judges, practically all of whom came of age
with the rotary dial telephone, had put in place a regime
which has made it extremely difficult for workers to
recover damages based upon their employers' review of
e-mail and Internet communications. This situation has
resulted from a judicial construction of the Federal
Wiretap Act, 4 which effectively eliminates any statutory
privacy protection for workplace e-mail and Internet use.
With e-mail and Internet use steadily transforming the
United States Postal Service into a quaint relic, the time is
ripe for judges, and Congress as well, to re-think the law
governing the privacy of e-mail and Internet
communications. However, the events of September 11,
2001, have placed the issue of workplace privacy on the
judicial and legislative backburner.
Consequently, employers, who are increasingly
concerned about regulating the use of e-mail and Internet
in the workplace, should view this regulatory vacuum as
an opportunity to establish their own rules governing the
use of these resources. 5 Moreover, employers have a
range of electronic monitoring policies from which to
choose. At one end of the spectrum is a policy aimed at
protecting employers from abuse of their electronic
communications systems through employee consent to
unrestricted electronic monitoring. At the other extreme
is a policy based upon the principle that electronic
privacy should be a workplace benefit. Employers can
tailor either policy to meet their own specific needs and
the demands of their particular workforce.
6
From The Rotary-Dial Telephone To The Apple
Macintosh: The Evolution Of The Federal
Wiretap Act
The 1960s were watershed years for wiretaps. By
that time, tapping technology had been in use for
decades with practically no restrictions or judicial
oversight under federal law. 7 Then, the United States
Supreme Court revolutionized the notion of
comiunications privacy. In Katz v. United States,8 the
Court held that even someone who uses a public
telephone booth can have an objectively reasonable,
subjective expectation of privacy in the content of his
telephone call, an interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment from government intrusion.
9
Congress responded to Katzby outlawing virtually
all interceptions of telephone calls without judicial
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authorization. Congress also strictly limited the
circumstances in which a court could order a telephone
wiretap. 10 However, the statute embodying this regime,
the Federal Wiretap Act, was a creature of its time. The
statute was premised upon a monolithic communications
world inhabited only by AT&T and its copper telephone
lines.
In the opening years of the 1980s, the world upon
which the Federal Wiretap Act was premised changed
slowly, but radically. Apple Computers began to market
"The Macintosh," the first computer designed for
consumption by the general public. Electronic mail was
becoming a widespread means of communication. The
cordless telephone represented the cutting edge of
telephone technology. The answering machine had just
recently become a "must-have" commodity. The
divestiture of AT&T was a work in progress.
With this backdrop, Congress amended the Federal
Wiretap Act in 1986, thereby extending the Act's coverage
to "electronic communications, " 1 In contrast to "wire
communications" - transmissions of the human voice over
telephone lines - "electronic communications"
encompassed transfers of data not containing the human
voice
12 (Napster, of course, was not yet on the radar).
At the same time, Congress passed an
accompaniment to the Federal Wiretap Act, which
sometimes is referred to as the Stored Communications
Act. 13 This statute protects stored electronic
communications in two limited respects. First, an anti-
hacking provision prohibits unauthorized access to "a
facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided," such as a server, for purposes of
obtaining access to electronic communications stored in
that facility. 14 Second, the statute imposes upon those
who provide electronic communications services to the
public, such as an Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), an
obligation to maintain the privacy of electronic
communications stored on their own servers.15
The Judicial De-Clawing Of Federal Statutory
Protections For The Privacy Of E-Mail And Internet
Communications
The practical effects of this dichotomy between
electronic communications and stored electronic
communications became apparent only as claims under
the Federal Wiretap Act based upon the unauthorized
review of e-mail began to trickle through the judicial
pipeline. The seminal case in the area, SteveJackson
Games, Inc. v. United States Secret SermS,16 did not involve
workplace monitoring, bt rather the Secret Service's
review of un-retrieved e-mail stored on the hard drive of
a computer seized from a company offering an electronic
bulletin board service.17 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Secret Service's
conduct was not actionable under the Federal Wiretap
Act because the Act prohibits only "real-time"
interceptions of electronic communications, i.e., the
acquisition of the content of the communication while the
communication is in transmission, 18 Because the e-mail
reviewed by the Secret Service was in electronic storage,
the Federal Wiretap Act did not apply. However, the
Secret Service did not escape Stee, Jackson Games scot-
free. The Fifth Circuit's opinion notes that the Secret
Service did not challenge the district court's finding that
its agents had violated the Stored Communications Act by
reviewing the un-retrieved e-mail without authorization
from the service provider, without the consent of either
party to the communications reviewed, and without
judicial authorization.
19
Steve Jackson Games opened the door to unrestrained
monitoring of workplace e-mail and Internet use. Until
relatively recently, software capable of "real-time"
interception of e-mail and Internet communications was
not even commercially available. Consequently,
employers seeking to monitor employee e-mail and
Internet use had no choice but to retrieve th content of
those communications from electronic storage on the
"The statute was premised upon a
monolithic communications world
employer's server. Moreover, unlike
the Secret Service in St(eiJa-cksono
Games, an employer can not be held
liable under the Stored
Communications Act for retrieving
employee e-mail from its own server
because that statute expressly
excludes the system provider from
liability. 20 The Stored
Communications Act also is
inapplicable to an employer's
retrieval of e-mail permanently
stored on an employee's hard drive
because the Stored Communications
Act protects electronic
communicitions only when in
intermediate or temporary storage. 2'
The Fifth Circuit's construction of
the Federal Wiretap Act to prohibit
only' real-time" interception of e-
mail and Internet use dominated the
judicial scene until the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue inJanuao
20I .22 Perhaps as a precursor to its
outcry against e-mail and Internet
monitoring by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, the
Philip L. Gordon is a shareholder in
the Denver office of Littler
Mendelson, P.C., a national labor
and employment law firm, and a
fellow of the Privacy Foundation.
Mr. Gordon specializes in
counseling employers on privacy
issues and representing employers
in privacy-related litigation
Ninth Circuit in Konop v. Hawaiian
Aiines23 held that the acquisition of
the content of an electronic
communication may be actionable
under the Fecdral Wiretap Act even if
the electronic communiciation is not
in transmission when the acquisition
occurs. 24 In that case, Konop, an
airline pilot, maintained a closed
bulletin board for pilots to speak
critically about both union
representatives and company
officials. 25 Konop alleged that an
airline executive violated the Federal
Wiretap Act by using false pretenses
to obtain access to, and to review,
messages on the aulletin board
2 6
The Ninth Circuit, rejecting the Fifth
Circuit's construction of the Act in
SieveJackson Games, held that the
airline executive's actions constituted
an interception under the Act.
27
Relying in part upon its holding in
Uiled States v. Smitb,'8 that the
unauthorized retrieval of a voice mail
message constituted an interception
under the Federal Wiretap Act,29 the
Konop court stated that there was no
reasoned basis for distinguishing
between voice mail and electronic
mail.30
The proponents of workplace
privacy had a short-lived victoiy. In a
startling reversal, revealed shortly
before the September 11 terrorist
attacks, the panel in Konop withdrew
its opinion sua sponte, with one
judge dissenting. 3i The majority's
brief opinion provides no reason for
this highly unusual action.3 The
majority might have belatedly
realized the potential impact of the
panel's original decision on law
enforcement, thus explaining the
panel's hasty retreat from its novel
holding. If the retrieval of stored e-
mail does constitute an interception
under the Federal Wiretap Act, then
law enforcement authorities must
obtain court authorization and
comply with the Federal Wiretap
Act's stringent limitations on
interceptions before, for example,
obtaining access to e-mail on an ISP's
servers. By contrast, the Stored
Communications Act, which
otherwise regulates access by law
enforcement officials to electronic
communications in storage at an ISP,
establishes a much lower threshold
and much less stringent requirements




Privacy Protections For E-
Mail And Internet Use Is Not
On The Horizon
The prevailing statutory
construction leads to bizarre results
in the employment context.
Communications by telephone -
whether wire-line, cordless, or
cellular - enjoy full protection
under the Federal Wiretap Act.
34
Federal law also protects the most
obvious piece of junk, snail mail,
from unauthorized interception.35 By
contrast, under Steejackson Games
and its progeny, electronic mail
enjoys no protection under the Act
unless intercepted in real-time.
36 Put
another way, employers cannot
obtain the contents of telephone
communications in any form without
risking liability under the Act, but
employers can review employee e-
mail and Internet use with impunity
so long as they do not intercept the
content of the communication in
real-tine,37
This is not the first time that the
Federal Wiretap Act has resulted in
an arguably irrational stratification of
means of communication. In 1986,
when Congress expanded the




telephone communications from the
Act's coverage. 38 Congress reasoned
that the general public could readily
attain the radio portion of a cordless
telephone conversation that resulted
from the transmission between the
handset and the base unit.
Consequently, the cordless
telephone user could not have an
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objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in his cordless telephone
conversations.
39
This "cordless" exclusion, like
the real-time construction of the
word "interception," resulted in a
boon for law enforcement.
Numerous reported cases decided
under the Federal Wiretap Act after
1986 analyzed motions filed by
criminal defendants to suppress the
contents of cordless telephone
conversations acquired by a police
scanner, or even a neighbor's baby
monitor.40 Relying on the
Congressional exclusion, courts
uniformly denied these motions to
suppress, whether based upon the





eliminated the "cordless exclusion" in
1994.42 Congress concluded that the
distinction between unprotected calls
over cordless telephones and
protected calls over cellular and
wire-line telephones had become
untenable. Even though it was
commonly known that others could
easily acquire the radio portion of a
cordless telephone call, the use had
become so widespread that society
could no longer tolerate unrestrained
interceptions of this means of
communication.
43
A similar congressional reversal
of the distinction between wire
communications and electronic
communications resulting from the
judicial construction of the term
"interception" is not on the horizon.
In the wake of September 1 lth,
Congress probably will not amend
the Federal Wiretap Act to put the
interception of stored electronic mail
on an equal footing with the
interception of telephone calls. To
do so would impose new constraints
on law enforcement when society is
focused on the war on terrorism and
the need to ensure personal security.
If anything, Congress signaled its
approval of the judicial distinction
between real-time interception and
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retrieval from storage when it passed
anti-terrorism legislation in October
2001, popularly known as the USA
Patriot Act. That statute, among
other things, removed voice mail
from the scope of the Federal
Wiretap Act.44 As a result, telephone
calls, like electronic mail, now enjoy
federal statutory protection only
when intercepted in real-time,
How Employers Can Fill The
Judicial And Legislative
Vacuum
Until Congress takes action, the
e-mailer s situation today will remain
similar to the man in the sidewalk
telephone booth in Katz, or the
cordless telephone user between
1986 and 1994. The means of
communication has become a part of
everyday life but its use is potentially
perilous.
From the employer's
perspective, this situation has
advantages in the workplace. The e-
mail system can pose a potential
threat by, for example, allowing the
transmission of trade secrets off site
with the press of a button. In
addition, Internet use can interfere
with the intended business purposes
of the employer's system resources
through, for example, the
downloading of pornography. Also,
the circulation by e-mail of
provocative messages could raise the
specter of discrimination or sexual
harassment claims. Given these
risks, employers are appropriately
concerned about these abuses and
their potential costs. In the absence
of judicial or legislative limits,
employers have the freedom to
protect themselves from these risks
as long as they do not intercept the
content of electronic
communications in real time without
first obtaining their employees'
consent.
45
By the same token, unrestricted
electronic monitoring may stifle
beneficial uses of e-mail and the
Internet. Privacy spawns creativity,
and the rapid interchange of ideas
through e-mail can accelerate the
creative process. But, if an employee
fears that a supervisor who monitors
the mail will swat down an
unorthodox idea, she might be less
willing to express herself. With
respect to personal activities, a
modicum of privacy may ultimately
benefit the employer. After all, which
course of conduct is more efficient:
fifteen minutes of surfing
Amazon.com's Web site or one hour
on a secret mission to Barnes &
Noble located several blocks from
the office?
This question remains: how
should an employer regulate the use
of e-mail and the Internet in the
workplace? The answer will depend
upon an array of factors including,
for example, the employer's own
objectives, the maturity and
sophistication of the employer's
workforce, the function of e-mail and
Internet communications in the
particular workplace, and whether
trade secrets are accessible in
electronic format.
Those employers who view their
electronic communications system as
a threat could deter abusive conduct
with a policy designed to send a clear
signal to employees that if they abuse
the employer's system, they will be
caught and disciplined. Some of the
principal points of this type of policy
would state the following:
1. The electronic communications
system and all communications sent,
received, or stored by the system are
the property of the employer;
2. The employer reserves the right to
monitor, read, copy, print, and
distribute the content of all electronic
communications, including e-mail
and Web sites visits, sent, received, or
stored by the system;
3. How the monitoring will be
effectuated;
4. By signing the employer's
continued onpage 5 75
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l The Importance of Private Actors in the Making
of Fourth Amendment Law,
0 2002 Sam Krnin 2
It is something of a truism in criminal procedure (as elsewhere in constitutional law) that
unless the conduct of a government agent is involved, the Constitution is not implicated.3
Thus, if a Federal Express employee acting on her own
initiative opens a shipped package that turns out to
contain drugs and then gives these drugs to law
enforcement, no search has occurred. 4 Similarly, if a
hotel manager searches the room of a guest and then
turns over any contraband he finds to the government, no
search has occuned. 5 So long as the private citizen is
acting as such and not at the direction or encouragement
of law enforcement, 6 the government is free to use the
discovered material without concern for its exclusion at
trial.7 To the extent that actions by private actors ever
find their way into our consideration of criminal
procedure, it is generally to prove this point: only the
government and its agents can be found to have violated
the Fourth Amendment.
In this essay, I argue that this focus on state action has
distracted both scholars and practitioners from an
important point: the interrelationship between privacy
vis-a-vis private actors and privacy vis-a -vis the
government. while it is trie that the absence of a state
actor means that a Fourth Amendment search has not
been conducted, it does not follow from this fact that
Fourth Amendment doctrine is unaffected by such
invasions of privacy. Quite the contrary: I argue that the
more privacy an individual surrenders to private actors,
the less privacy he will have from the government. The
more we become inured to our neighbors, employers,
creditors, and advertisers having greater and greater
access to areas we think of as private, the more we run
the risk that the government will have unfettered access
to them as well.
The principal basis for this argument is the Supreme
Court's decision in Katz v. United States8 and the line of
precedent that it has spawned. In Katz, the Supreme
Court stated that a search occurs and the Fourth
Amendment is implicated whenever the government
invades an area in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy? The Court held that whether an
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individual is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
depends not on where the search of the object takes
place, but rather on how the individual and society treat
that area. 10 Thus, as the court put it:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection
... [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.1
Instead of asking whether the place searched - in Katz a
public phone booth - is a place entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection in the abstract, the question
became whether the defendant behaved in a way that
demonstrated his subjective belief that the place searched
was entitled to protection, and whether society is willing
to validate that belief as reasonable.
12
On a case-by-case basis over the last thirty-five years,
the contours of the Fourth Amendment tinder Katz have
come into focus. I argue that one thing that has become
very clear is that even things in which one generally has a
very high privacy interest - one's home, one's business
records, etc. - can be searched by the government
without implicating the Fourth Amendment if one has
permitted others to have access to these things. If an
individual has given up a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his property or information by exposing them
to the view of others, he cannot attempt to deny the
government similar access to these areas.
Of course, in these cases one rarely waives an interest
in property or information explicitly. Instead, in a
number of contexts, courts have inferred from a
defendant's actions that he could not have had a privacy
interest in his activities, or that such an interest could not
be reasonable. For example, in California v.
GreenwooCd 3, the Supreme Court held that no search
occurred when police removed trash that Greenwood
had placed by the side of the road for collection. 
14
Without explaining whether Greenwood had
demonstrated that he did not expect his discarded
trash to be kept secret, or whether that expectation
of privacy, even if actually entertained by the
defendant, was not reasonably held, the Court
simply reasoned that there could not be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in something
consciously abandoned. 5  '4
The Court's reasoning was clearly influenced by
the fact that by putting the trash in front of the
house, Greenwood had made it available not just for
sanitation workers but for anyone else who happened by.
The Court stated, "lilt is common knowledge that plastic
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public."
1 6
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the sanitation workers
themselves, once in possession of the trash, might have
conveyed it to anyone else. 17 Thus, because the police
officers merely did what any other member of the public
could have done - looked through the trash that had
been left out - they did not invade Greenwood's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized to
other, earlier examples of this line of reasoning. For
example, in Smith v. Maryland's the Supreme Court held
that the installation and use of pen registers - devices
that allow law enforcement to access and record all of the
numbers dialed from a particular phone - was not a
search subject to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court held that the installation and use
of these devices (by the phone company at the direction
of law enforcement) was not a search because in the
course of using his phone, the defendant voluntary
conveyed information to the phone company about the
numbers he was dialing.1 9 Thus, Smith knew (or at the
very least should have known) that he was transmitting
this information to a third party, and "a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties. "20 Similarly, in
United States '. Miller trhe Supreme Court ruled that
records held by banks may be subpoenaed without
invoking the Fourth Amendment. The reasohing was the
same: "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government."22 Like Greenwood
putting out her trash, Smith and Miller had essentially
abandoned their privacy interests by allowing others
access to their information.
23
In still other contexts,








-made, she will not
be heard to complain when the government
makes the same invasion. For example, in
continued onpage 553
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This essay explores several dimensions of the debate between security and privacy that
accompanies many anti-terrorism and law enforcement proposals.
T lie debate is often framed, either implicitly orexplicitly, as a balancing of the tangible harms that a
security proposal would prevent, against the intangible
harms that an intrusion on privacy would cause. This
approach presents the choice between, for example, the
disastrous effects of a terrorist airline hijacking, and the
relatively minor feeling of discomfort that might flow
from presenting a national ID card before boarding.
Given those limited choices, what right-thinking person
would not choose the latter? This framework of balancing
tangible against intangible harms is not merely a
rhetorical strategy selected by the proponents of security
measures. It is also a way of understanding the debate
that flows naturally from the perception that privacy is a
mere abstraction, a luxury with little concrete value.
This essay focuses on three ways in which the tangible-
versus-intangible decision making framework both
overvalues security and undervalues privacy. First, the
framework is incomplete because it fails to account for
the many unintended consequences that usually flow
from security measures. The cumulative effect of those
unintended consequences gradually erodes society's very
conception of privacy. Yet the tangible-versus-intangible
framework implicitly focuses on short-term benefits and
consequences, necessarily excluding the long-term
effects on privacy.
Second, the contextual specificity that characterizes the
tangible-versus-intangible framework overemphasizes
the harms on the tangible side of the scale. By embedding
the choice between security and privacy in a concrete
factual context (such as boarding a plane), the framework
all but guarantees that people will decide to guard against
the tangible harms.
Finally, the framework draws a false distinction
between tangible breaches of security and intangible
intrusions on privacy. In fact, the tangible results that
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security proposals promise are often empirically suspect.
Instead, security proposals serve largely intangible goals,
such as allaying people's fears. In contrast, privacy
intrusions can have quite tangible consequences that
disrupt and inhibit social behavior.
I. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE
EXPECTATION-DRIVEN CONCEPTION OF
PRIVACY
T he tangible-versus-intangible framework described
above invariably understates the impact of any
particular security measure on privacy. This is so for two
related reasons. First, the framework fails to account for
the many unintended consequences that inevitably
accompany most privacy-intrusive security measures.
Second, the framework ignores the fact that our
conception of privacy is vllnerable to incremental
encroachment not only by the initial security measure,
but also by the unintended consequences that follow. 1
The tangible-versus intangible framework, however,
implicitly focuses on short-term benefits and
consequences, and therefore excludes long-term effects
on privacy.
A. Unintended Consequences
Unintended consequences come in several different
forms. The first is secondary use, which occurs when
information created or collected for one purpose is used
for another, or when an information collection technique
developed for one purpose is used for another.2 One of
the most widely acknowledged examples is the Social
Security number (SSN). After Congress passed the Social
Security Act, the newly-formed Social Security Board3 had
to find a way to track each worker's lifetime earnings,
social security contributions, and benefits. 4 The Board
assigned a number to each account, and assured citizens
that the SSN was to be used solely to identify citizens'
retirement accounts. 5 Yet in 1943, President Roosevelt
ordered all federal agencies developing their own
identification systems to use the SSN "exclusively."6 Over
the next five decades, the SSN's uses spread like wildfire,
and by 1998 the Secretary of Health and Human Services
acknowledged that the SSN was "in such extraordinarily
wide use as to be a defacto personal identifier. ' 7 Today,
someone who refuses to divulge her SSN will find it
practically impossible to conduct everyday transactions.8
This is not a peculiarly American phenomenon.
Identifying numbers in Canada, Australia, the
Netherlands, and Austria have all been put to widespread
secondary uses.9
Secondary uses can flow to government as well as from
it. For decades, direct marketers have collected vast stores
of personal information about potential customers. Data
profiling has become far more comprehensive with the
rise of the Internet, which has put a great deal more
personal information at profilers' disposal. Consumers,
however, might be surprised to learn that businesses are
not just sharing profiles with one another -they are
sharing our profiles with law enforcement as well. 10
Sometimes law enforcement need not even ask for the
information. Hosts of businesses reportedly opened their
customer records to law enforcement agencies in the
aftermath of September 11, often in violation of the
privacy policies that they claimed they would honor
when they collected the data."' Moreover, the LUSA Patriot
Act 12 dramatically expanded the types of information
about our Web surfing that any "governmental entity" -




second kind of unintended consequences are disclosures
due to insufficient safeguards over personal
information~t l Any centralized database is vulnerable to
hacking, even in such supposedly secure organizations as
the Internal Revenuie Service.' 5 Accidental data
disclosures have also become increasingly common. For
example, credit agency E-xperiain, drug manufacturer Eli
Lilly & Co., and healthcare provider Kaiser Permanente,
have all mtstakenly divulged confidential information
online.' 6 Eli Lilly recently entered uito a consent deciee
with the FTC concerning the accidental disclosure sf the
e mail addresses of nearly 700 patients with mental
illnesses, which Eli Lilly collected through its Prozaccom
Web site.1 7 Similarly, the House En'ergy and Commerce
Commitee recently took its Web site offline after
discovering that an internal database concerning the
Enron investigation was left exposed to anyone with a
Web browser."'5
In addition to human erro, there is the problem of
human corruption. Centralized information is always at
the mercy of dishonest or coriupt individuals willing to
use it for their own personal or political gain. The abuses
of J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon a re legendary.1 9
But abuses of centralized databases and government
surveillance are routine, rather than mere historical
anomalies, Many secuiity threat models prediet that one
percent of an organization's staff will always "be willing
to sell or trade confidential information.'ce For example,
in a five-year period, 127 employees of the California
Department of Motor Vehicles were disciplined 'foi
facilitating ID fraud.'Zi Similarly, a Virginia notary public
was recently convicted of 'helping thousands of
undocumented immigrants., willegally obtain Viginia
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driver's licenses" and ID cards.
2 2
Until September 21, 2001, Virginia
allowed applicants to prove
residence with identity papers and a
notarized affidavit. 23 The Washington
Post reported that seven of the
September 11 hijackers had obtained
Virginia ID cards using that same
loophole.
24
A chilling General Accounting
Office report details abuse of
centralized crime databases by FBI
and other law enforcement officers.
25
The National Crime Information
Center ("NCIC") "is the nation's most
extensive computerized criminal
justice information system" consisting
of a centralized database at FBI
headquarters "and a coordinated
network of federal and state criminal
justice information systems."
26
"[Jinsiders pose the greatest threat to
NCIC because they know the system
and can misuse it by obtaining and
selling information to unauthorized
individuals, such as private
investigators, or altering or deleting
information in NCIC records.'27 The
report found numerous incidents
where insiders disclosed NCIC
information to "unauthorized
persons, such as private
investigators, in exchange for money
or other rewards."2s In one case, a
former Arizona law enforcement
officer used NCIC information he
obtained from three other officers to
track down and murder his estranged
girlfriend.29 A Pennsylvania terminal
operator used the NCIC to conduct
background searches for her
boyfriend -a drug dealer -who used
the information to determine
whether his new clients were
undercover agents. 30 And in the
tradition of Nixon's "dirty tricks,"
some local officials unlawfully used
NCIC information to discredit
political rivals.
31
B. Incremental Encroachment and
the Expectation-Driven Conception
of Privacy
In any privacy-related debate, it is
important to understand that privacy
is generally defined by our own
expectations. 32 Judicial privacy
doctrines developed under the
Fourth Amendment and in tort law
define the scope of privacy by
reference to whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a particular context.33 Even
legislative action on privacy issues
reflects social expectations of
privacy, Given the variety of
powerful interests that might be
adversely affected by privacy
protective legislation, such legislation
is extremely unlikely to pass unless it
is supported by strong public
perceptions of what is appropriately
kept "private" in a given context.
3 4
Privacy, in short, is only as extensive





into the private sphere may fail
because they conflict with firmly held
expectations of privacy.3 5 However,
repeated moderate intrusions by
governments and institutions capable
of influencing social behavior can
gradually erode expectations of
privacy. The necessarily imprecise
nature of group preferences means
that we usually find a "gray area"
where societal expectations are
unsettled. The gradual erosion of
privacy occurs through repeated
incursions into this gray area.
36
Thus, the effects of any single
encroachment in fact reach much
farther than the tangible-versus-
intangible framework can
acknowledge. The tangible-versus-
intangible framework focuses too
narrowly on the present, to the
exclusion of the inevitable
unintended consequences that will
diminish privacy expectations far
more than the initial security
proposal. The framework commonly
examines the extent to which a given
proposal would intrude on our
currenl expectations of privacy, and
asks whether that intrusion is worth
the promised security benefits.
To take just one example,
proponents of a national ID card
might suggest that limiting such a
card to uses at borders and airports
would have only minimal privacy
implications, in part because people
are already used to showing some
form of ID when they travel.3 7 But
that view ignores the unintended
consequences that would inevitably
follow the creation of a card, even for
initially limited purposes. 3 The urge
to expand the uses of a biometric-
based national ID -and the
centralized database that would
inevitably support it39 -would be
irresistible. A centralized database
would facilitate the card's uses by
government agencies responsible for
welfare benefits, law enforcement,
and medical data.40 Businesses
would push to use the national ID
card, perhaps at first for credit and
banking purposes, but eventually for
as many purposes as the SSN and
driver's license are currently used.
4 1
Such plans are already underway.
The American Association of Motor
Vehicles Administrators ("AAMIVA")
recently proposed uniform national
standards for all state-issued driver's
licenses, which would encode a
variety of information about each
license holder, including a "bionmetric
identifier."42 Companies are already
marketing scanners that can not only
read, but also store, information from
the AAM'vA-standardized driver's
license.43 Scanners are being
marketed to bars, restaurants, car
dealerships, and convenience stores,
and suggested for use by health
clubs, personal trainers, and for the
general retail market.44 AAMVA itself
has proposed sharing its model with
banks, the travel industry, car rental
agencies, insurance companies, and
retailers."15 Furthermore, as illustrated
above, centralized databases are ripe
for abuse from within and without,
and increase dramatically the chance
for accidental disclosures. As these
uses and abuses accumulated in
incremental steps, we would
gradually come to expect less and
less privacy in a variety of contexts -
clearing the way for further
encroachment. Each inch of ground
that society yields in the private
sphere renders the next inch more
vulnerable, Yet the tangible-versus-
intangible framework ignores these
long-term effects by limiting its
temporal focus to the present.
continued onpage 554
VOLUME . 79 ISSUE . 4 I 521
judging
On March 17, 2000, the Tattered Cover Book Store received
a "subpena" from the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")
and I began a fight to save the First Amendment.
by Joyce Meskis
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Qn March 17, 2000, the Tattered Cover BookStore receiv ed a "subpena" from the DrgEnforcement Agency ("DEA"). The"subpena" required that the TatteredCove  turn over the purchas  records of
one of the store's customers. Specifically, it asked for the
record relating to a mail order purchase, in addition to all
other transactions by this particular customer.
I immediately faxed the "subpena" to our attorney, Dan
Rccht, who informed me that it was an unenforceable
administrative subpoena. 1 We discussed the First
Amendment implications of this request. Dan said he
would call the DEA agent. Dan informed the agent of our
First Amendment concerns and stated that the Tattered
Cover would not turn over the information based on this
administrative request. He invited the agent to obtain a
real subpoena that we would then litigate. The agent
indicated to Dan that he did not want to do so, and Dan
was left with the impression they were going to let it
drop.
We thought the matter was over. However, early in
April Dan received a call from Fran Wasserman at the
Adams County District Attorney's office. Mr. Wasserman
told Dan that a search warrant was being sought in order
to obtain the information that the DEA "subpena" had
requested from the Tattered Cover. Dan felt that Mr.
Wasserman hoped to avoid the search warrant by getting
Dan's permission to obtain the information. Dan asked if
he could have until the end of the next business day
before any action was taken to give him time to contact
his client. Mr. Wasserman agreed.
I was incredulous when Dan called to tell me about his
conversation with Mr. Wasserman. A search warrant! No
opportunity for further judicial review! We agreed to mull
over the situation and discuss it the following day.
However, before we had an opportunity to have that
conversation, there were four law enforcement officers
(soon to be joined by a fifth) in my office, search warrant
in hand. I could not believe it! I raised the First
Amendment issues, talked about the Kramerbooks case,
which put a greater burden on authorities when it came
to searches and seizures of constitutionally protected
material,2 all to no avail. The officers allowed me to
contact Dan, who persuaded them to hold off on the
execution of the warrant for a week after a series of
conversations with the officers and Mr. Allen, in the
Denver District Attorney's office, who had signed off on
the warrant.
The search warrant had been narrowed somewhat from
the original request. It required the Tattered Cover to turn
over detailed information concerning the mail order
shipment, plus all transactional information relating to
that same customer during a one-month period.
We filed for and received a temporary restraining order
halting the execution of the search warrant. This allowed
us to litigate the subpoena in the Denver District Court.
That case was heard in October 2000, and the judgment
rendered half a loaf to each side. Judge J. Stephen Phillips
denied authorities (the North Metro Drug Task Force)
access to our customer's purchase records over the one-
month period. However, the judge ordered the Tattered
Cover to provide the information regarding the specific
mail order shipment it had contained.
The facts leading up to the search warrant unfolded
over time. Apparently, late in 1999 and early in 2000, the
North Metro Drug Task Force was investigating a
suspected mcthamphetainine lab in a trailer home in
Adams County. During the course of that investigation,
they sifted through the trash outside of the home. In so
doing, they found the leavings of a meth lab as well as an
empty mailing envelope with a Tattered Cover mailing
label on it addressed to a person living in the trailer
home. That label also had an invoice number printed on
it which could be used to identify the shipment.
The leavings of a meth lab found in the trash gave
police probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the
trailer home. In searching the home, they found a small
meth lab in a bedroom. They also found two new looking
books on the manufacture of methamphetamines.
Neither had Tattered Cover inventory control stickers on
them. One was still in a wrapper. Testimony in court also
alleged that neither had the appearance of having been
read.
The police found that there were as many as five or six
individuals living in or frequenting the trailer home. They
concentrated on identifying the occupant of the
bedroom, A list of suspects emerged, our customer being
Suspect A. Suspect A's address book was found in the
bedroom, along with other documents with the names of
other individuals. A lot of effort went into building the
prosecution of this case, but it all came to a screeching
halt with the issue of trying to tie the meth books to
Suspect A. The police testified that they saw this as a
"piece of the puzzle,"
However, when Fran Wasserman was approached to
sign off on the search warrant in Adams County, he
refused to do so. He indicated to the officers that more
investigation was needed. He asked them to check the
books for fingerprints and told them that they needed to
interview the suspects connected
with the trailer home. They
proceeded to dust the books, but /
found no useful fingerprints.
The officers did not do the
interviews in compliance with
Mr. Wasserman's request.
Instead, they sought the
search warrant from another jurisdiction-Denver.
I knew very little about the investigation when the
police arrived at the Tattered Cover with the search
warrant from the Denver County Court. As our
conversation unfolded, I asked one of the officers if our
customer (Suspect A) had been contacted so that
permission could be obtained for me to turn over the
information. The officer said that they had not because
the suspect was not the sort to give permission. I thought
that might indeed be true if those particular books
regarding the manufacture of methamphetamine had
been sent in the mailer. If they had not, our customer may
have given permission for the police to find out what had
been in the mailer. In any case, it seemed to me that
there was little to lose in asking, and something might be
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gained. The officer stressed that they just wanted the
inforomation regarding the mail order shipment. I asked
the officer what would happen if this did not reveal what
they expected it to. He replied that they would then take
the next step, which I interpreted to mean that they
would seek additional records from the
Tattered Cover. ... he would
The officers made it clear that they the informa
were not investigating the Tattered
Cover for illegal activity. I was sure that regarding ti
was the case, because the Tattered purchase v
Cover is a law-abiding business. I tried tO establish
to make it clear that the Tattered Cover in the bedr
did not intend to stand in the way of a then, did th
criminal investigation. As an only focus
establishment we are in agreement books abOL
with authorities that meth labs are a methamph
scourge on the community. We support
the police in the difficult job they do.
But, for the Tattered Cover, an individual consumer's
book purchase has serious First Amendment implications.
We also believe that it is incumbent on the police to
protect and honor our First Amendment rights. This case
requires a balancing of the necessity of the information
the government seeks against important constitutional
protections.
As the afternoon wore on, I asked one of the officers
how having a book in one's possession could play a role
in a conviction for illegal activity. He replied that it could
be introduced into evidence to establish the suspect's
state of mind. Curiously, months later he Would say that
the information regarding the book purchase was sought
to establish residency in the bedroom (the police had
residency in the trailer home established). Why then, did
the police only focus on the aooks about










Tattered Cover v. Thornton:
by Corey Ann Finn
T he Colorado Supreme Court handed down
Tattered Cover v. Thornton on April 8, 2 0 0 2 .1
The court found in favor of Joyce Meskis' bookstore,
the Tattered Cover, holding that the search warrant of
a bookstore customer's purchase record was
unconstitutional.
2
In 2000, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the
North Metro Task Force were monitoring a trailer in
Adams County, Colorado, because they suspected
that its occupants were manufacturing
methamphetamine. 3 Having searched through the
trash of the trailer and having executed a search of
the trailer pursuant to a warrant, investigators needed
to connect one of four occupants of the trailer to the
meth lab found in the trailer's bedroom. Suspecting a
connection between the books found in the bedroom
on the manufacture of methamphetamine and an
empty mailer from the Tattered Cover found in the
bedroom? Vhat Would have been the outcome if the
Tattered Cover had not soul the neth books to this
suspect? Would that have freed Suspect A of suspicion? I
did not think that was likely. How important exactly was
this "piece of the puzzle?" Was a "compelling need" (a
higher stanlard than probalble cause)
ay that clearly established? Given all of the
on evideic, woruld there still have been a
3 book case without the hooks? Conversely, if theo whole case hung on the books, was it a
s sought viable case?
esidency Some have asked me why I did not
rm... Why declare victoiy after the decision of the
police District Court. Would turning over this
n the information really impact our freedom to
read? I believe it would. Therefore, the
amines? Tattered Cover decided to appeal the
decision of the District Court. Briefs were
submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court
and the oral arguments were heard on I)ecember 5, 2001.
I am writing this at the end of February 2002 as we await
the decision of the court.
While the Tattered Cover is not arguing that the First
Aiendment enjoys absolute protection, it is arguing that
there shoui be and is a higher standard of protection. It
is, after all, one of the very most important pillars of our
government. In the Krawerbooks case, a District of
Columbia District Court judge ruled that Kenneth Starr, in
his subpoena of Monica Leasinsky's book purchase
records, could not have unfettered access to such
information in his investigation of President Clinton's
activities. She ruled that he must demonstrate a
compelling need for the information as it relates to such
an investigation, which is a highr standard than
probable cause. 3 That case never made it to the next step
continued on page 555
trash, investigators served the Tattered Cover with a
DEA administrative subpoena, requiring information
about the order sent to Suspect A and all other
purchases made by the suspect. About this initial
subpoena, the Colorado Supreme Court said that
'u]sing such a subpoena was ordinarily a successful
technique for DEA officers, though such a subpoena
lacks any force or legal effect'4 Meskis, through her
attorney, informed investigators of her unwillingness
to comply because of her concern for the privacy of
the bookstore's customers.
Investigators then sought and received a warrant
from a Denver County court, which they attempted to
execute. Pursuant to Meskis' attorney's request, the
district attorney who signed off on the warrant
voluntarily stayed its execution so the bookstore
could litigate it (in fact, the Tattered Cover did receive
a Temporary Restraining Order from the court).
continued on page 570







\ Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein
Questions concerning the extent to
which privacy should be governed
and what the rules should be.
f
f
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P rivacy is a loose collection of principles,particularly including a property right in
information and an interest in a protected
personal sphere.1 In general, there are
questions concerning the extent to which
privacy should be governed by default or
by mandatory rules, and what these default
or mandatory rules should be.
Privacy raises particularly difficult and
important questions in the employment
context. Employees and employers have
competing interests in disclosing and
preventing disclosure of information. For
example, firms may want to share
information with their employees about
customers, trade practices and technology
that helps the employees do their jobs. This
raises the concern that employees will reap
private advantage by selling or otherwise
transferring this information to third parties
during or following their employment. This
concern could reduce firms' willingness to
share such information with employees,
and can suppress incentives to develop
information or inventions. 2 At the same
time, excessive protection of the employers'
information could reduce employees'
mobility and the flow of valuable
information in society.
wealth by encouraging efficient
employment relationships. This requires
sensitivity to the unique characteristics of
the economic activity that gives rise to the
specific organizational form chosen by a
given firm. It follows that balancing may
best be achieved by enforcing firms'
contracts. Contracts covering employment
issues in general, and privacy in
employment in particular, are among the
nexus of contracts that are the central
characteristic of a firm.3 Since efficient
restrictions add value to the firm by
protecting its proprietary information and
ability to monitor employees, employers
and employees usually are better off if
contracts are enforced than if they are not,
To be sure, employees may prefer expost
not to be bound by restrictions on
disclosure and not to be monitored by the
employer. But employees are better off ex
ante to the extent that they share in the
value of efficient arrangements through
higher compensation.
That is not to say that enforcing contracts
is always efficient. There may be some role
in this area as in other areas of intra-firm
contracting for legal regulation. For
example, restrictions on the dissemination
""tint"k j' k
Employers, in turn, need information
about employees in order to evaluate them
for hiring and to monitor them while they
are employed. Employees have an
incentive to disclose because employers'
information costs affect the cost of
employment and ultimately jobs and
compensation. But employees also may
have an interest in keeping some
information private to protect their personal
space or to hide shirking or other bad acts
that are detrimental to the firm.
Appropriately balancing employers',
employees' and society's interests in
workplace privacy contributes to social
of employer information or on employee
mobility may benefit both employees and
employers but reduce social wealth
because of their negative effects on
development of intellectual property and
competition. Employers' intrusions into
employee privacy may be privately wealth
maximizing within the firm, but have social
costs in terms of the loss of individuality.
Thus, it may be tempting to regulate these
contracts.
But in order to fully evaluate such
regulation, it is important to measure costs
as well as benefits. The full costs of
regulating employer/employee contracts
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appear only from an understanding of the role these
contracts play in the overall operation of the firm, and an
appreciation of the second-best alternatives parties would
resort to if regulation precludes first-best contracts. For
example, restricting protection of employer information
can inhibit firms from disseminating confidential business
information to employees4 and, in turn, force revision of
relationships with employees. Protecting the privacy of
employees' information can inhibit monitoring of
employees and force employers to resort to non-agency-
type relationships.
This paper is both normative and positive. It shows
why contracts regarding these issues should be enforced.
it also shows that the contracts are enforced despite
seemingly mandatory state rules preventing enforcement.
The key to understanding the positive analysis is to see
the enforcement issue in the interstate context, where
both employers and employees are free to choose the
states in which they live, contract, and sue.
Part I presents an overview of the theory of the firm
and its implications for privacy. Part 1I discusses the
issues regarding privacy of the employers' information,
including enforcement of contracts between employers
and employees from intra- and interstate perspectives.
Part III discusses privacy issues concerning employees,
again including enforcement of contracts.
I. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND PRIVACYE conomic activity is carried out within a firm when the
costs of using market transactions are relatively high. 5
Within a firm, a nexus of longer-term contracts that direct
activity and restrain the behavior of the transactors
replaces spot transactions directed by market prices. 6 The
form of these contracts is shaped by the nature of the
transactions and information costs the parties face, One
circumstance in which the cost of using market
transactions is high is team production. Team production
occurs when individual resources are combined so that
the value of the combined output exceeds the sum of the
outputs of the individual resources, and it is costly to
determine an individual's marginal contribution to team
output.7 Increasing the cost of monitoring an individual's
effort level increases moral hazard costs, ceteris paribus.
Moreover, if the team resources become specialized to
the team, individual members can opportunistically "hold
up" the team by threatening to withdraw team resources
under their control unless they receive a larger share of
the team's marginal product."
The use and production of confidential business
information is an example of the team production
problem. Team production is present because the value
of information produced by many individuals exceeds
the sum of the values of each individual's separate
information. Moreover, the value of the combined
information is often maximized when it is then widely
disseminated among members of the team, as opposed to
being closely held by management. Thus, to maximize
the value of team production, individuals must be
induced to disclose their valuable private information to
the firm, and the firm in turn must be able freely to
disseminate the information among team members,
The inherent attributes of information can, however,
make both types of disclosures costly. First, it is difficult
to monitor individuals' use of the team's information
because information is intangible, thereby facilitating
hidden behavior,9 and plastic in the sense that it can be
used in many different ways. This deters sharing of
valuable information and reduces the value of team
production. 1 Individuals may fail to disclose valuable
information to the team, inadequately safeguard valuable
information, or use disclosed information for their own
benefit at the team's expense, 12 by direct or indirect
disclosure to competitors.
13
Second, it is difficult to design mechanisms for
encouraging disclosure by individual team members,
Prior to disclosure, the discloser may be unable to
convince others of its value. Indeed, even after
disclosure it may be difficult to value the marginal
contribution of an individual's information.' 4 If the
owner of the information has been unable to strike a
bargain prior to disclosure, it may lose the value of the
information on disclosing it because, absent legal
protection, the potential buyer or others may disseminate
it. 15 These problems may lead to "adverse selection" in
the sense that team members are induced to disclose only
low quality information. 16 A team member also may be
able to use his private information to hurt the team, or
threaten to do so unless he is given a larger share of the
benefits the team creates.
The firm must devise ways to solve these problems of
moral hazard and opportunism associated with the
disclosure and use of information by individuals in the
firm. This includes restricting individuals' access to
valuable information, and developing incentives to create
information. The firm can promulgate rules apportioning
the value of the firm's information among team members,
contract with employees to restrict their behavior during
and after their employment, and monitor employees'
"...firms' incentives to share information with their employees
may be affected by the risk that employees will disclose this
jf in rma n hsgj
creation and use of information. These rules and
contracts may involve intrusions into the employee's
"privacy" and restrictions on the employee's "freedom."
But such "intrusions" are no more onerous than terms
contained in licensing agreements that serve to restrict
the "freedom" of the licensee.' 7 Both types of restrictions
facilitate the voluntary production and dissemination of
information.
How a firm addresses these problems depends on
several factors. First, firms differ in the extent to which
their activities use resources and information that are
costly to monitor and expose the firm to opportunistic
behavior. Second, employees vary in their costs of
reduced privacy and ability to move to other jobs. These
differences can be expected to produce many different
approaches to protecting information.
Firms' contracts also depend on legal rules precluding
enforcement of some types of contractual restrictions. For
example, rules that protect employees' privacy can
increase firms' monitoring costs by precluding them from
using some types of intrusive surveillance techniques.
Firms then will have to use less preferred methods of
reducing the costs of employee moral hazard. Firms may
not only switch to less intrusive and effective monitoring
methods, but also make more fundamental changes in
the way they conduct their business. For example, firms'
increased exposure to tort and criminal liability resulting
from diminished ability to effectively monitor employees
may induce firms to replace employees with independent
contractors, thereby effectively altering the scope of the
firm.18 Also, reducing firms' abilities to protect their
information also may reduce dissemination of
information with the firm and potential marginal benefits
of team production.
The desirability of legal rules prohibiting enforcement
of agreements that restrict employee privacy and mobility
must consider several issues in addition to the substantive
nature of such rules, including whether such rules should
be mandatory or default rules, what legal regime will
apply to a contract between a firm and its employees, and
how such rules should be made. For example, if a wide
variety of approaches would be optimal, default rules
may be superior to mandatory rules, and different types
of firms may need different default rules. Under these
circumstances, a decentralized, bottom-up approach to
legal restrictions may be preferred to a top-down,
centralized uniform approach. 19 Finally, while different
firms may prefer a wide variety of approaches, a given
firm may prefer that a particular rule apply uniformly to
all members of a firm. Otherwise, forum shopping by
mobile employees of multi-state or multi-jurisdictional
firms can result in the non-uniform and non-optimal
application of rules regulating the employer/employee
relationship. 20 This suggests that parties should be able to
enter into enforceable contracts by choosing which law
governs the employee/employer relationship.
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II. PROTECTING EMPLOYERS' INFORMATIONT his Part builds on the general discussion in Part I by
discussing more specifically the employment
contracts that protect dissemination of employer
information and the costs and benefits of enforcing these
contracts. It shows that, while enforcing these contracts
usually is efficient, there may be some justification for
state laws restricting enforceability. However, the politics
of such laws suggests that state regulation may be
excessive, In particular, states may internalize the
benefits of using these laws to protect local interests
while imposing costs out of state. This Part also shows
that this problem ultimately can be disciplined by the
parties' ability to locate and litigate in jurisdictions that
enforce efficient contracts. Subpart A discusses the
countervailing considerations that drive contracts in this
area. Subpart B discusses state provisions and
enforcement of contracts regarding these issues,
including the default rule protecting trade secrets and
customized contracts regarding ex-employees'
competition and disclosure. It shows that, viewing the
issues solely from an intrastate perspective, states have
perverse incentives not to enforce efficient contracts.
Finally, subpart C discusses the interstate dynamic that
disciplines state law inefficiency.
A. THE BASIC PROBLEM
As discussed in Part I, firms' incentives to share
information with their employees may be affected by
the risk that employees will disclose this information with
others. Employees may do so by either straight sale or by
effective sale in the form of employment. During
employment, the firm can monitor employees' misuse of
information, subject to restrictions on such monitoring
resulting from privacy considerations discussed in the
next Part. The employer's biggest problem, therefore,
may be the employee's use of the information to compete
with her former employer after leaving employment.
From the standpoint of the employer's and employee's
joint welfare, the optimal contractual restrictions depend
on the risk to the employer associated with the
employer's disclosure of proprietary information; the
value to the employer of disseminating the information to
the employee compared to alternative relationships in
which information is not shared with the agent, and the
costs to the employee of being restricted from sharing
information that the employee may have helped create
and that is inherent in the employee's expertise. For
example, the employer may have developed customer
lists or technical information that the employee must have
in order to be able to sell or develop the product.
However, if dissemination of the information to the
employee is likely to lead to the further disclosure of the
information to competitors, sharing this information will
result in a significant reduction in the value of the
employer's valuable informational property right. The
employer's only alternative to restricting disclosure may
be a less productive relationship with the employee.
However, the employee may have also contributed to the
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development of the employer's
products and its clientele. Also, a
highly specialized employee may be
unable to separate her own expertise
from that of the employer. Variations
on these facts would produce
different levels of optimal restrictions
on information in particular
relationships.
The policy analysis is complicated
by social costs of contracts regarding
dissemination of employer
information. Dissemination of
information may be valuable to the
amount of innovation.22 Conversely,
inability to protect proprietary
information may reduce incentives to
produce it in the first place. 23 Thus,
default roles and contract
enforcement matter.
BR ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS.
INTRASTATE PERSPECTIVET his subpart discusses the basic
law of enforcing contracts that
protect employers' information. It
assumes that the relevant law is that
provided by a single state. Subpart C
widens the perspective to the multi-
state scenario.
1. The default rule: Trade
secrets law
Trade secrets law most directly
protects the employer's business
information. However, this law has
important gaps, and may be costly
and uncertain to apply.24 Thus,
employers must supplement default
legal protection of trade secrets by
actively monitoring employees' theft
of information and with other
contractual protection, including




Although employees may become
involved in industrial espionage and
outright theft, while they are with the
firm it would seem that the threat of
dismissal would deter most direct
misuse of corporate information.
25
However, after the employee leaves,
firing the employee obviously is no
longer a viable sanction for misuse of
information and the employee has
much stronger incentives to abuse
corporate information. The
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employee might sell the information
outright, but more often is likely to
try to use the information as leverage
in getting another job or as the basis
for a competing business. As noted
above, relying on trade secret law
alone may not be an effective means
to prevent such abuse of employer
information. Thus, the most
important protection in this setting is
through the use of covenants not to
compete. 26 These contracts impede
employees from effectively selling
the information by pursuing lines of
work after employment where the
information is most valuable. The
agreements also serve several other
functions, including ensuring the
retention of unique talent, and
protecting the firm's investment in
training employees.
27
Covenants not to conmpete are not
always enforced under state law, The
main question regarding
enforcement concerns the scope of
the restriction. Most states enforce
"reasonable" restrictions,2 8 although
they may differ on standards of
reasonableness. Some states have
strong statutoy policies against
enforcement set forth in statutes. In
particular, the California statute
provides, "every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent
void."29
The states appear to have several
reasons for not enforcing these
agreements. First, where the
agreement restricts the employee
more than appears necessary to
protect the employer's property
rights, the agreement may be anti-
competitive - that is, it may prevent
employees with valuable expertise
from working for competitors. Also,
employers may try to piggyback
competition restrictions onto
protection of information by
disclosing more trade secrets to
employees than the job requires in
order to justify broad restrictions. 30
Second, some courts appear to be
concerned with inequality of
bargaining power between employer
and employee, perhaps attributable
to employees' lack of market power
or sophistication. Third, Ronald
Gilson has argued that enforcing
non-competes reduces positive
externalities of information sharing
between firms that can permit the
growth of high-tech corridors.
3 1
These arguments may or may not
justify non-enforcement.32 In
general, even if non-compete
agreements have costs, it is important
to consider whether the benefits of
enforcement discussed above
outweigh the costs. Even if the court
imposes a seemingly mild
"reasonableness" restriction, it may
be hard for employers to design a
restriction that is both broad enough
to protect their information and
narrow enough to satisfy the courts.
Thus, holding agreements
unenforceable may impede
protection of employers' information.
This seems particularly clear where
alleged costs are internalized
between the employer and
employee.
With respect to the argument that
the agreements are anticompetitive, it
is not clear why employers in general
should be deemed to have enough
market power in the employment
market to render their employment
agreements suspect. Just as
employers compete for valuable
employees at the time of
employment, so they must compete
as to the terms of employment,
including terms that restrict
employees' mobility. Thus,
employers would internalize the
costs of these agreements through
the wages they must pa- employees
to agree to the covenants. Indeed, it
would seem that employers would
have to pay employees more than
the agreements are worth as
restrictions on competition since
employees, whose human capital is
not diversifiable, could be expected
to be averse to the risks of
immobility.
Perhaps the competition argument
reduces to an argument that the
employers have unfair bargaining
leverage over employees. But again,
it is not clear why this would be the
case throughout the employment
market. Moreover, covenants not to
compete are most prevalent with
respect to the most highly trained
workers and professionals, who are
presumably most able to protect
themselves contractually. Although
legal restrictions on non-competes
may make workers better off than
they would be without the
restrictions, it is not clear whether
this is efficient or in any sense fair.
Non-enforcement of the covenants
may transfer wealth from employers
and low human capital workers to
high human capital workers. 33 Even
if employers do have bargaining
leverage, restrictions on non-
competes may accomplish little,
since employers can use their
leverage to reduce the employees'
compensation to adjust for the
inability to impose a non-compete, or
substitute other devices that may be
inferior from the employers'
standpoint but hurt employees as
much or more than non-competes.
For example, employers have the
option of simply disclosing less
information to employees.
With respect to Gilson's argument
that non-competition agreements
may impose social costs by impeding
the flow of information, it is not clear
when this benefit of restrictions is
outweighed by the social costs of
reducing incentives to produce
information or making employment
relationships less efficient. All of this
is not to say that restrictions on non-
competition agreements are never
efficient. The benefits of certain
types of restrictions certainly
outweigh the costs for some types of
economic activities. But the opposite
will be true for other types of
economic activities. Even if
legislation or common law rules that
restrict enforcement of non-
competition agreements enforce
efficient norms or practices for the
former subset of activities,34 applying
such laws to the latter set of activities
will be socially costly. Thus, there is
room for experimentation with and
competition among various regimes.
This raises the question, discussed in
the next subpart, whether
jurisdictional choice leads to
efficient rules.
C. THE INTERSTATE
PERSPECTIVEG ilson suggests that states should
be able to decide what policy
they will follow regarding
enforcement of non-competes
because employers can leave states
that inadequately enforce contracts
and protect property rights.35 But a
state's regulation may apply to
employers who have offices in
multiple states, that seek to recruit in
the regulating state, or whose
employees are being recruited by an
employer in the regulating state. The
national or international scope of
many modern firms makes it costly
for them to structure their businesses
so that they avoid operation in states
with undesirable rules, This may
enable states - particularly a large,
economically powerful state like
California - to impose the costs of
its competition policy on firms
elsewhere while local firms get the
benefits. Conversely, California's
firms are subject to the costs of other
states' inadequate regulation while
they must play by local rules in doing
business locally, This problem of
"spillover" of regulatory costs
suggests that state competition may
lead to inefficient results.
Firms' practical inability to avoid
undesirable state regulation is partly
attributable to default choice-of-law
rules regarding enforcement of
contracts that make it difficult for
employers to predict whether their
agreements will be enforceable in
these interstate situations.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
indicates the range of considerations
courts may take into account:
(1) The rights and duties of the
parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the
local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under
the principles stated in 5 6.
(2) In the absence of an
effective choice of law by the
parties (see § 187), the contacts to
be taken into account in
applying the principles of 5 6 to
determine the law applicable to
an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of
the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject
matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of
incorporation and place of
business of the parties. These
contacts are to be evaluated
according to their relative
importance with respect to the
particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating
the contract and the place of
performance are in the same
state, the local law of this state
will usually be applied, except as
otherwise provided in % 189-199
and 203.36 The general factors
that guide choice of law under this
section are:
(a) the needs of the interstate
and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the
forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the
determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified
expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying
the particular field-of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination
and application of the law to be
applied.
37
Thus, for example, a court might
apply the law of the raiding
employer's state rather than that of
the employee's or employer's state,
even if the employee originally
resided there, because of the raiding
state's strong policy favoring sharing
information. The regulating state
might be able to have it both ways,
since in the reverse situation its own
interest in protecting local
continued onpage 555
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L et me add two modestthreads to the incredibly
complicated fabric of
privacy that is the subject
of this issue. First,
















interest, and travelers often would find themselves
sharing a bed with a stranger at an inn,
In most states, citizens were compelled to fund religion
and their "souls" were public business. Nine colonies
funded churches; the separation of church and state
existed only in Rhode Island, Delaware, New jersey and
Pennsylvania. 5 Until the mid-nineteenth century,
American citizens publicly financed churches, usually
Congregational or Anglican.
6
No clear delineations existed between the "public"
sector and the "private" sector. The government often
performed its functions by requiring citizens to perform
municipal jobs. If a municipality had a public need it
would often enlist its citizens to perform it. Street
cleaning and paving were accomplished by obiging each
person and business in the city to clean or repair the
street abutting his house or shop. Many functions
considered public today were mandated to be performed
by the citizenry, and charters were issued to private
individuals to collect fees for many municipal services
like toll roads and education. Sanctions were issued
Privacy and Public Policy
by Richard D. Lamm
Professor,
University of Denver
although this has been an American success story, we
should take great care not to lose, in the name of privacy,
some of the efficiencies modern technology has made
available to government,
America was not born in or with privacy. Both
government and neighbors intruded on one's "privacy" in
ways unthinkable today. Americans lived mostly in small,
confined communities where everyone knew everyone
else's business. Your neighbor's business was your
business, and state authority often backed this up.1 A
citizen could, and often would, be turned in by a
neighbor for adultery, wife beating, dressing immodestly,
flirting, homosexuality, masturbation, sodomy or
violation of "community religious and moral values. 2
New Englanders thought nothing of spying on and
interfering with their neighbor's most intimate affairs, in
order, as one Massachusetts man said in 1760 "not to
suffer sin in My Fellow Creature or Neighbor. '3 Most
prosecutions in colonial courts were for moral offenses.
The Puritans made homosexuality, masturbation, sodomy
and bestiality capital offenses, and flirting in a lascivious
manner and failure to attend church on Sunday were
matters for prosecution. 4 People would gather around the
post office and demand a public reading of their
neighbor's private letters considered to be of special
against private persons for failure to perform their public
cuties.7 A person's life and lifestyle were closely
connected to that of his or her neighbor. People's private
actions were subject to public monitoring, and their time
was subject to appropriation by the community.
The thinking behind the American Revolution and the
Constitution changed this dramatically. People were no
longer "subjects" but "citizens," and republicanism
eliminated the Crown's prerogatives and granted them to
state legislatures. Government ceased controlling matters
of personal morality. Public taxation was expanded, and
public antd private functions separated. Public education
was initiated, and separation of church and state
expanded gradually, with Massachusetts being the last
state to abolish a state funded church in 1833.8 While
strong pressures to conform to certain moral standards
existed, the structure of those post-Revolutionary War
institutions that separated the public and private sectors
started America down the road to autonomy and privacy.
My second point is that while there are dangers of
ignoring or under-reacting to the issues raised by privacy,
there are also dangers of overreacting. The threat to
personal privacy and the Orwellian implications of our
surveillance technologies are awesome, worrisome,
intrusive and liberty threatening. Many, including Ronald
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Corbett and Gary Marx, have pointed out the dangers of a
surveillance society: "Such a society is transparent and
porous. Information leakage is rampant. Barriers and
boundaries -distance, darkness, time, walls, windows,
and even skin -that have been fundamental to our
conceptions of privacy, liberty and individuality give
way. "
9
In this issue, others articulately illustrate this danger to
life, liberty, autonomy and dignity. But in an attempt to
balance the scales somewhat, I would like to point out
some examples of efficiency and effectiveness that will
be precluded if we overreact. For twenty years, I was on
the front lines of the battle between the concepts of
privacy and the promise of new technologies to enhance
government efficiency and citizen convenience.
Building prisons is immensely frustrating for most state
governors. Corrections has been one of the fastest
growing pais of state budgets for the last 25 years, That is
certainly true of Colorado. I personally have investigated
and helped adopt the use of modem surveillance devices
in corrections and have been the subject of criticism for
doing so. I believe we can make use of some modern
surveillance technologies without fear that our society
will become like that of Orwell's 1984. We can
I believe we can make
technologies without fear that
save the taxpayers'
money and, at the same time, offer more humane settings
for offenders. However, we must think through the
privacy issues.
The use in corrections for surveillance of non-violent
offenders within the community allows them to hold jobs,
continue to support their families, and even allows us
leave some offenders in the community for their entircto
sentence. Surveillance technology allows the state to
expedite a phased reentry of incarcerated inmates into
society. It is more economical and humane than a
$25,000-a-year prison cell. A central monitoring system
allows the state to monitor offenders day and night, and
conduct random checks at anytime of day. Only the
offender and authorities need know of the surveillancc's
existence, and offenders can maintain a job.
Many states have installed video cameras in state patr
cars to the mutual benefit of both state patrol officers and
the public. Big Brother? Hardly. Surveillance allows
cleaner arrests and gives us a record on those rare
occasions something goes awry. Similar video cameras
surround the Governor's mansion and also monitor the
State Capitol during non-working hours. Cheap, efficient,
effective.
Likewise, sobriety check stops on heavy drinking
nights prove to be a very powerful tool with minimnum
intrusion. Clearly, a short stop by the state police and a
brief exchange with the driver is a powerful tool against
the biggest highway killer, drunk driving. I admit this was
a controversial issue, but I supported it and found it a
useful tool against drunk drivers during high-risk
holidays.
Requiring people entering the State Capitol or City and
County Building to go through security gates is
unfortunate but necessaiy, and hardly merits the excess
rhetoric that greeted its arrival. Likewise, some schools in
high-crime areas have found it necessary to institute
scanning devices. While we may feel sad that such
measures are necessary, they hardly signal the fall of the
Republic.
Electronic tolls on roads, tunnels and bridges add
immensely to an efficient transportation system.
Surveillance will allow many new innovations, like direct
charging by vehicle type, weight, location and time of
day. We stand on the threshold of "smart highways"
which have great promise in easing traffic delays, but all
of these innovations involve privacy issues, I believe the
concerns are valid but manageable. Some of these
use of some modern surveillance
our society will become like that
of Orwell's 1984.
technologies can function without collecting personal or
vehicle specific information. There are privacy enhancing
technologies which allow us to adopt the technology, yet
limit the manner, means, and data collected, We must
give great thought to how this information is safeguarded
and used, and certainly to whom has access to it. As we
have all seen with driver's licenses, it is possible to
balance individual privacy with public need.
Obviously, we do have to consider the cumulative
impact of all of these minor intrusions and the many
others of a similar character, The total effect of these
minor intrusions into privacy can clearly be more than the
sum of their parts, and it is well worth debating whether
we are entering a time of permanent, unceasing
surveillance of the citizenry. We must also worry about
"function creep," where initially reasonable technologies
overreach and become oppressive. But from a public
policy standpoint, it is hard to believe that we can run a
populous modern state without using technologies that
have the potential to threaten privacy. This will be an
incredibly important balancing act.
America was not born with privacy as a way of life, but
we have grown up with it, Privacy has become
indispensable to our personal lives and what we value
continued on page 566
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Supermarket Cards:
The Tip of the RETAIL SURVEILLANCE Iceberg
by Katherine Albrecht, Ed. M.
CASPIAN - Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering1
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
_he good news is, marketers know so much more aboutyou thatthey can precisely tailor their marketing messages. The bad
news is, marketers know so much more about you even when
you wouldprefer your anonymity. One man's relevance is another
man's intrusion. Big Brother has truly arrived, with a grin and a fist
full of coupons.
2
- Frequency Marketing in the 21st
Century
Love 'em, hate 'em, or merely
tolerate them, there is no escaping
the fact that supermarket cards have
become a fixture of the American
retail landscape. Since first appearing
in the early 1990's, card-based
purchase tracking programs,
variously known as loyalty, frequent
shopper, reward, or club cards, have
spread quickly throughout the
grocery industry. InJanuary 2000 it
was estimated that 60% of U.S.
grocers required a card to obtain
discounts, 3 and today eight of the top
ten U.S. grocery retailers own at least
one supermarket chain with a card
program in place or a trial
underway.
4
Promoted as savings devices by the
grocery industry, cards allow retailers
to amass unprecedented amounts of
longitudinal information on
consumer purchase and eating
habits. Each time a shopper scans a
card at the checkout lane, a record of
the items purchased, the time, the
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store location, and the payment
method are added to the shopper's
profile. Along with millions of other
records, this profile is stored in an
enormous "data warehouse"
(frequently a secure facility run by a
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when she hands over her card at the
grocery store. 'It's like sitting in your
beachfrontproperty watching the
storm warnings, hoping the
hurricane doesn't hit you, 'said
Arden Schell, 58, ofArlington. 'It's the
kind of thing you worry about but
you don't know how toput a stop to
it. ,5
- Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Washington
Post Reporter, quoting Virginia
Shopper Arden Schell
Though the majority of American
households have signed up for at
least one supermarket card,6 high
rates of program participation do not
necessarily mean that consumers are

















array of data on
supermarket
shoppers through the use of cards
and related technologies, but soon
social agencies, health insurance
companies, law enforcement, the
United Nations, criminals, and lawyers may also begin
clamoring for their own up-close view of shoppers'
personal food shopping habits.
By allowing their grocery purchases to be tracked and
recorded, consumers leave themselves vulnerable to
threats from these sources. This article sets out to
document these risks and provide information to enable
shoppers to make informed decisions about whether or
not to participate in supermarket card programs.
Why fight supermarket cards?
The food business isftir and away the most important
business in the world. Everything else is a luxury. Food is
what you need to sustain life every day. Food is fuel. You
can't run a tractor withoutfuel and you can't run a
human being without it either. Food is the absolute
beginning.
- Dwayne 0. Andreas, Former Chairman of the Board,
Archer Daniels Midland Company
At first glance it may seem odd that a privacy researcher
would conduct an in-depth analysis of something as
mundane as supermarket cards, especially considering
how many other invasive technologies have sprung up in
the last decade. But while other privacy-violating
technologies may be flashier, few have the pervasive
reach of the lowly grocery card. Virtually every American
family patronizes a supermarket," and since food is
essential for survival, obtaining it is perhaps the least
negotiable of consumer activities. Supermarket practices
arguably have greater potential to impact society than
those of any other retail channel.
The grocery cards in their wallets provide many
shoppers with their first glimmer of awareness about
retail surveillance. Though the most egregious privacy
violations in the commercial sphere occur far from the
average consumer's experience and awareness, grocery
cards provide tangible evidence of their existence.
Tracked back to their source, the cards lead the
investigator to a staggering host of complex strategies to
watch, record, and control consumers on an enormous
scale.
Background of supermarket card programs
Loyalty schemes are not gestures made by philanthropic
superstores.9
- Mark Price, Waitrose Supermarket Executive
Understanding how supermarkets have come to
embrace the card concept can provide a framework for
understanding the privacy implications of cards. The goal
of the modern marketer is to find out as much about
consumers' lives as possible. In the past, marketers were
frustrated by the fact that many consumers do not want to
provide information about themselves to strangers.
Marketers had to pay for people to provide them with
information about their purchases (a fair arrangement
based on mutual consent), but since the industry could
not to afford to pay all American shoppers to be tracked,
for years it limped along with what it could glean from
the occasional survey or focus group.
Then the marketers hit on an idea. Rather than use
money as the carrot to entice people into surrendering
private information about their shopping habits, they
could use it as a stick to punish people into surrendering
that information. And what's more, if they did it right,
consumers might never be the wiser.
Fast forward ten years, and here we are - the
supermarket card is a fixture in virtually every shopper's
wallet. By withholding access to sale prices, marketers
have coerced tens of millions of Americans into
surrendering data that they would never have revealed
voluntarily. Even though discounts on overstocked and
seasonal items have been around for thousands of years,
shoppers can now only receive discounted prices if they
comply with the supermarket's surveillance agenda by
serving as unpaid research subjects. And punishment for
refusal (the stick) is harsh: anyone refusing to participate
is penalized in the form of higher prices- sometimes to
the tune of double or more for a given grocery item.10
THE GOAL OF THE MODERN MARKETER IS TO FIND OUT AS
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It's brilliant that the marketers didn't have to give
anything up in the process. Ostensibly, the cards are
designed to save shoppers money, so participating
consumers should see their grocery bills drop
significantly as soon as the programs are implemented.
However, when prices at Kroger were compared before
and after the introduction of a card program in Indiana in
2000,11 exactly the reverse was found to be true - sale
prices on identical items went up after the cards.
Nevertheless, given a choice between mediocre discounts
with the card, or no discounts at all without it, most
consumers capitulate and sign up.
Consider how many shoppers would still choose to be
monitored if there were no punishment for refusal, and
the motivating factor (the stick) quickly becomes
apparent.
The industry talks out of both sides of its mouth
On the surface, customers view the card as a tool to
receive discounted prices or other incentives. Marketers,
on the other hand, use the cards to learn about their
shoppers. 12
- Ann Raider, Marketing News
Mostpeople, amazingly enough, look at what's going on
with that card and don't connect that we have the data.
For those ofyou in this room [MIT media labI have no
doubt that you know we have access to data on you. But
for a lot of consumers, it's afrightening thing. 13
- Curt Avallone, VP of Marketing and New Technology,
Stop & Shop Supermarket
While industry trade publications openly discuss the
data collection function of cards, the supermarkets
carefully avoid mentioning data collection to customers.
Instead cards are promoted through advertising and
promotional materials as "savings" devices to "reward"
loyal shoppers.
Shoppers are intentionally kept unaware of the privacy
implications associated with cards. When first
announcing its involvement with the supermarket loyalty
card concept a few years back, Catalina Marketing
Corporation (CMC) hired a public relations agency, the
CGI Group of New York, to "minimize media coverage
linking CMC with unethical obtrusive database
marketing."'
14
CGI proudly stated on their website that "despite
questions from the press regarding privacy issues not one
resulting story mentioned the (privacy) issue." 15 The
campaign to squelch discussion of privacy within the
media, coupled with extensive advertising, served to
keep these concerns from many shoppers' awareness in
the initial phases of card introduction in this country.
Unfortunately, many shoppers only discover that the
card is a data collection device (rather than a savings
device) after several months - or even years - of
regular use. By that time the store has already collected a
large dossier of information on the individual and for
many shoppers it feels too late to complain. Though
many people then contact the stores asking to have their
records expunged (only to be told in most cases that their
data is now the property of the store), most consumers
simply accept the situation as an unfortunatefi~it
accompli since to do otherwise would require admitting
to their previous ignorance and explaining a history of
"voluntary" card usage.
Consumer acceptance levels are debatable
Because many studies on consumer acceptance levels
of supermarket cards have been commissioned or
conducted by companies with a financial stake in the
outcome, it is difficult to gauge the true acceptance levels
for cards among consumers. Independent research is
needed to accurately determine how consumers feel
about data collection, price considerations, and other
factors that play a role in consumer card usage.
When asked, grocery executives point to internal surveys
as evidence that consumers support their card
programs. 16 Indeed, it is probably true that if store
representatives ask shoppers, "Would you use a loyalty
card if it meant you could save money on your groceries?"
many may well answer yes. However, consider the results
if a survey were to ask this, more truthful question:
If your supermarket required you to provide
personal information and carry a card to be
eligible for sale prices (the same sale prices
you already get today), and furthermore, used
that card to make a record of all of your
purchases in perpetuity with the goal of
extracting more money from you, leaving you
no way to manage or expunge that record and
leaving it vulnerable for use against you in a
variety of ways, would you approve?
The majority of shoppers would probably answer with
an emphatic and resounding "NO!"
SECTION 2: USE RND ABUSE OF SUPERMARKET DATA
Can supermarkets be trusted with data?
Whenever concerns about data collection ire raised,
supermarkets point to their privacy policies, particularly
their promise not to share card data with third-parties.
Despite this promise, many chains routinely sell large
amounts of card purchase data to outside marketing and
manufacturing companies, justifying this practice on the
grounds that they remove "identifying information"
before sharing the records. But is shopper card data,
minus a name and address, really anonymous?
Data reidentification
A computer process called "reidentification" can allow
marketers to re-attach names and addresses to
"anonymous" records - even after all so-called
"identifying information" has been removed. 17 The
process works by combining the "anonymous" data set
with outside information to pair up items that are
uniquely associated to individuals. For example, using
only birth date and full ZIP code it is possible to identify
97% of the Cambridge, Massachusetts population.' 8
The U.S. General Accounting Office recently expressed
alarm over the reidentification trend which it says enables
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marketers and other "data snoopers"
to identify specific individuals on the
basis of very limited information.19
The U.S. Census Bureau is so
concerned about reidentification by
marketers that it recently took pains




supermarket IT department is
unlikely to invest in complex and
expensive "blurring" procedures
before selling "anonymous" or
"aggregate" shopper card purchase
information to data-hungry
marketers, meaning that your
personal information could easily fall
into the marketers' hands.
Researchers predict that
reidentification risks will increase as
the amount of data available on
individuals continues to grow.
21
Internal risks
Unbeknownst to most shoppers,
the information contained in their
supermarket card records may
extend far beyond mere grocery
purchases, name, address and phone
number. In the early stages of card
introduction, many stores required a
social security number or driver's
license number (or both) to receive
discounts - and would not issue a
card without them.22 Today, because
many stores' shopper cards double as
"check cashing cards," such
identifying information is still
routinely collected from millions of
grocery consumers without raising an
eyebrow. Even shoppers who do not
want check cashing privileges are
often encouraged to provide
additional information, such as their
date of birth, on card applications.
The problem is that once the store
has shoppers' identifying
information, it can easily obtain
detailed intelligence on other aspects
of their lives. A Florida company,
AccuData, aggressively markets a
product it calls a "penetration profile"
to grocers. 23 These profiles are
designed to augment the grocery
purchase data collected on customers
with a wealth of additional
information about them from outside
databases. 24 AccuData recommends
that supermarkets attach the profiles
to customer data files so they can
better analyze the "geodemographic,
psychographic and purchasing
characteristics" of their unsuspecting
customers.25
Data collected in this way not only
violates customers' expectation of
privacy, hut it is also subject to
internal security risks. The IT staff of
a typical supermarket has access to
all information contained in the
store's shopper card records. This
data is often held on insecure
computer systems where even low-
ranking employees have access. Here
it is subject to both human error and
employee corruption.
On the error front, stories abound
of sensitive personal data stored on
corporate computers being
accidentally revealed to the public.
One recent case involved
Travelocity.com inadvertently
posting the names, addresses, phone
numbers, and e-mail addresses of
45,000 customers on its website for a
period of several weeks before the
error was discovered. 26 On the
corruption front, it was recently
alleged that AOL employees have
been providing criminals with
subscribers' passwords and account
information to make fraudulent
purchases. 27 One hacker said, "AOL's
biggest security risk is corrupt
employees who will straight up give
away info for a price."28
There are also a number of
disquieting cases where Internet
companies reneged on their privacy
policies during hard times by
attempting to sell customer purchase
data to the highest bidder (e.g.,
Toys.com 29 and Voter.com 30 ).
Companies have also retroactively
eased privacy restrictions to allow
them to reveal previously collected
customer data (e.g., Amazon.coM,
31
e-Bay,32 and Yahoo 33).
These are only the publicly
reported cases. Larry Ponemon, a
privacy expert who has conducted
hundreds of corporate privacy audits
both for PricewaterhouseCoopers
and later as an independent privacy
consultant, 34 reports that only 19% of
financial businesses actually adhere
to their privacy policies. 35 The reality
is that whenever sensitive data is
collected there is always a risk that it
can be revealed in error, misused, or
abused - and privacy policies offer
little protection against these threats.
Personal injury and family law
Shopper cards have already begun
cropping up in personal injury and
family law cases. A California
shopper named Robert Rivera sued
Safeway-owned Vons supermarket
after slipping on a yogurt spill in the
store and fracturing his kneecap.36 A
mediator allegedly told Rivera's
attorney, M. Edward Franklin, that
Vons planned to introduce Rivera's
liquor purchase records at trial to
paint him as an alcoholic.
37 In
another case, a man's supermarket
card records indicating purchases of
expensive wine were used against
him in a divorce proceeding as
evidence that he could afford to pay
more alimony than he had claimed. 38
Other security risks
The keychain versions of
supermarket cards pose their own
security risk. Anyone finding a
shopper's keys has the potential to
gain access to the data linked to it.
Stop & Shop Supermarket in Boston
gave a customer's name, unlisted
home phone number, and residential
address to a complete stranger who
had found the customer's keys using
the shopper card number on the key
chain card.39 The potential for danger
is obvious if a criminal has the key to
a person's front door and knows
both his or her address and phone
number.
In late 2001, a radio producer in
Dallas obtained similar information
from Safeway-owned Tom Thumb
Supermarket. 40 She called Tom
Thumb's toll free customer service
line claiming to be a stranger who
had found a set of keys in the
parking lot (though they were
actually her own). The customer
service representative used the
customer number from the key chain
tag to quickly obtain her name and
home address, which he then freely
gave out to her (a supposed stranger)
over the phone.
4 1
Tom Thumb later apologized for
the incident, explaining that the
employee had made an error by
sharing the information.42 However,
the company's explanation simply
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underscores the point that no retailer
can guarantee human error will not
lead to disclosure of customers'
personal information.
Shopper card records and health
HMO's may soon have shopper
card data
Supermarket cards record more
than just purchases; they make a
record of the actual food people put
into their bodies. Because they
contain nutritional information for
tens of millions of Americans,
supermarket databases offer a
potential gold mine for anyone who
wants to monitor the eating habits of
individuals and groups of people.
One U.S. supermarket chain, Royal
Ahold-owned Stop & Shop, has
already poured $3 million into the
development of a very disturbing
software program called SmartMouth
to tap this potential. 43 SmartMouth
can sift through the millions of
supermarket card records Stop &
Shop has collected on shoppers over
the past eight years to create
nutritional profiles on each
individual cardholder. 44 If a customer
has been overindulging in sugar and
fat or ignoring a doctor's warning to
cut back on sodium, the supermarket
- or anyone else with access to the
database - can find out with just a
few mouse clicks.
While Stop & Shop has temporarily
shelved the program, its future plans
for SmartMouth are perhaps the most
alarming I have yet encountered with
regard to shopper cards: Stop & Shop
executive Curt Avallone recently
made the shocking admission that his
company is considering "an HMO
alliance" with "three or four health
organizations" to make use of the
SmartMouth program and Stop &
Shop customer records.
4 5
The staggering potential to form
longitudinal nutritional profiles on
their subscribers is not lost on health
insurance companies, who could use
the information to deny coverage, set
rates, or use a person's lifetime eating
habits to deny medical procedures
such as heart bypass operations and
dialysis. HMO subscribers' medical
records and their food purchase
records could become so intertwined
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that eating habits could ultimately
become part of a patient's standard
medical chart.
Stop & Shop is not the only
company that has expressed an
interest in linking card data to health
records. Boots, a major British
pharmacy retailer, offers medical and
dental insurance plans linked to its
"Advantage Card, ',46 which can also
serve as a chip-based credit card.
47
Boots even encourages shoppers to
donate their organs through a check
box at the bottom of the card
application, explaining on their
website that "joining through Boots
provides you with a combined
Advantage Card and Organ Donor
scheme card in one plus the peace of
mind that your donor details are
safely stored on the NHS [National
Health Service] Organ Donor
Register. "48
Boots hopes to someday link its
frequent shopper card with
customers' medical records, health
insurance, and social security
information, 49 and the "smart card"
industry here in the U.S. is clamoring
for the same thing.
50
The use of shopper card records to
track health problems could be of
interest to some members of the legal
community, who have begun
contemplating class-action suits
against snack food companies.
51
Both attorneys and food
manufacturers may soon develop a
keen interest in who bought what,
when, and in what quantities, along
with individuals' health records to
either instigate or fend off lawsuits.
If shopper card records are
allowed to evolve into de facto
health records, they will become an
obvious target for government
agencies wishing to claim their own
piece of the information pie. Already,
a chip-based "Health Passport card"
(which uses a microchip to store and
retrieve health information and
"redeem nutrition benefits") has been
issued to welfare recipients in three
U.S. cities. 52 Disturbingly, the card,
which is required to purchase
groceries under the Women, Infants
and Children (WIC) program, links
food purchase information with
medical assessments, health records,
and immunization records, thus
allowing WIC officials to closely
scrutinize the nutritional makeup of a
family's weekly shopping.
53
Observers in Wyoming, one of the
program's test locations, say that
eventually the Health Passport
program could be expanded to
include all citizens in the state, not
just those receiving public
assistance. 54
Government health organizations
want access to shopper card
records
Anything recorded is sub/ect to
control.
- Katherine Albrecht, CASPIAN
55
"Public health" has already been
used as justification for three British
supermarket chains to violate their
privacy policies by offering card
records to the government. With very
little prompting, these chains agreed
to release shoppers' purchase
records to health officials to track the
consumption and health effects of
genetically modified (GMO) foods.
56
The study, which was fortunately
cancelled, had planned to link store
records and health databases seeking
links between GMO food purchases
and a variety of health problems,
apparently without obtaining the
permission of the shoppers
concerned.'57
Scottish health officials would like
access to shopper card records to
facilitate "the monitoring and
evaluation of the variouSinitiatives to
promote improved [Scottish] diet." 
58
Calling such data "invaluable," their
report says that they plan to "consult
the major supermarkets to explore
the feasibility of accessing this data
and to examine with them the scope
for other uses to which loyalty card
data might be put.
59
Most worrisome of all, the World
Health Organization (WHO) recently
stated that one of its major objectives
is to "maintain global databases for
monitoring, evaluating, and reporting
on the world's major forms of
malnutrition, the effectiveness of
nutrition programmes, and progress
towards achieving targets at national,
regional and global levels."6° The
global database would be a
component of the WHO's larger plan
to "prevent, reduce and eliminate
malnutrition worldwide, ' 61 implying
that the WHO envisions a more
active role for itself in the global food
arena than the mere collection and
analysis of data. will the United
Nations someday demand shopper
card records from around the world
to form the basis of the WHO's
"global database"?
Regardless of the good intentions
of health officials, it is imperative that
citizens keep grocery records out of
government hands. Allowing
governmental bodies to monitor and
evaluate citizens' purchase and
consumption of food could lead to
various forms of control over the
food supply - one area of life where
politics should play no role.




The same software used by grocery
marketers to analyze purchase
records and predict future behavior is
also being used by accountants at the
Department of Defense (DOD) to
keep tabs on 40,000 DOD
employees. 62 When an employee
uses his or her "government
purchase card" the transaction is
analyzed against the employee's
personal information and previous
purchase history.63 Then the
purchase is compared with profiles
of "data patterns that might indicate
improper use. "64
The problem is that the program
doesn't always work. Officials admit
it needs "some fine tuning" after
observing its unsettling tendency to
make false accusations. 65 Over a
recent three-month test period, the
software caused 345 individuals to be
put under investigation for making
"suspicious purchases," many of
which later turned out to be
legitimate.66 Unfortunately, worries
over falsely accusing the innocent
have done little to dampen the
agency's enthusiasm for the data-
mining program; the DOD plans to
expand its use in coming years.
6 -
The DOD will have plenty of
company. The IRS may soon "feed
data from every entry on every tax
return, personal or corporate,
through filters to identify patterns of
taxpayer conduct."6 s The agency
hopes to compile and store detailed
information in taxpayer databases
that can be sifted through in search
of irregularities. 69 Given the insight
into household income that eating
habits provide, the IRS might find
grocery records a tempting target for
inclusion in the database. British
revenue authorities have already
demanded customer purchase
records from supermarkets in the
U.K. to investigate whether shoppers'
spending habits match the lifestyles
indicated by their tax returns.
7 °
Of course, no one scans a grocery
card with the expectation that their
data will wind up in the hands of the
IRS. Nevertheless, data given to
retailers for one purpose has a
disquieting tendency to wind up in
someone else's hands. Selective
Service once came under fire for
using a list of children's addresses
and birthdays from Fanell's ice cream
parlors to mail out reminders about
Selective Service registration.
7 1
Farrell's had originally collected the
information to offer free ice cream
cones on kids' birthdays.
72
Profiling by law enforcement
Law enforcement agencies are
already making use of shopper card
records. DEA agents obtained the
supermarket card records of
individuals in Arizona to check for
large purchases of plastic bags
(presumably for packaging drugs).
73
In theory, shopper card records
could be used to trigger this type of
investigation whenever any purchase
fits a "suspicious profile." Soccer
moms getting ready for a bake sale
could someday find themselves face-
to-face with federal authorities asking
them to justify their Ziploc purchases.
While the notion of federal
authorities rifling through customer
databases in search of irregularities
may seem unbelievable, former
president Bill Clinton has suggested
that they do just that. Referring to
"suspicious behavior," Clinton was
recently quoted as saying, "More
than 95% of the people that are in the
United States at any given time are in
the computers of companies that
mail junk mail and you can look for
patterns there. "74
If the Police Federation of England
and Wales has its way, it will soon be
routine for U.K. law enforcement
officials to review grocery records in
search of "unusual" or "suspicious"
behavior. The Federation has called
for the more than 300 separate
database records that exist on U.K.
citizens - ranging from their
supermarket purchase records to
their driver's license information-
to be merged into one super-
database for easy access by law
enforcement.
75
Once the data is thus linked, they
have asked for "artificial intelligence
systems to watch and listen,"76
around the clock to every activity
recorded in the database. If
implemented, powerful software
programs would analyze records
representing virtually every aspect of
individuals' lives in painstaking
detail. Of course, these systems will
rely on profiling to distinguish
between "normal" and "suspicious"
behavior.
The specter of ethnic profiling
looms especially large when it comes
to eating patterns, which can reveal
information about a shopper's origin,
life experiences, and current
economic status.77 In the wake of the
September 11 th terrorist attacks,
federal agents reviewed the shopper
card records of the men involved to
create a profile of ethnic tastes and
supermarket shopping patterns
associated with terrorism.78 It's hard
to see how this information could
improve national security, however,
considering that the eating habits of
Middle Eastern terrorists are probably
quite similar to those of Middle
Eastern schoolteachers and factory
workers.
Unfortunately, supermarkets are
making little effort to shield their
customers from law enforcement
fishing expeditions through their
databanks; in fact quite the reverse is
true. A national supermarket chain
recently approached privacy
consultant Larry Ponemon for
recommendations on how to advise
shoppers that it had violated the
privacy policy associated with its
continued onpage 558
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The Right to Privacy
of Medical Records
Balancing Competing Expectations
by Joel Glover, Esq. & Erin Toll, Esq.
Introduction
Today, the right to privacy of medical iecords is seldom
contested. A recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court recognized our "reasonable expectation" that medical
records are private. Courts permit tort claims fo- invasion
of privacy where medical record information is disclosed. Tn
addition, new federal regulations promulgated under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("I IPAA") are being implemented on the presumption that
medical records are private and entitled to protection-
This article examines the development of that right to
privacy and the related balancing of expectations in the
federal courts and the Colorado courts. Even where privacy
rights have been recognized, those rights often fail in the
balancing test when compared to society's legitimate
interest in monitoring health care information. Finally, this
article addresses the information that the HIPAA regulations
consider to be private and subject to protection.
3
The law recognizes our two competing expectations
regarding medical records7 privacy. First, we each expect
our medical records to be private and confidential. Second,
wc understand that privacy will be regularly invaded as a
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part of the health care system to support national
priorities such as the protection of public health, health
care research, health care quality monitoring, and the
prevention of crime, including health care fraud.
These competing expectations are reflected in the
balancing tests established in the federal and state cases
and more recently, in the IIIPAA regulations. First,
medical records are private, consistent with our
expectations. Second, our privacy expectation will be
invaded as necessary to satisfy society's needs to utilize
health care information of the population to promote the
public welfare. While HIPAA, at least in part, appears to
be based on an attempt to codify case law, even after the
HIPAA regulations, a precise understanding of that
balancing test can be elusive. As is evident from the case
law, it often comes down to a case-by-case approach with
the balance typically favoring a limited invasion of our
privacy expectations when societal interests outweigh
our privacy needs.
I. Development of the right to privacy in
medical records.
A. 7he Whalen 4 decision - an arguable right toprivacvy
Over the last thirty years, the federal courts have
uniformly accepted the principal that medical records are
private and entitled to protection. The existence of a right
to privacy in medical records can be traced to the United
States Supreme Court's
decision in Whalen v. Roe.5
In some ways, the Whalen
decision is an unusual
authority to serve as the basis
for such an important privacy
right. In answering the
question before it, the Court
ruled that there was no
constitutional violation and
expressly did not decide
whether there was a right to
privacy in medical records.
6
Nevertheless, it is repeatedly
cited as precedent for that
right.
The Whalen Court was
presented with the question
"whether the State of New
York may record, in a
centralized computer file, the
names and addresses of all
persons who have obtained,
pursuant to a doctor's
prescription, certain drugs
for which there is both a lawful
and an unlawful market.'7 The Court, in an opinion
drafted by Justice Stevens, answered the question
affirmatively and held that, "neitier the immediate nor
the threatened impact of the patient-identification
requirements in the New York State Controlled
Substances Act of 1972 on either the reputation or the
independence of patients for whom Schedule II drgs arc
medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion
of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."' However, in rejecting a constitutional
violation, the Court created the framework by which
future courts would develop the right to privacy in
medical records.
In deciding that there was no privacy violation, the
Court discussed two different types of individual privacy
interests: (1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters; and (2) the interest in independence in
making certain important kinds of decisions. 9 The
program did not pose a sufficiently grievous threat to
either interest.( The Court concluded that any privacy
invasions would not be meaningfully distinguishable
"from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that
are associated with many facets of health care."I
Nevertheless, disclosures of private medical
information to doctors, to hospital personnel,
to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern
medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the
patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having
responsibility for the health of the community,
does not automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy. 2
In essence, the Court balanced the two individual
interests against the societal need to protect the public's
health and to deter criminal activity. Although Wbalen
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held that the mandatory disclosure of
prescriptions and patient identities
was not a violation of privacy, the
Court also explained that "[tlhe right
to collect and use such data for
public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures."' 3 The
Court then concluded that "in some
circumstances that duty arguably has
its roots in the Constitution." 
4
Although clearly identified as an
issue "not decided" by the Court,
subsequent cases nevertheless relied
on Whalen's reasoning to develop
what has become a generally
accepted right to privacy in medical
records,
Shortly after Whalen, two district
courts implicitly adopted Justice
Stevens' analysis that the right to
privacy in medical records arguably
has its roots in the Constitution,
although in both cases the right to
privacy did not prohibit disclosure.
In one of the first district court
decisions to rely on Whalen, an
employer, du Pont, raised the right to
privacy argument as a defense to a
subpoena seeking employee health
department to undergo psychological
testing. Even in the absence of public
disclosure of the results, the district
court determined that the "character
and amount of information given to
the Government alone is itself an
intrusion on the privacy interest in
nondisclosure of personal
information to government
employees recognized in Whalen."2
1
As a result, the court required Jersey
City to "justify the burden imposed
on the constitutional right of privacy
by the required psychological
evaluations." 22 After confirming a
right to privacy, the court determined
that there was "sufficient support to
conclude that the psychological
evaluation and hiring procedure
taken as a whole [was] useful and
effective in identifying applicants
whose emotional make-up makes
them high risk candidates for the job
of fire fighting." 23 As in Whalen, the
court balanced the individual's
privacy interests against society's
interest in having a psychologically
sound fire department.
B. The Third Circuit accepts the right
to privacy in medical records.
A federal appellate court soon
There can be no question that
an employee's medical records,
which may contain intimate
facts of a personal nature, are
well within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy
protection. Information about
one's body and state of health
is a matter which the individual
is ordinarily entitled to retain
within the "private enclave
where he may lead a private
life.'25
As is evident from the quotation,
Weslinghouse was one of the first
cases to accept explicitly Justice
Stevens' "argument" that medical
records may be subject to
constitutional protection. While the
court noted "there can be no
question" of this right, there was also
no previous judicial authority that
could be cited for that proposition.
26
In the absence of judicial decisions
for authority, the Third Circuit relied
on a law review article and
protections for medical records in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Freedom of Information Act.
27
Seven years later, relying on its own
Westinghouse decision, the Third
th.iticutCuto peal concude that,
untorl0uauulo. I lie eipIoyer
argued that the medical records
of its employees were protected
by a constitutional right of
privacy and thus could not be
disclosed.' 6 Relying on Whalen, the
district court inplicitly accepted that
a right to privacy in medical records
existed.' 7 Accordingly, the issue was
"not whether a right of privacy exists
respecting the information sought,
but rather whether the record
indicates that such right will be
abridged."' 8 Although the court
upheld the subpoenas over the right
to privacy claim, the court echoed
Justice Stevens' concern in Whalen
that unwarranted disclosure of the
medical records could violate the
Constitution. 19
Just a year later, in McKenna v.
Fargo,20 a district court considered a
program in which Jersey City
required applicants for its fire





identifying a right to ' '
privacy in medical
records though typically finding in
favor of the invasion of that right. In
one of the first decisions by a circuit
court of appeals upholding a right to
privacy in medical records, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the
Whalen decision to conclude that
there is a protected privacy right "not
to have an individual's private affairs
made public by the government."
24
The Third Circuit concluded that
medical records fall within one of the
zones of privacy entitled to protection:
Circuit again recognized the right to
N privacy in medical records.28 In
1995, the Third Circuit relied on
/the Westinghouse declsion to
conclude that records of
prescription medications are
private.2 9 "An individual using
prescription drigs has a right to
expect that such information will
customarily remain private. "30
C. A division among the circuits on
the right loprivacy in
medical records.
Although the Third Circuit adopted
Justice Stevens' argument, the Sixth
Circuit did not follow suit. Without
citation to Westinghouse or Whalen,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that, "[disclosure of
plaintiff s medical records does not
rise to the level of a breach of a right
recognized as 'fundamental' under
the Constitution."
31
This difference of opinion among
the circuits was brought to the United
States Supreme Court's attention by a
decision of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,32 the Fourth Circuit
expressly noted the division among
the circuits, as follows:
Although the Supreme Court
addressed a claim to a right of
privacy in medical records in
Whalen, it declined to decide
whether such information
merits constitutional privacy
protection. See Whalen, 429
UI.S. at 605-06. And, the
circuit courts of appeals are
divided on this issue.
33
Although the Uinited States
Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Ferguson, the Court did
not address the division of authority
noted among the circuits, Instead, it
acknowledged an "expectation of
privacy" in medical records, as
follows, "[t]he reasonable expectation
of privacy enjoyed by the typical
patient undergoing diagnostic tests in
a hospital is that the results of those
tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her
consent. "34 The Court did not
indicate whether this expectation of
privacy was protected by the
Constitution, as had been "argued"
by Stevens in Whalen.
D. No right toprivacy in making
medical decisions.
The Westinghouse line of authority
and the Ferguson decision focus on
the first type of privacy identified in
Whalen, that is avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. 35 The second type
of privacy identified in Whalen is
independence in making certain
important kinds of decisions. 6 it has
not received much, if any, support
from the courts. For example, in New
York State Ophtbalmological Society
v. Bowen,37 the court determined that
there was no right to privacy in
medical deterninations. 38 The
plaintiffs were seeking to challenge a
federal statute limiting Medicare
payments for certain cataract
services. 39 Plaintiffs maintained "that
the right to privacy protects patients'
interest in procuring the treatment of
choice" and insisted that "all medical
treatment decisions are protected
from state interference because they
are inherently private and peculiarly
'personal.'"4° The court concluded
that "[tihere is no basis ulnder current
privacy case law for extending such
stringent protection to every decision
bearing, however indirectly, on a
person's health and physical well-
being."4'
II. Application of a balancing test
to privacy rights in medical
records.
Even in the cases where medical
records were considered within a
zone of privacy, that privacy was
nearly always invaded after
application of a balancing test to
determine whether the "societal
interest in disclosure outweighs the
privacy interest on the specific facts
of the case." 4 According to the Third
Circuit, the factors to be considered
in deciding whether an intrusion into
an individual's privacy is justified are:
[The type of record
requested, the information it
does or might contain, the
potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, the injury from
disclosure to the relationship
in which the record was
generated, the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, the
degree of need for access,
and whether there is an
express statutory mandate,





In lVeaslinghoue, the court balanced
the factors and conclided that
complete employee medical records
needed to be turned over to the
government in response to a
subpoena issued Linder the
Occupational Safety and Health
Act.
44 The court found that "the
interest in occupational safety and
health to the employees in the
particular plant, employees in other
plants, future employees and the
public at large is substantial.45 The
court also relied on the security
measures that would be taken to
protect against the disclosure of the
informration.46 Recognizing that there
may still be privacy concerns, the
Court permitted employees the
opportunity to raise a personal claim
of privacy.
4 7
The Third Circuit has repeatedly
utilized these Westinghouse factors to
conclude that the balance favors
invasion of the privacy right in
medical records. For example, in In
re: Search Warrant, 48 the Third
Circuit concluded the balance
favored disclosure of medical records
where the patients were already
known through insurance
submissions and separate
mechanisms existed to guard against
disclosure and to maintain the
confidentiality of the records. 49 As
well, in Fraternal Order of Police v.
Philadelphia,[0 the Third Circuit
again concluded that the balance





directly related to the interest
of the police department in
selecting officers who are
physically and mentally
capable of working in
dangerous and highly
stressful positions,
sometimes over long periods
of time, and because police
officers have little reasonable
expectations that such
medical information will not
be requested, we hold that
questions 18 [physical
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defects], 19 [prescription
drugs] and 20 [mental or
psychiatric condition] do not
unconstitutionally impinge
upon the applicants' privacy
interests,
52
Finally, in SEPTA, the court
concluded that the right to privacy in
medical records was not absolute.
53
In that case, an employer learned that
one employee suffered from an HIV-
related illness when the employer
reviewed medical records that gave
each employee's name and listed the
prescription drugs each employee
purchased through a prescription
drug program. 54 In its review, the
court concluded that audits of drug
information, in the aggregate, are
essential to the public interest 55 The
review of the identity of the
employee and his medication was
not a violation of the employee's
privacy largely because it was
unintentional. 56 The employer did
not ask for the employee's identity
from the drug company.57
In concluding that the balance
favors disclosure, other courts have
relied on the purpose of the
disclosure in order to override the
privacy rights. For example, in 1985,
the District Court for New Jersey
concluded that the privacy interests
in medical records were not absolute
and needed to be balanced against
the legitimate interests of the state in
securing such information.
58 In
Shoemaker, jockeys were required to
disclose illnesses or conditions for
which a particular drug had been
prescribed or used. 59 However
access to the information was
limited.60 In concluding that the
balance favored the interests of the
state, the court focused on the
purpose, noting that "[s]uch
information is gathered with
'rehabilitative' and not 'penal'
purposes in mind.' 61 Another
example is Patients of Dr. Barbara
Solomon v. Board of Physician
Quality Assurance.62 There, the court
acknowledged a privacy interest in
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medical records but found in favor of
the government's interest in
reviewing that information. 63 In that
case, patients were attempting to
keep a regulatory body from
reviewing the medical records
maintained by their doctor.64 The
court focused on the purpose of the
information and the safeguards, as
follows:
Given the Board's mission of
identifying physicians who
engage in immoral or
unprofessional conduct, and
the Board's goal of
preventing future
misconduct, courts in this
Circuit would most likely
find that the Board's activity





records are adequate to
protect the Patients from
widespread disclosure,
courts in this Circuit would
most likely find no
constitutional violation 65
In In Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum,
66
the court considered challenges to
four subpoenas issued arising from
an investigation into federal health
care offenses.67 The doctor argued
that his patients' privacy interests in
their medical files outweigh the
government's interest in those files.
68
The court rejected the argument
because the government has a
compelling interest in identifying
illegal activity and in deterring future
misconduct.69 That interest
outweighs the privacy rights of those
whose records were turned over to
the government, particularly in light
of the protections associated with the
subpoena. 71 The subpoena
prohibited use of disclosed
information except as directly related
to receipt of health care, payment for
health care, a fraudulent claim
related to health care or as
authorized by a court.
7i
III. The right to privacy in
medical records in Colorado.
Various states, including Colorado,
have adopted an approach to privacy
based on the federal courts'
approach. More than twenty years
ago, in a case not specifically related
to medical records, the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted the Whalen
privacy analysis, and performed a
balancing test to invalidate a state
agency's regulation. 72 Several life
insurance agents brought suit to
enjoin the Colorado Division of
Insurance's enforcement of a
regulation requiring them to notify a
life insurer whose insurance was
being replaced of the proposed
replacement, even when the insured
specifically requested that the
transaction remain confidential.
73
Acknowledging that the United
States Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right to privacy, the
Colorado court, citing several United
States Supreme Court cases, found
that the right to privacy is implicit in
various Constitutional amendments,
including the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Bill of Rights.74 The Colorado
court adopted the Whalen definition
of two types of privacy interests: "1)
the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters; and 2)
the individual interest in making
certain kinds of important
decisions."75 The court found that the
insurance regulation clearly invaded
the insured's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.76 The
Colorado court enjoined
enforcement of the regulation but
noted that "a burdensome regulation
may be validated by a sufficiently
compelling state interest."77 "A
generalized concern for protecting
the public from unscrupulous
practices or misrepresentations by
replacing insurers is outweighed by
the insured's request for
nondisclosure. 78
Seven years later, without
discussion of the constitutional
aspects of the right, the Colorado
Supreme Court implicitly recognized
a right to privacy regarding medical
information. 7 9 Respondents were
recipients of donated blood infected
with the AIDS virus.80 They sought
disclosure of the identities of each of
the donors whose blood was used
and production of all of the donors'
records in order to pursue their
claims. 81 The blood center asserted
that compelling public policy
grounds, including the maintenance
of the supply of volunteer blood and
the privacy interests of volunteer
blood donors, prohibited disclosure
of the donors' identities.
82
The court performed a balancing
test and determined that the blood
donors had a "privacy interest in
remaining anonymous and avoiding
the embarrassment and potential
humiliation of being identified as
AIDS carriers. " 83 The blood center,
and society as a whole, had "an
interest in maintaining the availability
of an abundant supply of volunteer
blood. "84 The petitioners had an
interest in pursuing their claims.
8 5
Therefore, the court tailored a limited
discovery procedure designed to
provide the respondents with tie
information without risking the
consequences of public disclosure of
the donors' identities or infringing
upon society's interests in a safe,
adequate, voluntary blood supply.
86
While no constitutional authority was
cited, the Belle Bonfils case indicated
that Colorado courts would
recognize a right to privacy
concerning medical information, but
that this right must be balanced by
the societal interest in disclosing the
information.
Although the Colorado courts have
not explicitly applied the Wbalen
analysis to medical information,
when considering privacy interests,
the courts recognize a right to
privacy regarding medical
information, and balance the
individual's privacy interests with
society's interest in obtaining the
information. 87 As with the federal
cases, the emphasis in Colorado has
been on the first interest expressed in
Whalen, that of avoiding disclosure
of personal matters, as opposed to
the second interest of independence
in making certain kinds of decisions.
IV. Privacy rights in medical
records give rise to a tort
claim for invasion of privacy.
The Whalen and Westinghouse
decisions address medical records'
right of privacy in the context of
government actions. However, courts
have also recognized that the private
sector may be liable for claims for
violating privacy with respect to
medical records. 88 Even in cases
where there was no liability, a court
would not rule out the possibility that
instances may exist where the
collection of highly personal
information irrelevant to any
legitimate business purpose might
constitute an invasion of privacy by
unreasonable intrusion.8 9
The state law claim of invasion of
privacy generally requires the
plaintiff to establish: "1) an intrusion
upon her seclusion or solitude or in
her private affairs; 2) a public
disclosure of embarrassing private
facts; 3) publicity which places her in
a false light in the public eye; or 4) an
appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness."90 While medical records
often trigger privacy interests, the
communications may be considered
privileged where the following
elements are satisfied: "1) good faith;
2) an interest to be upheld; 3) a
statement limited in its scope to this
purpose; 4) a proper occasion; and 5)
publication in a proper manner and
to proper parties only."9 1
In Ross, an employee had
complaints about working under
fluorescent lights. 92 The employer
required her to see the agency's
doctor, a psychologist. 93 The
employee authorized the doctor to
forward a copy of the psychological
evaluation to one individual, who
then distributed the report to three
others at the office. 94 Because there
was a reasonable belief that the other
individuals needed to review the
report, the court ruled that the
employer was not liable, even
though the situation could "have
been handled in a more sensitive
way."
95
Other cases have resulted in the
employer's liability for invasion of
privacy. For example, in Levias, the
medical examiner for an employer
(United Airlines) received a report
from a flight attendant containing
details of contemplated
gynecological surgery.9 6 The medical
examiner disclosed most of that
information to the flight attendant's
male flight supervisor, who had no
compelling reason to know it, and to
the employee's husband.9 7 The flight
supervisor repeatedly contacted her
to discuss the details of her medical
condition and its effect on her
employment. 98 The flight attendant
had not authorized the medical
examiner to disclose any of that
information, and she considered it
highly personal. 99 The court upheld a
damages claim (for compensatory
damages but not punitive damages)
for the flight attendant, concluding
that it was "doubtful that either the
flight attendant's supervisors or her
husband had a real need to know the
disclosed data." 10
As another example, in Colorado,
in a case of first impression, the
Colorado Supreme Court recognized
a tort claim for invasion of privacy "in
the nature of unreasonable publicity
given to one's private life," in the
context of medical information.IrI
The court determined that disclosure
of "disgraceful illnesses" are
considered private in nature and
disclosure of such facts constitutes an
invasion of the individual's right of
privacy.
102
Though admittedly based on a
different test, the court's recognition
of a tort claim for invasion of privacy
based on medical records generally
appears to track the approach set
forth in Whalen and Westinghouse.
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M il - of Americans remember
.111 .. scertain events of July
1969 as milestones in the national
consciousness. On July 20 of that year, Neil
Armstrong walked on the moon. One week
later, on the streets of Greenwich Village, a
typical police raid of a gay bar called the
Stonewall Inn sparked an atypical response
among the crowd of people who normally
would have dispersed quietly after the
police arrived.
For three days, crowds rioted
through the streets of the Village,
spawning a movement which has
affected the daily lives of millions of
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender Americans. Whether
the movement is labeled "Gay
Liberation," "Gay Rights," or "Queer
Activism," the momentum
unleashed that hot Ju]y weekend
has transformed the landscape of
American society, politics, sciences,
academia, and theology, and
challenged the historical
relationship of gay people to the
law -especially sodomy laws.
No other group of people has had
their private, consensual sexual
behavior attacked and scrutinized
as much as the gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgender
population. For this population,
privacy concerns are of utmost
importance, because what happens
in the bedrooms of this group of
citizens has been held up for public
scrutiny and condemnation. This
scrutiny of private behavior
happens legally through the use of
sodomy laws. Thus, for this
community to be afforded the
privacy rights that the rest of the
American population enjoys in their
bedrooms, sodomy laws must be
first understood, and then finally
abolished.
In the years since the events at
the Stonewall Inn, public support
for sodomy laws has waned as
people become less- tolerant in
general of state regulation of adult,
consensual sexual behavior.
Specifically, social attitudes have
moved toward the position that
sexual activity between competent,
mutually consenting adults should
not be the subject of state
interference. The bedrooms of
gays and straights have become a
private realm.
In the evolutionary lineage of
laws touching the rights and
behaviors of gays, sodomy laws
form the starting point. The first
American lawmakers imported
them into the colonial codes,i
adopting the prohibition against
sodomy rooted in the British
common law.2 Sodomy laws were
not invented to regulate
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homosexual sex, though people
associate sodomy with homosexual
sex and homosexuals with
sodomites. There are two reasons for
this disjunction between origins and
common perception. The first is
historical. Not until the nineteenth
century did homosexuality come to
be seen as a condition or identity of a
person.3 The law did not categorize
people as homosexual and did not
apply laws to gays as a class.
However, as society came to
recognize gays as an identifiable
group, sodomitical acts became more
and more identified with
homosexuals. The second reason is
analytical. Though not applying by
definition to acts of a class of people,
laws prohibiting sodomy do apply to
classes of acts 4 Therefore, sodomy
laws do not analytically relate to any
one group.
5
The legal definition of sodomy
often confused courts well into the
twentieth century. By 1940, courts
applied sodomy statutes "to nearly all
sexual activities other than
procreative activities between
husbands and wives., 6 From the
beginning of the nineteenth century
to that time, however, confusion
about the definition of sodomy
caused courts to struggle with how
and when to apply sodomy laws.
At common law, copulation by a
man with an animal or another male,
adult or child, was clearly a
sodomitical act. Under common law,
however, some jurisdictions required
prosecutors to prove that emission of
semen had taken place.7 Appellate
courts sometimes reversed trial court
decisions for lack of evidence of
either seminal emission or penile
penetration.8 Prosecutors responded
by urging courts to expand the
definition of sodomy. They were not
always successful. In some
jurisdictions, courts overturned
convictions on appeal after finding
that fellatio was not an offense at
common law or that statutes
adopting the common law did not
encompass the act of fellatio.9 They
sometimes appealed to legislatures to
define the offense more clearly.10
Confusion about the nature of the
crime was sometimes compounded
by Victorian modesty about things
sexual. Appellate courts reluctantly
dismissed or remanded some cases in
which the criminal information failed
to set forth facts describing in
sufficient detail the circumstances of
the crime'1 (in other cases, though,
appeals court opinions contain
graphic descriptions of the
offense). 12 For the sake of propriety,
some courts did not require a full
description of the act charged in the
bill of information. i3
Some legislatures and courts
expanded the scope of sodomy
beyond its traditional common law
definition. For instance, some courts
rulecl that anal intercourse by a man
with a woman fell within the
category of sodomy. 14 In some
jurisdictions, a man or a woman who
received in the act of fellatio could be
found guilty of sodomy.'5 Attempted
sodomy came to be a recognizable
offense. 16 Late into the twentieth
century, courts and theorists found
that sodomy between two women
was a legal impossibility. 7 As the
definition of sodomy became
broader over time, the law extended
to acts by a male with another male,
a female, or an animal. The common,
requisite element for a conviction for
sodomy, through the first half of this
century, was genital sexual activity
by a male. Without male sexual
misbehavior, no act of sodomy could
be performed. Sodomy laws,
therefore, have been directed
primarily at regulating male sexual
behavior. They generally regulate
female sexual behavior only insofar
as it relates to male behavior.
Because sodomy has been associated
in the public mind with
homosexuality, and because sodomy
laws relate primarily -
to male sexual behavior, criminal
sodomy is associated primarily with
male homosexuality.
Despite this popular association,
however, the historical application of
sodomy laws to consensual gay male
sex appears to be far less than to
other situations regulated by sodomy
laws. A survey of 148 appeals court
decisions in sodomy cases from 1883
through 1944 reveals few cases
involving consensual, adult male-to-
male sexual activity.18 Sodomy
involving animals accounts for 9.5%
(14) of the cases. The same
percentage involves "girls,"
presumably females under the age of
18. Cases involving adult females
account for 8.8% (13). In 20% (30) of
the cases, the sex and age of the
other party is not identified in the
court's opinion. Sex with males age
18 and under occurred in 30% (43) of
the cases. Of those, six cases (4% of
the total) involve boys age seven or
younger. (The youngest identified
was three years of age). Sodomy with
adult men accounts for 22% (33) of
the total number of cases,
The fact that so many of the cases
involve non-consensual sex acts is a
function of the nature of the acts
themselves. Unless a third party
witnesses an act of sodomy and
reports it, the crime will unlikely be
discovered unless one of the actors
reports it to authorities or tells
another about it. Unlike rape or child
sexual abuse, where there is always a
perpetrator and a victim, in sodomy
cases it is not always correct to refer
to the actors as perpetrator and
victim. They may be consenting
adults. In a minority of the historical
cases surveyed, third parties
(sometime law enforcement officers)
who happened to be at the right
place at the right time observed the
acts. In almost all cases involving
animals, the actor was seen by
neighbors performing the act
which the
common law or that statutes
elimination of the nation's way to le g ally invade the privacy of the bedrooms...
neighbors either reported to
authorities or about which they
circulated stories which led
authorities to an arrest. In a few
cases, especially involving female
prostitutes, charges were brought
after the women testified regarding
the nature of the sex acts they had
had with a customer. However, in
most of the cases surveyed, a male
perpetrated an unwanted sexual act
on a victim.
These cases illustrate the fact that
sodomy laws are rarely enforced in
cases of consensual, adult same-sex
male sexual activity. They also
illustrate, by comparison to appellate
decisions of recent years, the
contemporary strategy of attacking
the validity of sodomy laws on the
ground that they violate
constitutionally protected rights to
privacy. 'these privacy-based attacks
have achieved mixed success. In
1986, the United States Supreme
Court found that the Constitution
contains no privacy right protecting
same-sex sexual activity because
such activity has no connection to
family, marriage or procreation. 19
Since the Court handed down that
decision, several state courts have
found that their states' constitutions
offer greater privacy protections than
does the federal Constitution and
declared their states' sodomy laws
unconstitutional. 20 Not all states'
constitutions are so generous, and
not all state privacy-rights cases have
succeeded.2
One wonders, though, whether the
attack is worth the effort. After all,
prosecution for sodomy is not
regularly used against homosexuals,
and sodomy is not analytically
identifiable only with homosexuality.
So why does the popular mind
associate sodomy laws so closely
with homosexuality, and why do
gays adamantly support attempts to
repeal the sodomy laws still on the
books?
22
The answer to these questions
rests, at least in part, on the role the
very existence of sodomy laws plays
in the shaping of gay identity and
defining the place of gay people in
American society. Janet Halley argues
that sodomy laws serve to
subordinate gay identity and
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superordinate heterosexual
identity. 23 The laws, she contends,
lead to an identification of
homosexuality with sodomy and
confirms the subordination of gay
people. 24 Others suggest that
unenforced sodormy laws "create a
criminal class," brand "gay men and
lesbians as criminals," create a "social
hierarchy" that inflicts emotional
harm on gay people, and legitimize
anti-gay violence 25
Richard Posner observes that the
main contemporary significance of
laws against homosexual sodomy is
to make a statement of opposition to
homosexuality.26 He subscribes to
the proposition that sodomy laws in
fact apply only to homosexual
sodomy, and that they would be
unconstitutional if applied to
heterosexual sodomy 27 Posner
devotes a chapter in his book "SEX
AND REASON" to the analysis of
social policy toward gay people from
the point of view of law and
economics theory. He places sodomy
laws in context with other laws
which establish anti gay policy, such
as those forbidding same-sex
marriage and limiting career
opportunities for gays in the military,
government service, and education
28
From the point of view of law and
economics theory, Posner criticizes
laws, including sodomy laws, which
subordinate gays in society.2 9 He
questions why society has an interest
in subordinating gays.3 0 He subjects
anti-gay policy to an economic cost-
benefit analysis.
3
Law and economics theory
assumes that a person acts rationally
to choose economically beneficial
modes of action: that people make
choices to act in their best interest,
and that self-interest is identifiable
with economic benefit. IRational
man goes where the balance of costs
and benefits inclines. 32 Laws
promote or hinder the aggregate
benefit to society by encouraging or
discouraging people from making
certain choices rather than others. If a
person has no ability to make a
rational choice, then that person has
no ability to choose an economically
efficient form of action, and law,
therefore, is ineffective to influence
that person's action. The issue of
choice in being gay is central,
therefore, to a law and economics
analysis of the efficiency of laws
subordinating gay people.
The question of whether people
choose to be homosexual has formined
the core of debate over the morality
of homosexuality. If being gay is a
pure moral choice and society places
a value on restraining that choice,
then sodomy laws may be analyzed
in terms of their efficiency as a
counter-incentive to make the choice
to be gay. Religious and social
conservatives, for example, tend to
view homosexuality as a choice,
lifestyle, or preference. Their premise
is that homosexuality is a social evil,
that it is a choice, and therefore, that
it can be effectively discouraged
through legal disincentives.
Being gay, however, is not a
choice. Rather, it is a pre-moral
condition (such as conservatives
generally believe heterosexuality to
be). Legitimate scientific research
recognizes that people do not choose
their sexuality and science has
discarded theories that
homosexuality is a disease that can
be treated or cured. 33 Therefore,
using law as a disincentive for being
homosexual makes no practical
sense. The best the law can do is to
discourage homosexual activity, not
homosexuality per se. The fact that
being gay is not a choice begs the
question: what social value (or
disvalue) is there to limiting
homosexual activity? What are the
costs, and what are the benefits?
Posner identifies two results of
limiting same-sex sexual activity that
some perceive as beneficial.34 The
first is prevention of the spread of
AIDS; the second is limiting the
exposure of young people to the
blandishments of homosexuality
which would lure them into a
homosexual lifestyle. 35 Posner
dismisses them both as perceived
and not real benefits, the first being
ineffectual (perhaps even if sodomy
laws were enforced), the second
being based on a false belief that
young people convert to
homosexuality.
36
If the benefits of limiting same-sex
sexual activities are illusory, why
bother to regulate gay sex? Posner
points to a deep-seated anti-gay
sentiment in Anglo-American culture,
which he associates with the rise of
companionate marriage.3 7 Posner
theorizes that in societies where
marriage was not historically
companionate, that is, where the
function of marriage was primarily
political or procreational, as in
ancient Greece and Rome,
homosexual activity was tolerated or
even encouraged. Ile believes that
the origin of American society's
traditional abhorrence of same-sex
sexual activity relates to the restraint
that societies which value
companionate marriages place on
the sexual activities of males.38 Such
societies place a high value on
monogamous sexual activity, and a
high disvalue on "any form of
nonmarital sexual activity.'
39
Posner's theory does not account,
however, for the fact that American
society does not react as negatively
to pre-marital and extra-marital
heterosexual activity as it does to gay
sex, a fact which suggests that the
origins of the "disgust" which drives




Whatever the origin of anti-gay
animus may be, Posner recognizes
that this animus is simply irrational.
He characterizes it as being the
"biggest externality: the revulsion
that so many people in our society
feel at the very idea of. . sexual
deviance .... The disgust that
homosexual intercourse arouses...
explains the survival of sodomy laws
better than the external effects of
such intercourse do." 41
What are the costs to society, and
to gay people, of society's attempts to
limit gay sexual activity? Here,
Halley's connection of sodomy laws
with subordination of gay people is
helpful. Although sodomy laws are
rarely used to prosecute sexually
active gay people, they contribute to
and form a locus for the
subordination of gay people. Posner
points out that gay people incur costs
when society punishes people for
sexual orientation, or threatens to
punish.4 2 Attitudes supported by the
very existence of sodomy laws lead
to the subordination of gay people,
in turn leading to two high-cost
results: a clandestine search for
partners, and, when the cost of that
search is too high, marriage to
members of the opposite sex. 43 Both
these situations resul from a fear of
expression of "gayness" in a society
in which gay people are
subordinated to heterosexual people.
Subordination also results in the
cost of mental distress from the
alienation which subordination
engenders in gay people and their
families and friends, including high
rates of suicide among gay yonuth.
44
In addition, the emotional and
economic costs rise from fighting
political battles to overcome
subordination. Some of those battles
take place in arenas traditionally
recognized as being "political," while
some occur in arenas such as
churches and workplaces which are
also political, but not usually
denominated as such.
These costs to gay people may
actually be viewed as benefits by an
anti-gay society which seeks to keep
gay identity and behavior
clandestine, and impel gay people
into traditional heterosexual
marriage. As Posner points out, the
higher the cost of gay activity (sexual
or otherwise), the less activity there
will be. 45 But the cost to society of
achieving those perceived benefits is
high: clandestine behavior results in
social disruption, unhappy marriages
result in family dysfunction and
divorce, emotional distress leads to
economic inefficiency, and legal
battles destabilize private and public
equilibria.
Society has begun to discover that
subordination of gay people may be
too costly to continue, at least to the
degree that it has subordinated them
in the past. The post-Stonewall cra
has witnessed increasing
incorporation of openly gay people
in society, and a gradual decline of
some barriers to their inclusion.
Among the signs indicating the
change: gay people are finding
acceptance or toleration in
neighborhoods outside of gay urban
ghettos, corporations and
government agencies are extending
benefits to same-sex partners, and
the media portray gay people in a
positive light.
Yet states attempt to pass
amendments to their constitutions
specifically excluding gay people
from special legal consideration,
6
heated debates rage in legislatures
and Congress over protecting
"traditional family values" from
"threats" by gay people, and
discrimination in workplaces is still
common. And sodomy laws remain
on the books.
Obviously, society has not
concluded that the benefits of
eliminating traditional anti-gay
structures outweigh the costs of
subordinating gay people. But what
about the costs of maintaining
sodomy laws? As Posner notes, the
cost to the taxpayer of retaining
criminal penalties for gay sexual
behavior is minimal, especially when
those penalties are rarely or weakly
enforced.
47
The time has come, indeed is long
past, when sane and rational voices
should speak out for the elimination
of the nation's sodomy laws - the
nation's way to legally invade the
privacy of the bedrooms of a
substantial population should end.
Their cost to society is simply too
high to allow them to remain silently,
but not ineffectively, in our criminal
codes. The population of citizens that
is affected by these laws deser-ves the
same respect for the privacy of their
bedrooni as the rest of the
population. Regardless of whether
courts find that federal or state
constitutions guaranty the right of
adults to behave as they choose to
behave in the privacy of their
bedrooms, lawmakers should take
responsibility for the social inequities
and economic harm they or their
predecessors have created. The
movement that began publicly on the
streets of New York in 1969 has at the
beginning of the 21st Century
evolved into a force for the
recognition of some people's right to
pursue happiness in privacy and
peace.
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ver the last several years, an issue has emerged
that has challenged employers: whether and
how to monitor employee electronic
communications, in particular, employee use of e-mail
and the Internet. Employers have undertaken such
monitoring in an effort to reduce the amount of
productivity lost to non-work related activities and to
guard against employees accessing inappropriate
websites or sending inappropriate e-mails. 1 Employer
concern with potential sexual or racial harassment has
also motivated many to take action,2 Major employers,
such as The New York Times, Dow Chemical, and Xerox,
have recently terminated employees for inappropriate e-
mail and Internet use.3 In addition, the American
Management Association reports that over eighty percent
of surveyed companies engage in electronic monitoring
and/or surveillance of their employees. 4 These
employers monitor employee use of the Internet, e-mail,
and computer files, as well as video recording employee
performance and reviewing employee telephone
conversations and voice mail messages. 5 Furthermore,
nearly ten percent of companies in the United States have
been subpoenaed for employee e-mail in pending cases.
6
There have also been cases where employers have
obtained court orders allowing them to search the home
computer hard drives of employees.
7
One consequence of the actions that employers have
taken in this area is concern regarding the rights of
employees.8 To what extent, if any, are there limits on the
employer's right to monitor employee use of e-mail and
the Internet? Most companies have policies concerning e-
mail and Internet use, a somewhat smaller percentage
provide notification to employees of the monitoring, and
relatively few provide training regarding such policies. 9
In an ironic twist, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit ordered staff members to disable the
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software that had been monitoring
the e-mail and Internet use of the
judges."T The United States Judicial
Conference's Committee on
Automation and Technology,
however, was of the opinion that
"federal employees - including
judges - should continue to be
monitored for Internet misuse and
should be blocked from such
activities as downloading music.""
This paper will address the
monitoring of employee electronic
communication. The following
sections will examine the law
concerning searches, the issue of
employee notice, and reconmend
policies in this area that would be





The first ten amendments to the
Constitution of the United States are
referred to as the "Bill of Rights" and
are generally understood to codify
the most basic of rights that we enjoy
as citizens and residents of this
country. 12 The right to be free of
unreasonable searches is one of the
most carefully guarded rights, and is
treated in the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution.13 The Fourth
Amendment reads as follows:
The right qf thepeople to be secure in
theirpersons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and thepersons or things to
be seized.'
4
What is a "Search"?
The Supreme Court has construed
the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures
embodied in the Fourth Amendment
"as proscribing only governmental
action; it is wholly inapplicable 'to a
search or seizure, even an
unreasonable one, effected by a
private individual not acting as an
agent of the government or with the
participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.''15 Within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
"a 'search' occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed. ' 16 In determining whether
a claimed expectation of privacy is
proper, the courts apply a two-part
test.17 First, did the individual
demonstrate by his conduct that he
had an "actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy?"' 8 Secondly,
if so, was that subjective expectation
something that society at large would
"recognize as reasonable?" 19
However, this is not to say that the
individual's subjective expectation of
privacy is dispositive of the issue.
20
The totality of the circumstances
must be considered to determine
whether an individual has a
legitimate expectation of privacy.21
For example, what can be observed
or heard, without the aid of technical
: NNN ....
enhancement, when the observer is
legally present in a place where he
has a right to be is not considered an
illegal search.
22
Searches can be performed
visually23 or by more advanced
technology, such as through the use
of electronic listening devices24 or
thermal imaging devices.2 5 It is not
the same as a seizure. 26 The term
"seizure" describes the actual taking




The law is well settled in that "[w]hat
a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." 28 "The
rationale of the plain-view doctrine is
that if contraband is left in open view
and is observed by a police officer
from a lawful vantage point, there
has been no invasion of a legitimate
expectation of privacy and thus no
'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment .... 29
Administrative/Regulatory
Inspections
As with searches that occur in the
criminal context, Fourth Amendment
protections also apply "with respect
to administrative inspections
designed to enforce regulatory
schemes. '30 "In closely regulated
industries, however, an exception to
the warrant requirement has been
carved out for searches of premises
pursuant to an administrative
inspection scheme. "31 For an
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administrative or regulatory
inspection to be conducted
constitutionally without a warrant,
three criteria must be met: (1) "there
must be a substantial government
interest in the regulatory scheme
under which the inspection is
conducted;"32 (2) "the warrantless
search must be necessary to further
the regulatory scheme;"33 and (3) "in
terms of certainty and regularity of its
application, the inspection must
provide a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant.' 34 These
three requirements combined
present a formidable chasm to cross.
These requirements for warrantless
inspections are normally met only in








The police must have a search
warrant before they conduct a
search, except in rare and specific
situations.42 As the Fourth
Amendment specifically states, a
search warrant should be issued only
upon a finding of "probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. ' 43 The property
to be searched must be described in
writing and in specific detail.
44
Likewise, the items being looked for





Normally, searches without a
warrant are presumed to be
unreasonable. 46 Among the situations
where a warrant is not necessary,
other than for administrative or'
regulatory searches of closely
regulated industries, are situations
where time is clearly of the essence.
47
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A warrant is also not necessary when:
(a) the person to be searched gives
free and voluntary consent to be
searched; 48 (b) entry of the subject
property is necessary to save a
person's life; 49 (c) a search is
necessary to prevent the immediate
loss or destruction of evidence of a
crime; 50 (d) the items are in plain
view, as described above; 51 (e) a
search is necessary to protect the
safety of the law enforcement officer,
such as looking for weapons in the
driver's area of a car that is stopped
because of a traffic violation;52 and





Private employers are normally not
subject to the same restrictions as law
enforcement officers because the
Fourth Amendment applies to
governmental actors and not private
individuals. 54 In a purely commercial
setting an employer has a business
and monetary interest in what her
employees are doing while on the
job and while on the business
premises. Under general
employment law, every employee
owes a duty of loyalty to his
employer.55 This duty gives the
employer a vital, as well as legal,
interest in what is going on in and
about her premises.56 Since the
employer is not a criminal
investigator, she is given wider
latitude in conducting searches of her
own business areas.
57
Employer as an Agent of the
Police
When the police conduct a criminal
investigation, they cannot coerce or
too strongly encourage an employer
to search her employee's work place
without a search warrant. 58 If the
employer does so, she is acting as an
agent of the police and the
constitutional restrictions are the
same as if the police themselves
conducted the search.59 A search
warrant is required unless the search
fits one of the above referenced
exceptions.
6
A two-part test is used to determine
if the employer's actions are subject
to constitutional strictures. The first
inquiry is whether the law
enforcement agency initiated, "'knew
of,]' or 'acquiesced in' the intrusive
conduct,"6' The second inquiry is
whether the employer who
performed the search intended to
assist law enforcement efforts, or was
merely trying to further her own
ends.
62
That is not the case, however,
when the employer conducts a
private search of the employee's
work area, on her own, and without
any contact with the police. 63 In that
case, whatever the employer finds is
usually held to be admissible in a




When an employer suspects an
employee of misconduct, the
employer usually simply fires the
employee. 6 5 If, however, the
employer is not trying to assist law
enforcement and has as her main
purpose the furtherance of her own
business ends, the employer is
usually permitted to conduct her own
search of the employee's work area
located on the employer's property.
66
However, this general rule has
limitations, one of which is the
common law tort of invasion of
privacy.
67
The tort of invasion of privacy has
come to symbolize several different
causes of action.68 However, for
purposes of this article, we will
concentrate on the cause of action
entitled "intrusion upon seclusion,
which focuses on the manner in
which information that a person has
kept private has been obtained."
69
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The courts recognize a privacy
interest in medical records and then
balance that interest against various
legitimate purposes associated with
disclosing that information.
V. The HIPAA regulations
adopt and seek to implement
the privacy interests and
balancing tests developed in
the various cases.
In 1996, Congress enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). 13
Among other things, HIPAA required
Congress to enact new safeguards to
protect the security and
confidentiality of health care
information. Congress failed to do so,
requiring the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") to
promulgate regulations for such
protections10 4 In November of 1999,
HHS published proposed regulations
and, during the comment period,
received 52,000 communications
from the public1 0 5 In December
2000, HHS issued the final rule that
took effect on April 14, 2001,106
However, most covered entities have
until April 14, 2003 to comply with
the final rule's provisions.10 7 The
HIPAA regulations are intended to
establish a set of basic national
privacy standards to serve as a floor
of ground rules for health care
providers, health plans and health
care clearinghouses to follow.
108
In promulgating the regulations,
HHS considered the need for privacy
of medical records to be great. 10' The
HHS recognized a "growing concern"
stemming from several trends,
"including the growing use of
interconnected electronic media for
business and personal activities, our
increasing ability to know an
individual's genetic make-up, and, in
health care, the increasing
complexity of the system."" 0) Unless
those public concerns were allayed,
the HHS believed we would be
"unable to obtain the full benefits of
electronic technologies. The absence
of national standards for the
confidentiality of health information
has made the health care industry
and the population in general
uncomfortable about this primarily
financially-driven expansion in the
use of electronic data.""' The HHS
focused on one of the same concerns
that was recognized by various
courts, the consequences of sharing
information without the knowledge
of the patient involved."
12
In concluding that "privacy is a
fundamental right," HHS looked to
judicial authority and, in particular, to
the Whalen decision. 113 In several
aspects, the HIPAA regulations have
followed the guidance from the
federal courts. 114 In relying on this
federal authority, HHS did not
specifically address the fact that the
judicial authority it cited related to
the right to privacy from the
perspective of government actors
rather than the private sector, which
is not subject to the constitutional
restrictions. 1
15
There are several principles from
the federal decisions that are
reflected and expanded in the HIPAA
regulations. First, the cases generally
accept that there is an expectation of
privacy in medical records, although
the extent to which it reaches a
constitutionally protected right may
be debated.116 In promulgating the
regulations, HHS characterized
privacy as a "fundamental right" and
concluded that the "United States
Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutional protection of personal
health information" in Wbalen.
117
Second, the HIPAA regulations focus
on the first type of individual privacy
protection identified in Whalen, the
protection for medical records. 18
The HIPAA regulations do not seek to
protect medical decision-making, an
interest also largely ignored by the
courts.119 Third, the HIPAA
regulations acknowledge that the
right to privacy "is not absolute" and
must be balanced against legitimate
continued onpage 556
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California v. Ciraolo24, the Court held
that an overflight of the defendant's
property by a police airplane did not
amount to a search, on the unusual
ground that the plane was in FAA
approved air space. The Court's
rationale for this rule was that no
expectation of privacy could be
reasonable, as "[alny member of the
public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers
observed."25 Here, the individual's
fault is not conveying information
to a third party, but failing to properly
safeguard his property:
That the area is within the
curtilage does not itself bar
all police observation. The
Fourth Amendment
protection of the home has
never been extended to
require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a hone on
public thoroughfares. Nor
does the mere fact that an
individual has taken
measures to restrict some
views of his activities
preclude an officer's
observations from a public
vantage point where he has a
right to be and which renders
the activities clearly visible.2
6
In its most recent Fourth
Amendment case, Kyllo v. United
States,27 the Court held that the use of
thermal imaging technology to
measure the heat coming off of a
dwelling was a search subject to the
requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court held that
because the device provided details
about the interior of a home that
could not otherwise be obtained
without trespassing into the home
and because the device had not yet
entered into general use, its use
constituted a search. 28 The flip-side of
this argument appears to be that had
the device used by the police
continued onpage 574
VOLUME . 79 ISSUE . 4 I 553
continuedfrompage 521





security because it embeds the
choice between tangible and
intangible in a specific factual
context, such as the process of
boarding an airplane - a context that
is itself tangible. As explained below,
framing the question in such a
context inevitably leads people to
guard against the more tangible
harms.
In an age pervaded by cost-benefit
analysis, there is an urge to reduce all
policy decisions to a balance sheet.
But we lack a single currency in
which to measure the relative value
of the privacy and security interests.
Attempts to equate a "unit" of privacy
to a "unit' of security, for example,
are doomed to fail. As we attempt to
choose between these two
incommensurable goods,46 we lack a
simple, cost-benefit approach to the
balancing.
Of course, the mere fact that two
goods are incommensurable need
not skew the calculus in one
direction or the other; it simply
makes the choice more difficult.
Indeed, incommlensurability
characterizes Inost attempts to
balance competing goods.47 Despite
our lack of a common "metric" in
which to measure those goods, we
find ways to make hard decisions.
What does skew the calculus,
however, is the perception that
breaches of security lead to tangible
harms, while intrusions on privacy
lead to intangible harms. Proponents
of security measures can raise the
specter of specific, all too tangible
acts of violence. Failures of security
can lead to concrete harms that have
shaped our collective experience,
such as the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut, the bombing of
the American Airlines flight over
Lockerbie, Timothy McVeigh's attack
in Oklahoma City, and September 11.
Privacy, in contrast, is often
considered a purely abstract value,
one that we can sacrifice in a
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particular instance without risking
any real, tangible harm.48 Many who
argue for the preservation of privacy
stress its importance for purposes
that are themselves abstract, such as
personal autonomy,49 personal and
political identity, 50 and freedom of
expression and association.51
Moreover, privacy is a highly
subjective concept, one that can vary
from person to person.
52
Comparing tangible and intangible
consequences in the context of
specific security proposals is likely to
overstate the value of the tangible. As
Julie Cohen observed in a related
context, "Privacy, like other dignity-
related goods, has inherently
nonmonetizable dimensions. These
dimensions may be lost or distorted
beyond recognition in the translation
to dollars and cents."53 So a
consumer making a decision about a
transaction, with consequences
defined in monetary terms, will find it
difficult to translate the intangible,
nonmonetizable dimensions of
privacy into that decision making
equation. 54 The specific context in
which the consumer must decide
constrains her decision making
calculus,
A similar problem of context
frustrates privacy advocates in the
debate over privacy and security. 55
Debates over security proposals are
often grounded in specific factual
contexts in which the privacy
implications appear innocuous,
while a security breach could lead to
grave harm. British Home Secretary
David Blunkett colorfully contrasted
the danger of terrorist attacks with
abstract notions of privacy and
liberty: "We can live in a world with
airy-fairy civil liberties and believe
the best in everybody and then they
destroy us."56 Oracle CEO Larry
Ellison expressed a similar sentiment
in testimony submitted to a
congressional subcommittee
considering national ID cards:
Two hundred years ago,
Thomas Jefferson warned
us that our liberties were at
risk unless we exercised
'eternal vigilance.'
Jefferson lived in an age of
aristocrats and monarchs.
We live in a nuclear age
with the threat of terrorists
getting their hands on
weapons with the capacity
to destroy entire cities.
Only by giving our
intelligence and law
enforcement agencies
better tools and more
latitude to pursue terrorists
can we expect to save life
and liberty together.
57
Former National Security Agency
general counsel Stewart Baker
summed up this perspective:
We as a people are willing
to trade a little less privacy
for a little more security. If
using more intrusive
technology is the only way
to prevent horrible crimes,
chances are that we'll
decide to use the
technology, then adjust
our sense of what is private
and what is not.
58
Security proposals implicitly
summon images of a horrible reprise
to the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks, as well as attacks
using biological or nuclear weapons.
Juxtaposed against those images are
what some characterize as "airy-fairy"
notions of privacy. 59 Though they do
not explicitly deny that privacy has
some value in the abstract, they urge
people to sacrifice it in particular
cases to prevent "real," tangible
harms.60 With the issue framed in
such stark terms, one would be hard
pressed to argue that, in just this one
case, abstract privacy values should
not yield to the need to prevent
attacks by terrorists with biological
and nuclear weapons.
61
Furthermore, differences in the
scale upon which security and
privacy benefits are observable
exaggerate our perception of privacy
benefits as intangible and security
benefits as tangible. The example of
airport checkpoint searches helps
illustrate this point. As I am frisked or
scanned, I cannot possibly see the
cumulative effect across society of
implementing these types of uniform
measures. I experience only my
search and the searches of a few
continued onpage 571
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employers' infornation may override
the interests of a state that has no
policy favoring sharing
infornation.3 1
A potential solution to all these
problems is allowing the parties to
nail down the applicable state law by
including a choice-of-law clause in
their employment contracts. 'tbis can
potentially ensure enforcement of the
clause against application of statc law
that protects employees or raiding
employcis. The Restatement
provides that the law designated in the
contract is not enforced as to a
regulatory issue if:
(a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the
chosen state would he contraiy to
a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the
particular issue and which, under
the rule of 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties.3
9
Since the chosen state is often the
employer's headquarters or at least a
branch office, the main issues
concern, not the relationship with the
chosen state,"O but whether another
state has a fundamental policy against
enforcement and that state's interests
outweigh the chosen state. The cases
reach varied results, but a review of 67
restrictive covenant cases involving
choice-of-law clauses shows that
clauses were enforced in 39 cases, not
enforced in 25 cases, and inteipreted
as inapplicable in three cases. To be
sure, further analysis is necessary to
determine the marginal effect of the
clause -that is, whether the court
would have reached the same result
under either law. But the courts'
tendency to enforce contractual choice
suggests that the clauses may have
some effect in inducing courts to
enforce
restrictive covenants.
This brief review of the law
suggests that the parties gain
something from these choice-of-law
clauses, even if they are frequently not
enforced. Where the law of a
contractually selected state is fairly
similar to that of another state x lose
law would apply in the absence of
contractual choice, but where the law
of the two states might go either way
with close facts, the court likely will
apply the selected law. Thus, a firm
may be able to gain predictability by
contracting for the application of the
law of a state that has experience with
these clauses or has enforced the
particular clause or clauses in
relevant industries.4' Also, even if the
two potentially applicable laws differ
significantly, a court may choose to
apply the less regulatory statute where
the fact situation is arguably not
covered by the more regulatory
statute.
42
How evxer, these clauses do not give
employers perfect protection. The
problem is that states ciforce their
own "fundamental" policies, while at
the sane tinxe refusing to apply tihe
laws of states that have weak
contacts with the contract. This often
means protecting local employers
against employers based out of state.
Consider, for example, Application
Group, Inc, v. Hunter Group, Inc.,43 in
which a California state court
protected a local employcr raiding an
employee of a Maryland firm despite a
Maryland choice of law clause.
Applying the Restatement 44, the court
held that California's anti-non-
compete policy applies to
employment involving performance of
'services for California-based
customers" even if the employee had
no prior contact with California and
does not reside in California. The court
reasoned:
In this day and age-with the
advent of computer technology
and the concomitant ability of
many types of employees in many
industries to work from their
homes, or to 'teleconmmute' to
work from anywhere a telephone
link reaches-an emlployce need
not reside in the same city,
county, or state in which the
employer can be said to
physically reside. California
employers in such sectors of the
economy have a strong and
legitimate interest in having broad
freedom to choose from a much
larger, indeed a 'national,'
applicant pool in order to
maximize the quality of the
product or services they provide,
coutniuted onpqge 56 7
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in the judicial process because Ms.
Lewinsky struck a deal with Mr. Starr
and voluntarily turned over the
records.
The Tattered Cover, in its case,
urged the court to apply the
compelling need standard. Wc
argued that the government did not
demonstrate a compelling need for
the information to make their case,
nor did authorities exhaust their
other alternatives in gathering
information. Only when there is
compelling need and there are no
other alternatives should First
Amendment guarantees be set aside.
continued on page570
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public uses of that information.'
2 °
However, steps must be taken to
ensure that the balancing does not
result in unnecessary privacy
breaches. 121
Initially, the HIPAA regulations
seek to implement these principles
with its definitions. The regulations
protect the defined term "protected
health information" by generally
limiting the use of that information to
the individual or with the individual's
consent."a That key phrase -
protected health information -is
based on another defined phrase,
"individually identifiable health
information. ",123 In turn, "individually
identifiable health information" is
defined as a subset of health
information, including demographic
information collected from an
individual that:
(1) Is created or received by
a health care provider, health
plan, employer or health
care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past,
present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of
an individual; the provision
of health care to an
individual; or the past,
present or future payment
for the provision of health
care to an individual; and
(i) That identifies the
individual;
(ii) With respect to




used to identify the
individual.
124
However, health information that
does not identify an individual or
permit identification of the individual
does not meet the definition of
"identifiable health information."1 25
In order to satisfy this exclusion,
numerous identifiers must be
removed, including identifiers such
as names, dates, numbers, addresses
and any unique identifying
E
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characteristics 126
Similar to the balancing test from
judicial decisions, the regulations
identify many situations where the
"protected health information" may
be disclosed, even without consent,
so long as it Is required by law and
the use or disclosure complies with
and is limited to the relevant
requirements of law. 127 Similar to the
federal case law, appropriate
disclosures are determined based on





To a public health authority
to prevent or control
disease or injury;
To a public health authority
authorized by law to
receive reports of child
abuse or neglect;
To a person who may have
been exposed to a
communicable disease or
may otherwise be at risk of
contracting or spreading a
disease or condition;
To a social service agency
about a victim of abuse,
neglect or domestic
violence, if required by law
and if the individual
consents or if there is a
belief that disclosure is
necessary to prevent
serious harm to individuals;




To a law enforcement
official's request for the
purpose of identifying or
locating a suspect, fugitive,
material witness or missing
person.
30
This list focuses on many of the
purposes identified in the federal
case law as appropriate and
necessary societal uses of medical
records. As noted by justice Stevens
in Whalen, disclosures for these
types of purposes are those
"unpleasant invasions of privacy that
are associated with many facets of
health care. "'31 The HIPAA
regulations seek to implement the
courts' case-by-case analysis by
itemizing those instances where
society's needs outweigh the
individual's privacy rights. While the
regulatory approach provides more
specificity, it also lacks the flexibility
that would be exercised by a court
enforcing the existing case-by-case
approach. However, that specificity
may provide greater certainty and
predictability, which are critical for
the entities subject to HIPAA.
Conclusion
The right to privacy in medical
records is balanced against society's
expected invasions of privacy related
to health care. Our expectation of
privacy in those records has never
been seriously contested. Federal
courts have consistently reached that
conclusion without the need for
precedent. However, those rights
often fail in the balancing test against
society's interests. The extent to
which the privacy expectation rises
to a constitutional right has not yet
been resolved and may never be
resolved, The HTPAA regulations
attempt to adopt the balance
established by the courts, by
protecting medical records and
protecting society's legitimate uses of
the health care information.
LAND OF
THE FREE? Professor Mell's forthcoming article discusses how the USA Patriot Act erodestraditional protections afforded American citizens against invasion of privacyby the government, by Joseph H. Lusk
T he USA Patriot Act ("Act") changes the existinglegal landscape by, among other things, amending
both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
2
("FISA") and the "Wiretap Statute.,"
3
Traditionally, Congress and the courts have limited
the CIA's investigative authority to non-domestic
issues, and its surveillance power to outside the
United States.4 According to Mell, these restrictions
were enacted to protect American citizens from the
scrutiny of the CIA, because Congress "recognized the
potential for abuse by an organization with authority
to pursue clandestine surveillance." 5 Mell explains
that the Act's FISA amendments diminish the
protections traditionally afforded U. S. citizens by
allowing the CIA to conduct domestic surveillance.
6
Additionally, Mell describes how the Act is vague
and overbroad.7 For example, the Act's "crimes of
Domestic Terrorism and Harboring a Terrorist" may
include "such legitimate activist activity as anti-
abortion rights, animal rights, environientalists,
striking union members in vital industries, civil rights
protesters, and the G-4 protesters .... ,,"
Mell also traces the history of law enforcement
surveillance abuse, which led to FISA's enactment.9
Before FISA, law enforcement, notably the FBI, used a
"national security" justification in conducting
surveillance that would have otherwise been
disallowed. 10 When enacted, FISA created a "scheme
of surveillance oversight" which balanced the
government's desire to institute surveillance with the
target's civil liberties. This scheme protected the
subject of a criminal investigation from the
government's abuse of its surveillance authority."
Similarly, the Wiretap Statute created an oversight
scheme in the unique area of wiretapping.1 2 Mell
explains how the Act's amendments to both FISA and
the Wiretap Statute allow for potential abuses the
original acts sought to prohibit. 
13
In addition to the potential for abuse in the FISA and
Wiretap Statute amendments, the Act also enhances
the CIA-FBI information sharing partnership. This
same type of agreement resulted in the compilation of
intelligence dossiers on citizens involved in legitimate
protests during the 1970s.14 The CIA-FBI partnership,
coupled with the Act's loosened restrictions on
gaining information obtained in CIA-conducted
surveillance, has the potential to intrude on
Americans' political activity, business relationships,
and personal lives. 15
Thus, Mell concludes that the Act generally removes
critical "checks and balances on governmental action"
which "could have the effect of diminishing the
already waning protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendient."16
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card.79 On his own initiative, a
company employee had provided
"huge swaths" of customer data to
law enforcement to aid in the
investigation of the terrorist attacks.
80
Ponemon says that such breaches are
increasingly common, with a variety
of industries routinely "breaking their
privacy policies" and sharing
customer data with law enforcement
"to analyze suspicious activity.' 81
Can government agents be
trusted with this data?
By capturing the fundamentalprofile
ofeach household.., supermarket
databases provide the government
with a close and surreptitious look
into the lives and habits of
individuals.82
-Christine Anthony, Researcher
While government agencies may
want to add shopper card
information to the ever-widening
number of databases they can access
for information about citizens, would
such information be safe in their
hands? Considering tales of
corruption, fraud, and shady dealings
around the country, the answer may
well be "no."
Abuse of data
Law enforcement officials, who
clamor for databases on citizens to
keep the public safe from crime, are
not above abusing the data to
commit their own crimes. Data abuse
by government officials appears to
be widespread. Just a few recent
cases include a DEA agent caught
selling sensitive records from several
different government databases and
officials in Las Vegas selling
confidential court records.
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More than 90 state police
employees have been accused of
misusing Michigan's Law
Enforcement Information Network,
including a state trooper who used it
to keep tabs on her ex-husband's
new girlfriend,8 4 and another who
obtained the home address of an 18-
year-old woman in order to hound
her for a date.85 The abuse reaches as
far back as 1983 when the database
was used to harass a union
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representative. 8
6
The California Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) has had a
particularly hard time keeping its
database secure. Scores of DMV
employees have abused their access
to sensitive information on the
system to help criminals commit
identity theft and other crimes.
8 7
Even after firing 80 employees in a
yearlong crackdown, the agency
acknowledged in late 2000 that it still
has "a very large employee fraud
problem. "88
California DMV and Safeway
The California DMV has been
involved in some shady dealings with
supermarkets, as well. A few years
back Safeway (the nation's 3rd
largest grocery chain) sent someone
to two rival grocery stores to copy
the license plate numbers from 1,000
cars in the other stores' parking lots.
For S5,000, the DMV sold Safeway
the home address of every individual
parked at the competition's lot.8 9
Amazingly, a 1990 California state
law allows the I)MV to release
drivers' residential addresses (but not
their names) to anyone who can
demonstrate a "legitimate business
reason" to request the data. 90 The
Safeway transaction was apparently
"business as usual" and only came to
light when an audit revealed that the
DMV failed to obtain a written
statement from Safeway promising
not to use the information for direct
marketing purposes. 91 Had the DMV
filled out the paperwork correctly,
the transaction would have gone
undetected.
Perhaps more disturbing, when
Safeway's actions came to light the
company made no effort to
apologize to the people whose
privacy it had violated. Safeway
spokeswoman Debra Lambert
justified the company's behavior and
dismissed privacy concerns saying,
"It's only addresses. We keep the data
to ourselves. It is never divulged
outside of the company. '92
Somehow I suspect the fact that the
company keeps those records to
themselves would be scant
reassurance to the 1,000 shoppers
who had chosen not to do business
with Safeway in the first place. Since
Safeway aggressively collects data on
its own customers through its
"Safeway Club Card," shoppers in
rival parking lots may have been
intentionally trying to keep their
shopping habits out of Safeway's
reach. It is unconscionable that a
government agency would
circumvent the desire of its citizens to
avoid a particular business by selling
their confidential records to
marketers, and even more appalling
that Safeway seems to place no moral
or ethical limits on their data
collection practices.
SECTION 3: TECHNOLOGY IS
PRING THE WRY FOR DATA
COLLECTION ON AN ENORMOUS
SCALE
Cards will become inextricably
linked with identity
The ability to match names,
addresses, purchasing behavior, and
lifestyles all together into one record
allows companies to build detailed
pictures of people's lives. 93 Grocery
card records are already being linked
with data from a variety of outside
sources. For example, more than
700,000 British shoppers have linked
their Tesco grocery cards with the
natural gas supplied to their homes,
9 4
thus necessitating the use of a valid
name and home address to obtain
the card. Of even greater concern are
the links being formed between
marketing databases and-government
identification documents.
As supermarket purchase records
become increasingly useful
informational commodities for law
enforcement, government bureaus,
and other entities, the accuracy of the
data collected will become an
important issue. Though it is
currently possible to obtain a
supermarket card using anonymous
or fictitious information at many
supermarkets around the country,
this loophole could easily close. With
"document fraud" being the new
buzzword in law enforcement and
legislative circles since September
11th (carrying with it a maximum 15-
year prison sentence 95), it is not hard
to envision a day when providing
false information on a private
contract or card application could be
punishable as "fraud."
Supermarkets may begin
tightening up their card application
procedures to include identity
verification. Though customers may
balk, the process could be
streamlined and made transparent by
offering the option of scanning a
government-issued ID card instead of
a loyalty card. Not only would this
reduce the number of cards in a
shopper's wallet, it would simplify
the collection of food purchase
records for inclusion in government
databases.
Such a scheme is not far-fetched.
Virginia Congressmen Jim Moran (D-
VA) and Tom Davis (R-VA) recently
introduced legislation that would
require all state driver's licenses and
ID cards to contain an embedded
computer chip capable of accepting
"data or software written to the
license or card by non-governmental
devices."'96 The mandatory "smart
chips" 97 would carry bank and debit
card data so that citizens could use
their ID cards "for a variety of
commercial applications.' 98 Barring
protests from citizens, the state of
New Mexico plans to issue a "smart
card" driver's license containing a
computer memory chip, a portion of
which will be set aside for use by
credit card issuers and other
commercial service providers.9
Supermarket "loyalty" cards would
be an obvious application for the
high-tech smart cards. As Alan Glass,
Senior Vice President of Electronic
Commerce at MasterCard
International, points out, "A senior
citizen could have securely protected
medical information, supermarket
loyalty programs, social club
membership and access, discount
programs, a municipal transportation
pass, and a library card all stored on
a single chip."100
To complete the total identity
picture, the biometrics industry
hopes that security concerns will
"advance the day when mass
commercial applications of
biometrics become routine.""1 1
Accordingly, supermarkets have
begun testing out biometric
identification systems on U.S.
shoppers. Fingerprint payment
technology is already in place at a
Thriftway grocery store in
Washington,1 02 and Kroger, the
nation's largest supermarket chain, is
testing a fingerprint payment system
in Texas.103 The eventual endpoint of
the identification-for-food trend may
require transmitting one's shopper ID
number through a subdermal
computer chip implant, such as the
Verichip produced by Applied Digital
Solutions."14 A Florida family recently
had these chips surgically embedded
in a procedure publicized on national
television.
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Linking government and private
sector databases would provide both
with nearly omniscient powers of
observation over the consumer-
citizen. Such a potent concentration
of power and knowledge in so few
hands could hardly be expected to
operate in the interest of privacy and
freedom. Sadly, it may be all too easy
to convince shoppers that
conducting their commercial
transactions by means of a
government identity document
would be more convenient, or that it




The trade publications for the
loyalty marketing industry offer a
unique window of insight into the
marketers' long-range goals. The
writings of marketing strategists
reveal a pervasive, industry-wide
mentality that will stop at nothing
short of omniscient knowledge of
consumers' every move - a goal that
can only be achieved through total
surveillance. As evidence of this
mindset, here are a few of the
invasive retail surveillance
technologies in use today as
described on the companies'
websites and in related publications.
The ceiling-mounted store cameras
originally installed to prevent
shoplifting have been turned to a
new use - spying on the average
shopper. A market research company
called Envirosell uses time-lapse
surveillance cameras to record
detailed information about
consumers as they shop. Unlike
stationary camera surveillance, which
only records what occurs in a given
area, Envirosell's technology singles
out individualshoppers, identified by
body mass or body temperature, and
"passes" them from camera to camera
to record their movements during the
entire shopping trip.' 6 The
surveillance is so complete that if a
shopper lingers for more than a few
moments in one spot, a wall-
mounted camera may zoom in to
peer closely at the individual's
face.
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Apparently, Envirosell feels it is
necessary to collect "hundreds of
hours of video tape"")" in this
manner, since customer behaviors
such as reading labels are "easier to
observe on tape, where they may be
repeatedly watched frame by frame,
than live." 109 The system also
employs unobtrusive on-site
researchers called "trackers" to
follow shoppers around the store,
listening in on and recording their
conversations. 10 Envirosell has even
stooped to closely scrutinizing the
moment-by-moment behavior of
customers seated at fast food
restaurants and groups interacting in
sit-down restaurants, without their
knowledge or consent."'
A "Frequently Asked Questions"
(FAQ) page on Envirosell's website is
filled with reassurances apparently
designed to soothe the skittish retail
executive. It explains, for example,
that "according to Foderal law, in-
store filming in public areas does not
constitute an invasion of the privacy
of customers or employees,"1i 2 and
asserts that video surveillance is
employed by "virtually every retail
chain in this country."t13 The FAQ
page also offers revealing insight into
the company's attitude towards
shoppers. Asked, "Do customers
know they're being watched?" the
website explains that "most shoppers
are so intent on the shopping process
that they notice very little of what
goes on around them.... However,
when they do notice [the cameras]
most people assume that they are for
security purposes.' 1
4
Apparently, Envirosell has no
shortage of clients. Fred Meyer, CVS,
Trader Joe's, and Wal-Mart are among
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the nearly 50 major retailers that have
used Envirosell's surveillance system
to spy on their customers. 15
Envirosell is just one of many
companies eager to deploy its
espionage systems in retail
environments. Brickstream
Corporation uses in-store video
technology and image analysis
software to track where customers go
and what they do in retail stores and
banks.116 A press release issued by
Brickstream and partner company
Retek Inc. once boasted, "This
solution is transparent to the
customer yet yields a wealth of
information and customer insight for
the retailer," 117 implying that
shoppers will have no knowledge of
being watched. Point Grey Research
markets the Censys3D video
surveillance system, which literally
draws a line on a time lapse video
indicating the exact movements of
each person who enters the
environment.1 18
Not content to rely on mere
surveillance cameras, IBM has
developed a thermal tracking system
it calls "Footprints" to monitor
shoppers. 119 The system uses sensors
mounted throughout the store that
pick up body heat.1 20 The sensors are
so precise that they can distinguish
between individuals in a group and
track the exact path of an individual
shopper through the store. 12 1 It is
suggested that the thermal
technology be coupled with existing
video cameras so that human
observers can record sex, age and
approximate income group data as
well.
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A company called ShopperTrak has
developed a "traffic counter [that]
utilizes an on-board video sensor and
multiple high-speed microprocessors
to unobtrusively track shoppers'
movements.' 123 The system, which
"literally watches shoppers from
overhead," has already been
implemented at 6,000 retail locations
worldwide and is touted as "discreet"
on the company's website.
124
Another company, KartSaver Inc.,
mounts tracking devices to shopping
carts that communicate via infrared
signals to receivers mounted in the
store's ceiling. 25 This allows the
store to track "the traffic patterns and
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shopping habits"126 of individual
consumers as they walk around the
supermarket, In the covert fashion
typical of these companies, KartSaver
once boasted in a press release that
'most consumers will never even
know that the product is being
employed."1
27
Hy-Vee Food Stores, one of
America's 15 largest grocery chains,
recently contracted to have a similar
infrared cart-tracking network
installed in its Kansas City stores. 128
Ktever Marketing, which developed
and installed the system, equipped
Hy-Vee shopping carts with tracking
devices and video screens to better




Klever Marketing suggests that its
technology could be linked with
frequent shopper card records, since
knowing a shopper's complete
purchase history, along with his or
her precise location in the store,
would better enable the supermarket
to target the shopper with
promotional messages. 130 "I think we
have just touched the tip of the
iceberg," said a senior Hy-Vee
executive. 131 "[This] will be a
standard part of our business within
the next three to five years."1 32 Then,
ominously, he added, "I'm not sure
any of us know what all the final uses
will be."' 
33
Semcor Inc., a Microsoft strategic
partner in the business of using
"geographic information systems"1 34
to "track and monitor the movements
of vehicles, equipment, wildlife and
virtually anything else that moves, 13
5
also suggests "inserting mini radio
transmitters into shopping carts in
your supermarket"' 36 to keep track of
shoppers.
Bridge Technology, an Arizona
corporation, is just one of the many
companies that hope to link loyalty
cards to wireless communications,
global positioning systems (GPS),
and Internet technologies to record
transactions and collect data from
remote and mobile locations on a
real-time basis. 37 This technology
would enable supermarket cards not
only to record what people buy, but
where they travel as well.
Even the floor people walk on can
be used to surreptitiously gather data
on them.138 Semcor's website advises
the use of pressure sensitive floor
pads to keep tabs on people as they
visit museums, galleries, and zoos. 1
39
Pressure sensitive flooring may be
just the beginning. Students at MIT's
Media Lab have developed a system
of floor sensors that can identify each
place a person has moved within a
room over time and exactly where
they are at any given moment.
140
While a shopper may be upset to
learn how extensively her local
retailer observes customers, imagine
her horror at discovering that her
favorite boutique is not a store at all,
but a carefully designed clandestine
consumer research laboratory. One
such "store" now exists. 141 The Once
Famous boutique in Minneapolis is a
1,800-foot storefront that presents
itself to shoppers as a trendy home
furnishings store.142 What shoppers
don't know is that the decorative
items are merely props to lure them
inside the store where they serve as
unsuspecting -and unpaid -research
subjects. 143 A complex network of
cameras and microphones carefully
concealed throughout the boutique is
used to observe and record each
shopper's response to specific itens
offered for sale. 144 These reactions
are later written up and sold to
clients of the parent company, who
pay anywhere from $15,000 to
$100,000 or more for researchers to




marketers seem to be to watch
customers' every move, it may not be
long before another Applied Digital
Solutions product-the "Digital
Angel Monitor," a GPS system that
can be worn as a wristwatch to allow
anyone to "find a person, animal or
object anywhere in the world...
anytime"146 is recommended as the
perfect device for collecting
consumer data 24 hours a day.
Auto-ID: Tracking everything,
everywhere
In 5-10 years, whole new ways of
doing things will emerge and
gradually become commonplace.
Expect big changes.147
- MIT's Auto-ID Center
Supermarket cards and retail
surveillance devices are merely the
opening volley of the marketers' war
against consumers. If consumers fail
to oppose these practices now, our
long-term prospects may look like
something from a dystopian science
fiction novel,
A new consumer goods tracking
system called Auto-ID is poised to
enter all of our lives, with profound
implications for consumer privacy.
Auto-ID couples radio frequency
(RF) identification technology with
highly miniaturized computers that
enable products to be identified and
tracked at any point along the supply
chain. 1
48
The system could be applied to
almost any physical item, from
ballpoint pens to toothpaste, which
would carry their own unique
information in the form of an
embedded chip.149 The chip sends
out an identification signal allowing it
to communicate with reader devices
and other products embedded with
similar chips. 1
50
Analysts envision a time when the
system will be used to identify and
track every item produced on the
planet.
151
A number for every Item on the
planet
Auto-ID employs a numbering
scheme called ePC (for "electronic
product code"), which can provide a
unique ID for any physical object in
the world. 52 The ePC is intended to
replace the UPC bar code used on
products today
53
Unlike the bar code, however, the
ePC goes beyond identifying product
categories - it actually assigns a
unique number to every single item
that rolls off a manufacturing line.
154
For example, each pack of cigarettes,
individual can of soda, light bulb or
package of razor blades produced
would be uniquely identifiable
through its own ePC number.
155
Once assigned, this number is
transmitted by a radio frequency ID
tag (RFID) in or on the product.'
56
These tiny tags, predicted by some to
cost less than I cent each by 2004,157
are "somewhere between the size of
a grain of sand and a speck of
dust.'' 58 They are to be built directly
into food, clothes, drugs, or auto-
parts during the manufacturing
process.
159
Receiver or reader devices are used
to pick up the signal transmitted by
the RFID tag. Proponents envision a
pervasive global network of millions
of receivers along the entire supply
chain - in airports, seaports,
highways, distribution centers,
warehouses, retail stores, and in the
home. 1 0 This would allow for
seamless, continuous identification
and tracking of physical items as they
move from one place to another,'
161
enabling companies to determine the
whereabouts of all their products at
all times. 1
62
Steven Van Fleet, an executive at
International Paper, looks forward to
the prospect. "We'll put a radio
frequency ID tag on everything that
moves in the North American supply
chain," he enthused recently.
16 3
The ultimate goal is for Auto-ID to
create a "physically linked world" 164
in which eveiy item on the planet is
numbered, identified, catalogued,
and tracked. And the technology
exists to make this a reality.
Described as "a political rather than a
technological problem," creating a
global system "would ... involve
negotiation between, and consensus
among, different countries."
165
Supporters are aiming for worldwide
acceptance of the technologies
needed to build the infrastructure
within the next few years,'
66
The implications of Auto-ID
7heft will be drastically reduced
because items will report when they
are stolen, their smart tags also
serving as a homing device toward
their exact location. 167
- MIT's Auto-ID Center
Since the Auto-ID Center was
founded at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) in
1999, it has moved forward at
remarkable speed, The center has
attracted funding from some of the
largest consumer goods
manufacturers in the world, and even
counts the Department of Defense
among its sponsors. 6 In a mid-2001
pilot test with Gillette, Philip Morris,
Procter & Gamble, and Wal-Mart, the
center wired the entire city of Tulsa,
Oklahoma with radio-frequency
equipment to verify its ability to track
Auto-ID equipped packages.1
69
Though many Auto-ID proponents
appear focused on inventory and
supply chain efficiency, others are
developing financial and consumer
applications that, if adopted, will
have chilling effects on consumers'
ability to escape the oppressive
surveillance of manufacturers,
retailers, and marketers. Of course,
government and law enforcement
will be quick to use the technology to
keep tabs on citizens, as well.
The European Central Bank is
quietly working to embed RFID tags
in the fibers of Euro bank notes by
2005.170 These tags would allow
money to carry its own history by
recording information about where it
has been, thus giving governments
and law enforcement agencies a
means to literally "follow the money"
in every transaction.il 1 If and when
RFID devices are embedded in
banknotes, the anonymity that cash
affords in consumer transactions will
be eliminated.
Hitachi Europe wants to supply the
tags. The company has developed a
smart tag chip that - at just 0.3mm
square and as thin as a human hair -
can easily fit inside of a banknote.
172
Mass-production of the new chip will




Radio frequency is another
technology that supermarkets are
already using in a number ofplaces
throughout the store. We now
envision a day where consumers will
walk into a store, select products
whose packages are embedded with
small radio frequency UPC codes,
and exit the store without ever going
through a checkout line orsigning
their name on a dotted line.i 
4
-Jackie Snyder, Manager of
Electronic Payments for Supervalu
(Supermarkets), Inc., and Chair, Food
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Marketing Institute Electronic
Payments Committee
Auto-ID would expand marketers'
ability to monitor individuals'
behavior to undreamt of extremes.
With corporate sponsors like Wal-
Mart, Target, the Food Marketing
Institute, Home Depot, and British
supermarket chain Tesco, as well as
some of the world's largest consumer
goods manufacturers including
Proctor and Gamble, Phillip Morris,
and Coca Cola 17 5 it may not be long
before Auto-ID-based surveillance
tags begin appearing in every store-
bought item in a consumer's home.
According to a video tour of the
"Home of the Future" and "Store of
the Future" sponsored by Proctor and
Gamble, applications could include
shopping carts that automatically bill
consumer's accounts (cards would
no longer be needed to link
purchases to individuals),
refrigerators that report their contents
to the supermarket for re-ordering,
and interactive televisions that select
commercials based on the contents
of a home's refrigerator.
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Now that shopper cards have
whetted their appetite for data,
marketers are no longer content to
know who buys what, when, where,
and how. As incredible as it may
seem, they are now planning ways to
monitor consumers' use of products
within their very homes. Auto-l) tags
coupled with indoor receivers
installed in shelves, floors, and
doorways, 177 could provide a degree
of omniscience about consumer
behavior that staggers the
imagination.
Consider the following statements
by John Stermer, Senior Vice
President of eBusiness Market
Development at ACNielsen:
[After bar codes)t] he next 'big thing'
[was] [flrequent shopper cards. While
these did a bellerjob of linking
consumers and theirpurchases,
loyalty cards were severely
limited.. consider the usage,
consumer demographic,
psycbographic and economic blind
spots of tracking data.... [Something
more integrated and holistic was
needed to provide a ubiquitous
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understanding of on- and off-line
consumerpurchase behavior,
attitudes andproduct usage. The
answer. RFID (radio frequency
identification) technology.... In an
industryfirst, RFID enables the
linking of all thisproduct
information with a specific
consumer identified by key
demographic andpsycbograpbic
markers .... Where once we collected
purchase injbrmation, now we can
correlate mulliplepoints of consumer
productpurchase with consumption
specifics such as the how, when and
who of producl use.1
75
Marketers aren't the only ones who
want to watch what you do in your
home. Enter again the health
surveillance connection. Some have
suggested that pill bottles in
medicine cabinets be tagged with
Auto-ID devices to allow doctors to
remotely monitor patient compliance
with prescriptions. 1
79
While developers claim that Auto-
ID technology will create "order and
balance" in a chaotic world,1 8t even
the center's executive director, Kevin
Ashton, acknowledges there's a
"Brave New World" feel to the
technology) 18 He admits, for
example, that people might balk at
the thought of police using Auto-ID
to scan the contents of a car's trunk
without needing to open it.1" 2 The
Center's co-director, Sanjay E. Sarma,
has already begun planning
strategies to counter the public




[Tihe consumer is therefore
constantly constructed as an exterior
object to be captured, studied,
reduced and targeted by the operator
in other words, as the enemy of the
intelligent machine. 154
-John Goss, Marketing the New
Marketing
What does all of this say about the
marketing industry and its attitudes?
In their frenzy to manipulate others,
marketers have lost their awareness
of their fellow human beings as
equals, deserving of dignity and
respect. Viewed through the
distorted lens of loyalty marketing,
customers cease to be people; they
are transformed into rather stupid
domestic animals or laboratory
specimens, becoming inventory units
to be studied, manipulated,
controlled, and exploited to
maximize their contribution to the
bottom line. Any feelings the
customer may express about this
treatment are dispassionately
observed and duly recorded to
become fodder for even more
analysis, which is then used to inform
the next, more thorough iteration of
persuasion and control.
While we may be "valued
customers," our value is no more
than that of chattel, since our true
value - our humanity - is
disregarded. Shopper cards play a
key role in fostering this
dehumanization in the minds of
retailers and marketers. Once
consumers are systematically
numbered and recorded in the
database, the supermarket can finally
treat them like any other item in their
inventory control system - as
impersonal units to be numbered,
cataloged, and tracked.
SECTION 4: WORKING TOWRRD R
SOLUTION
A national organization to
oppose supermarket
surveillance cards
When I first realized the long term
implications of allowing our food
purchases to be monitored and
recorded, I created a website that




mission is to educate consumers,
condemn marketing practices that
invade customers' privacy, and
encourage privacy-conscious
shopping habits across the retail
spectrum. Today, CASPIAN's
membership base spans the U.S.A.
and our efforts have been featured by
numerous media outlets including
Kiplinger's Personal Finance
magazine, Extra!, the Boston Globe,
the Seattle Times, the major
television networks, PBS, and local
radio, TV, and newspapers around
the country.
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CASPIAN believes that individual
consumers are ultimately responsible
for protecting their own privacy, so
we encourage shoppers to become
informed, inform others, and "vote
with their feet.'186 We also encourage
peaceful protests against card
programs and other intrusive retail
surveillance schemes. We do not
advocate legislative solutions to the
card problem, having observed a
disturbing trend in the past for "data
protection laws" to put the data to be
protected squarely into the hands of
the government.1
7
A common sentiment expressed by
new CASPIAN members is, "Thank
goodness I found you; I thought I
was the only person to feel this
way!"188 And indeed one of
CASPIAN's key roles is to encourage
privacy-conscious shoppers with the
knowledge that they are not alone.
Regrettably, many supermarket
chains demoralize card opponents by
pretending ignorance of the
movement to oppose cards and
failing to acknowledge the large
volume of anti-card complaints they
receive.
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Arguments against using 'fake"
or traded cards
Unfortunately, many shoppers think
they have found a clever way to
bypass the surveillance schemes at
their local supermarkets by filling out
shopper card applications under
false names or trading their grocery
cards with others.' 90 Though the
shopper may think he or she is
pulling the wool over the
supermarkets' eyes, these tactics
actually play right into the marketers'
hands.
In a brilliant counter-move, stores
not only permit these practices, but
may openly encourage them as a
way to lull card opponents into
participating in the system rather
than fighting it. Stores know that the
fake name "loophole" removes
dissenters from the ranks of the
opposition and adds them instead to
the army of shoppers standing in line
with cards - where they continue to
pour money into the store's coffers.
The anti-shopper-card movement
loses some of its strongest potential
allies this way, because shoppers
who sign up under fake names or
trade cards with others believe
they've found "the solution" and no
longer have to fight.
Though the choice of where to
shop may feel like a decision that
only affects the consumer, it is a two-
way street. Money that leaves the
shopper's wallet winds up in
someone else's. By continuing to
shop at card stores, consumers
contribute their hard-earned grocery
money to fund the retail surveillance
agenda. They pay for publicists to
fight people like me. They pay the
salaries of the Catalina Marketing
executives who create and peddle
these schemes. 191 And they pay for
psychologists to analyze the
remaining holdouts to find ways to
overcome their resistance.
Boycott cards now while there
are still alternatives
[One customer issue is the inertia of
the typical consumer While a
segment will always be active and
vigilant, the majority willpay; less
attention to encroachments on their
right to privacy92
- Frank Franzak, et al., Journal of
Consumer Marketing
Find out just what anypeople will
quietly submit to and you have found
out the exact measure of iniustice
and wrong which will be imposed
upon them, and these will continue
till they are resisted with either words
or blows, or both. The limits of tyrants
areprescribed by the endurance of
those whom they oppress.193
- Fredrick Douglass, Two Speeches
It is surprising that so many people
cooperate with the retail surveillance
agenda, considering how easy it is to
resist. For most shoppers, resisting
simply means driving a few extra
minutes to a card-free supermarket
and paying by cash instead of using a
credit card. If everyone who opposed
cards decided to shop elsewhere for
even a few months, the card stores
would soon feel the financial effects
and the card programs
would crumble.
The time to shop elsewhere is
now, while alternatives are plentiful.
Two of the nation's largest card-free
grocery chains are currently test
marketing cards (Albertson's in
Dallas/Ft, Worth 194 and Winn-Dixie
in Florida and Georgia'
95). If
shoppers do not stand firm in
boycotting these trials, eventually
both chains may implement cards
nationwide, leaving towns and cities
all over the country stranded with
few or no card-free shopping options
left.
The longer consumers postpone
taking action on the problem, the
harder it will be to solve in the future.
Eventually, the implementation of
fingerprint readers in the
supermarket coupled with Auto-ID
technology may make the problem
so enormous that few will have the
strength to resist.
The tide is turning
The good news is that consumers
appear to be growing wary of card-
based surveillance. Stop & Shop's
Curt Avallone revealed that
acceptance levels for Stop & Shop's
card have dropped from a high of
50% eight years ago to just 40%
today.196 He admits that "people are
disappointed in the card and what
we've been doing with it'197 and
acknowledges that privacy concerns
have become a sticky issue for the
company.
19 8
American consunhrs may be
poised to take back the ground they
have lost. When Albertsons began
test-marketing its card program in
Texas last year, it was met with fierce
opposition by CASPIAN-led shoppers
who joined together in a boycott and
mounted a peaceful protest against
the store.' 99 Virtually all of the major
media in Dallas (television,
newspaper, and radio) discussed the
privacy implications of the card and
informed shoppers of the movement
to oppose it. The media coverage
and boycott corresponded with a
drop in Albertson's market share in
the region. 200 Through continued
pressure, CASPIAN hopes to
encourage Albertsons to reconsider
its plans to introduce the card
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elsewhere.
A number of other supermarket
chains have dismantled their card
programs over the years in response
to consumer concerns. 20 1 These
include Raley's (rated America's #1
supermarket chain by Consumer
Reports 20 2), Wild Oats (the nation's
third largest natural food chain by
sales 20 3), and the H.E.B. Grocery
Company of San Antonio (recently
called the "most impressive
' 20 4 of
U.S. grocery retailers).
Even Britain's fourth largest
grocery retailer, Safeway (now
unrelated to the U.S. chain of the
same name), abandoned its card
program in 2000 because of its
enormous cost. When the chain re-
channeled the approximately $70
million it had been spending
annually on cards into lower overall
prices, 205 its market share rose 5%.
2
06
"People don't think [the cards] give
value. [But] they'll never get tired of
great deals," explained Safeway's
chief executive Carlos Criado-
Perez.2
07
A message of hope
Though danger is on the horizon,
consumers need not feel hopeless,
outnumbered, or discouraged. The
good news is that the corporations
are dependent on their customers,
not the other way around. As soon as
large numbers of consumers begin to
withhold their shopping dollars from
stores that engage in shopper
surveillance, stores will scramble to
regain those dollars through more
responsible practices. We must each
make the decision to stop funding
the beast.
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
It's not too late to turn back
We all wantprogress ... but if
you're on the wrong road, progress
means doing an about-turn and
walking back to the right road, and
in that case, the man who turns back
soonest is the mostprogressive man...
We are on the wrong road. And if
that is so, we must go back. Going
back is the quickest way on. 208
-C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity
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Of the many reasons to oppose
cards, the future is perhaps the most
important. Should our children grow
up trained to report their every move,
activity, and purchase - even the
contents of their every meal - to
marketers and government officials?
As a nation we must think twice
about creating a society where
everything we do is monitored,
scrutinized, and observed by others. I
believe that most Americans feel
strongly enough about privacy and
freedom to reject the surveillance
model of society - and are
uncomfortable with the direction we
are headed.
The promoters of retail
surveillance technology might better
spend their time asking more
fundamental questions about the
societal implications of their work,
rather than asking themselves how to
convince the public to tolerate the
all-encompassing surveillance their
systems are likely to spawn.
Even today, supermarket cards
have begun to serve a conditioning
function to ease the public's
concerns over other forms of
intrusive registration and
surveillance. Consumers' use of
grocery cards and, by extension, their
implied acceptance of the cards' data
collection function, are pointed to as
justification whenever more invasive
schemes are proposed.
A recent UN report cited "the
increasing data collection by the
private sector" as possibly the most
important factor influencing the
public's willingness to surrender data
to government entities. 209 The report
mentions Catalina Marketing, which
has collected billions of rows of data
on American shoppers, saying, "the
widespread public awareness of
private sector profiling may act to
actually reduce privacy and
confidentiality concerns among the
public, if they believe that all
information about them is already
known."
21 0
Among other things, supermarket
cards have been used to justify
National ID. 211 Alan Simpson, Former
Senate Majority Whip, testifying on
National ID said, "Every time we try
to do something in this area, it's filled
with emotion, fear, guilt, and racism.
You have to do something, and that
something is not any more intrusive
than what you get when you go into
the [grocery] store and slide your
[discount] card. 
' 212
Instead of using supermarket cards
as justification for even more invasive
surveillance, we need to remember
that surveilling the food habits of
millions of human beings is in and of
itself tremendously invasive. The fact
that large numbers of Anericans scan
a supermarket card on a regular basis
does not detract from this reality.
The future is up to us
While surveillance should not be
tolerated in any area of our lives, its
application to something as
physically intimate and essential for
survival as food is particularly
repugnant. As long as shoppers
continue to allow their eating habits
to be recorded, the danger will
always remain that laws or political
maneuvering will override their
stores' privacy policies or ethical
standards. The data that
supermarkets have quietly collected
for nearly a decade has become a
tempting target for busybodies of all
stripes.
There will always be those who
believe the potential societal benefits
of surveillance schemes outweigh the
risks of abuse. However, though
there is ample evidence that the
supposed security "benefits" of mass
surveillance are quite doubtful, 21 3 the
risks of unchecked goveftiment
control are very real and not to be
discounted.20 4 As the police and
other agents of the state increasingly
tap the power of the retail sector's
growing arsenal of sophisticated
surveillance technologies, we may
soon find ourselves in the totalitarian
nightmare described by George
Orwell in 1984. It is up to each of us
to ensure that comprehensive, all-
knowing surveillance systems are
returned to the scrap heap of
history's bad ideas before it is too late
to turn back.
Even though most citizens are
unaware of Auto-ID and plans for
omniscient police and UN databases,
virtually everyone has heard of the
lowly supermarket card. And here,
finally, is one useful purpose cards
can serve: as a wake up call to the
public. Americans must take a
second look at the cards in their
wallets and on their key chains,
recognizing that they represent only
the most visible component of a
massive push toward global
surveillance being driven by the retail
sector. Cards arc just one symptom of
an advancing disease that, left
unchecked, will almost certainly
prove fatal to privacy - and may
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continuedfrompage 533
about being American. I do believe,
however, that we can utilize many
modern technologies in government
and business as long as we fully
appreciate and evaluate the larger
stakes, There has been too much
blind criticism and too much jerking
of the knees on this subject.
Government has a stake in both
efficiency and privacy. We have
large problems that need to be
managed by modern technologies.
But, government also has a stake in
maintaining privacy. Meaningful
privacy guarantees are necessary to
ensure public confidence in
government. After all, privacy is the
foundation of the secret ballot,
search and seizure protection,
doctor-patient and lawyer-client
privilege, and our whole concept of
being a free and independent
American.
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as well as the reach of their
'market.'45
In short, the court insisted on the
ability of California employers to
compete for employees nationwide
irrespective of the costs incurred by
non-California employers from
abrogation of their non-competition
agreements.
There are strong arguments for
enforcing contracts choosing the law
applicable to non-competition
agreements. First, such agreements
are likely to reflect the contracting
parties' mutual interests. Second,
enforcement allows firms to escape
inefficient restrictions on contracting,
particularly where states otherwise
would be able to reach far outside
their borders, as in Hunter. Third,
enforcing agreements notifies parties
what law will be applied to their
contract, and therefore how to draft
the contract, price its provisions and
behave in accordance with the
applicable law. Fourth, these
contracts allow firms to impose the
same rules with regard to all
employees, even if they live in states
with different rules on enforcement of
non-competes. This may be
significant where the fir must design
company-wide rules and
contracts relating to information
dissemination, incentives, and basic
structure of its employment
relationships.46 For example, a firm
may want to make its compensation
contracts contingent on compliance
with the non-compete in order to
discipline potential abuse of
corporate information.
The problem with enforcing
contractual choice is that it can allow
an end-run around efficient state
regulation. if state regulation of non-
competes reduces externalities such as
the efficiency of free-flowing
information, it follows that these
externalities will impede efficient
contractual choice just as they do
efficient non-competes.47
One way to accommodate
arguments for and against
enforcement is to enforce contractual
choice of law except where a state
whose law would apply in the
absence of a choice of law clause
specifically legislates against
enforcement of the non-compete.
This restriction has two components.
First, it limits the reach of state
restrictions on contractual choice. This
focuses attention on the terms of the
default choice-of-law rule. In contrast
to the current multi-factor test, this
rule should be designed to be as
precise and predictable as
possible. Predictability would
maximize the parties' ability to exit
from oppressive laws by avoiding
regulating states, and would let the
parties shape their conduct and
contract with reference to the
applicable law.48 These
considerations would, for example,
usually preclude application of the
law of a raiding employer's state
where the firm is raiding employees of
an out-of-state firm, as in Hunter.49
Second, the applicable state should
be able to restrict contractual choice
only by explicit legislative policy. This
again reflects the need to
facilitate contracting with reference to
the applicable law. It also helps
ensure popular support for any
restrictions on contractual choice by
making the restriction salient and
thereby inviting active competition
among interest groups.50 This is not
feasible where courts decide choice of
law disputes expost in specific cases.
5i
This approach contrasts with the
current emphasis on
"fundamental policy" and a state's
"interests," which make it uncertain
which states' regulation will be
applied to trump contractually
selected law. The vagueness of these
tests sometimes allows states to have
it both ways, applying their laws to
enforce contracts of local firms against
out-of-state firms, as well as to tromp
contracts of out-of-state firms in favor
of local firms.
Efficient enforcement of
contractual choice of law consistent
with the recommended rule may
follow from the combined influence
of several related contractual devices
and legal rules. First, since results like
that in Hunter are likely to be reached
only by state courts in states with self-
serving policies regarding non-
competition agreements, the parties
may be able to minimize these results
through choice-of-forum or arbitration
clauses that choose more contract-
friendly adjudicators or jurisdictions.
For example, in the Hunlersituation,
the parties might agree to have the
case tried in Maryland. Although the
employee may seek to avoid the effect
of this clause by suing in California, a
California state court may have some
incentive to avoid having to decide
the tricky choice-of-law issue by
enforcing the choice-of-forum
clause. 52 The Federal Arbitration Act
may ensure enforcement of the
arbitration clause if the transaction
involves interstate commerce.
53
Second, to the extent that courts do
not enforce ex ante choice of forum
clauses, the parties have significant
leeway to ensure enforcement of their
chosen law by choosing to litigate in a
hospitable forum. For example, the
employer can sue in the contractually
selected state or in federal court to
enforce the choice-of-law clause or to
get a declaratory judgment that the
contract is enforceable. Although
federal courts apply local state law in
diversity cases, 54 they may tend more
than state courts to enforce
contractual choice of law in marginal
cases because they lack state judges'
incentives to back the prerogatives of
the local legislature. 55 In fact, a
survey of approximately 20 years of
decisions under the Restatement
provisions quoted above showed that
federal courts were mpproximately
twice as likely to enforce contractual
choice as state courts. 6 As one might
expect, most cases involving
enforcement of contractual choice of
law have been decided in federal
court.
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To be sure, the employee can play
the same game and sue in a non-
enforcing court to invalidate the
agreement. Indeed, both games
played out in Hunter, with the
wronged employer suing and getting
a judgment in Maryland, and the
competing new employer suing in
California. 58 The former employer
was able to stay the California action
pending completion of the Maryland
action.59 The California court noted
that it was not determining the full
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faith and credit effect of any
judgment Iunter might obtain in
Maryland, 60 Although the employer
will not always succeed in this game,
the prospect of competing judgments
may be enough to persuade courts to
enforce choice of forum clauses and
eliminate any uncertainty about the
forum.61
'Third, even if the parties cannot
control the fomm, they may be able to
structure their contracts to avoid
application of regulating states' laws,
or avoid contacts with those states that
might justify application of those
states' laws. In HunleC for example,
the raided employer could avoid
subjecting its own activities to
California law by not stationing
employees with non-competes in
California, instead working there
through independent contractors.
Although none of these
approaches helped I tunter avoid
application of California law to the
California firm that raided its
employees, Hunter should be seen as
an extreme case where Hunter was
specifically concerned about being
raided by the California firm. The
application of California law there
meant that the partics were at least
treated sy rmnetrically - that is,
Hunter could not hide behind
Maryland law while raiding the
California firm under Calilornia law.
Thus, the decision effectively
preserves the viability of California
law, which otherwise would have
been threatened by one-sided
application of the California
regulation. Moreover, the quote from
the opinion above makes clear that
the court was specifically concerned
about "virtual" or knowledge based
firms with no fixed location. 62 The
court held that under its rule "it is
plainly not sufficient simply to be
employed by a California-based
employer such as AGI, or to be
treated as a California employee for
tax and other legal purposes, if the
employee is to perform services
exclusively 'beyond the borders of
California.'"63
In sum, this discussion raises two
general points. First, the existence of
an externality or spillover problem
with state regulation is based on the
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same factors that give rise to
jurisdictional choice. Second,
jurisdictional choice supports
enforcement of contracts from an
interstate perspective even if these
contracts do not seem to be




"Jhis Part discusses the issues
regarding privacy of employees'
information. As discussed in Part I,
above, the employers' need for this
information is a function of the
inherent characteristics of the firm -
namely, the team production
problem, which triggers a need for
monitoring. As discussed in subpart
A, this need for information may
collide with employees desire for
and expectation of privacy. As
discussed in subpart B, these
problems theoretically may be
resolved by contracts between
employers and employees, although
these contracts may not always be
enforced. Subpart C shows that, as
with privacy of employers'
information, contracting is a viable




E lployecs have an interest in
protecting against employers'
intrusions on their private space,
Conversely, employers have a
legitimate interest in monitoring
employees, including preventing
abuse of employers' confidential
information and detecting crimes and
other wrongs committed by
employees. Enforcing contracts
regarding these matters increases
social wealth by encouraging
efficient employment arrangements.
Arguments concerning the
employee's privacy draw on the




thereby making the employment
marker less efficient and increasing
agency costs. 64 This may both
reduce social wealth and redistribute
wealth from "good" to "bad"
employees. Amnong other effects, the
inability to monitor may decrease
employers' ability to protect against
employee abuse of trade secrets,
thereby increasing the firm's need to
rely on non-competition agreenents.
On the other hand, protecting
employees' privacy to some extent
may be efficient. Employees may
derive utility from protecting their
personal space.6 5 This protection
may enable them to better realize
their prixate preferences, such as
sexual orientation, or to avoid
misinterpretation of isolated bits of
information, such as out of context
statements. 66 If legal protection is
inadequate, employees may have to
invest in self-protection, which
would force greater expenditures on
reputation than would be the case
under an efficient legal rule,6' Even if
Larry Ribstein
I am currently Foundation
Professor of Law, George Mason
University School of Law.
Effective in May I will be the
Richard W. and Marie L. Corman
Professor of Law, University of
Illinois College of Law. I am the
author or co-author of six books
and more than 80 articles on
corporations, securities law,
partnerships, conflict of laws,
professional responsibility,
bankruptcy, constitutional law
and other topics. My interest in
privacy law stems from my work
on contractual choice of law. See
especially my written articles with
Professor Bruce Kobayashi: A








and State Regulation of Electronic
Comnerce, George Mason Law &
Economics Working Paper 01-31,
http://papers.ssmn.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract id=294466,
forthcoming Emory Law Journal.
the particular basis for employee
utility cannot be identified, the test




INTRASTATE PERSPECTIVEk with non-competition
greements and protecting
against abuse of trade secrets,
enforcing contracts can lead to the
optimal rules for particular situations.
Employers arguably would not seek
excessively to invade employees'
privacy because they will have to pay
employees to succumb to this
surveillance. Employers seemingly
would have little interest in
generating irrelevant or inaccurate
information about employees. The
courts have, in fact, enforced
employer surveillance where it has a
business purpose.
69
An initial contracting issue
regarding employer surveillance
concerns the appropriate default
rule.70 In the consumer information
context, a default rule favoring
privacy may be appropriate because
the merchant arguably has a better
idea than the consumer of the value
of the information. 71 However, in the
employment context the default rule
arguably should favor surveillance
because the employee has a better
idea of the negative information that
the employer might discover. The
default rule, of course, would not be
expected to prefer unlimited
surveillance because this would
impose high costs on employees
without enough benefit for
employers to justify sufficient wage
adjustments to cover these costs. This
supports the general requirement of
surveillance being reasonably related
to the employer's business
purpose.
7 2
But it is not feasible to design a
default rule that adequately covers all
situations because such a rule would
have to be too narrow or too broad. A
default rule based on a legitimate
business purpose might cover all
employers and employees but is too
broad to provide adequate guidance
in specific situations. Thus, the
parties will need to rely on specific
contracts.
Nevertheless, there is significant
recent authority against enforcement
of contracts. Cramnerv. Consolidated
Freightways, Inc.7 3 held that a
collective bargaining agreement that
arguably allowed video surveillance
behind two-way bathroom mirrors
could not supersede what the court
deemed to be the mandatory
provisions of state privacy law. The
judge who wrote the en bane
decision expressed a concern in his
panel dissent about Orwellian
intrusions.74 This makes little sense
assuming that the employees
consented to the intrusion in the
collective bargaining agreement, as a
dissenter to the en bane decision
argued.75 Moreover, the Orwellian
argument suggests the
implementation of a federal policy,
which is inappropriate in the context
of purportedly interpreting a state
restriction on intrusions. In any event,
this case indicates that, as with non-
competition agreements, employers
apparently cannot rely on contracts





W e interstate perspective on
employee privacy contracts
differs from that in the non-
competition setting because
employee privacy agreements are
more likely to be anchored in a
single state. The non-compete
context involves the competing
interests of states where raiding and
raided firms are located. With respect
to employee privacy, on the other
hand, the primary interests are focused
in a single state, where the employee
whose interests are at stake is located.
Thus, there are less likely to be
regulatory spillovers in this context. In
other words, the employers' ability to
select
jurisdictions in which they locate may
be enough to internalize
regulatory costs and benefits in
regulating jurisdictions. At the same
time, employers' ability to choose the
applicable jurisdiction is likely to be
more limited. Under the Restatement,
courts are unlikely to enforce the
contractual choice of a jurisdiction
other than where the invaded
employee works to trump the
"fundamental" regulatory policy of the
state of employment.
Despite these considerations,
employee privacy has a real interstate
dimension. Multi-state employers are
likely to want to choose a single
policy for monitoring employees.
The problem is even more serious for
"virtual" companies like those in
Hunter, where employees live and
work in several states and the
employers' privacy policies relate to,
for example, networked computers.
Although default choice of law rules
raise fewer problems in this context
than in the non-compete context,
choice-of-law clauses may be useful to
enable employers to avoid oppressive
states without
having to avoid hiring in those states.
Again, these clauses should be
enforceable unless the "default" state
specifically legislates against them.
Howeve; the Consolidated
Freightways case indicates that
contractual choice may not always be
enforceable. The court refused to
enforce the employer's effective
choice of federal labor law against a
supposed state mandatory privacy
rule.
As with non-competes, employers
may be able to enforce jurisdictional
choice by choosing the forum in
which they litigate. To be sure, courts
with strong pro-privacy policies may
be unwilling to enforce contractual
choice of forum. Bu an employer
may be able to choose expostto
litigate the enforceability of the
contract in a state in which it does
substantial business,
V. CONCLUDING REMARKSY aditional economic theories of the
firm intersect with modern
concerns about privacy. The firm is
about ensuring the free flow of
information, while privacy policies
attempt to intersect these flows. These
competing concerns generally should
be resolved by contracts. In some
cases state regulation is
appropriate. Jurisdictional choice in
our federal system serves to
discipline excessive state regulation.
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The government argued that the
information sought was only a
business record, that they could not
care less what the suspect read, and
that it could be used to establish a
state of rnind. They contended that a
book purchase is no different than a
hardware purchase record when it
comes to a criminal investigation. I
fundamentally disagree.
Entering books into evidence that
are found at a crime scene is one
thing. Seeking out who bought what
from a bookstore is another.
Purchasing, borrowing or "reading a
book is not a crime. "4 To edge closer
to using a customer's book purchase
records as an acceptable way of
determining criminal behavior is
disquieting at best, and downright
frightening at worst. Whether as a
reporter seeking information, an
iconoclast harmlessly pushing the
envelope of societal acceptance, or
even someone potentially
contemplating illegal behavior,
reading is not a crime.
The Tattered Cover is appreciative
of the thoughtful consideration Judge
Phillips gave to his decision. While
we are in disagreement with part of
that decision, we could not agree
more with the chilling effect that he
addressed when speech is thwarted.
Judge Philips stated: "It is clear that
the First Amendment of the
Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas,
regardless of social worth, and to
receive such information without
government intrusion or
obsenation" 5 He went on to quote
the late Supreme Court Justice
Douglas on the necessity for such
protection:
Once the government can
demand of a publisher the names
of the purchasers of his
publications, the free press as we
know it disappears. Then the
spectre of a government agent
will look over the shoulder of
everyone who reads. The
purchase of a book or pamphlet
today may result in a subpoena
tomorrow. Fear of criticism goes
with every person into the
bookstall, The subtle,
imponderable pressures of the
orthodox lay hold. Some will fear
to read what is unpopular, what
the powers-that-be dislike. When
the light of publicity may reach
any Student, any teacher, inquiry
will be discouraged. The books
and pamphlets that are critical of
the administration, that preach an
unpopular policy in domestic or
foreign affairs, that are in
disrepute in the orthodox school
of thought will be suspect and
subject to investigation. The press
and its readers will pay a heavy
price in harassment. But that will
be minor in comparison with the
menace of the shadow which
government will cast over
literature that does not follow the
dominant party line. If the lady
from Toledo can be required to
disclose what she read yesterday
and what she will read tomorrow,
fear will take the place of freedom
in the libraries, bookstores, and
homes of the land. Through the
harassment of hearings,
investigation, reports, and
subpoenas government will hold
a club over speech and over the
press.
6
When they heard about this case,
hundreds of outr customers took the
time to call or write to us in support
of our stand, underscoring this
message and raising their own
concerns about privacy and the
chilling effect on the Fi st
Amendment of requiring bookstores
to tmrn over to the police information
regarding the purchases of
customers,
continued frompage 525
When the trial court held that officers could seize the
record of the purchase that was delivered in the
maile, but denied them the right to confiscate other
records of the same customer, the Tattered Cover
appealed.
In its decision, the Colorado Supreme Court
explained "how the First Amendment and Article II,
Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution safeguard the
right of the public to buy and read books
anonymously, free from governmental intrusion.' 5
Accordingly, the court developed a test for whether
law enforcement officials may seek to seize the book
purchase records of an innocent, third-party
bookstore in order to gather evidence against a
customer. The test requires the government to
demonstrate a compelling need for the information
sought. "The court must then balance the law
enforcement officials' need for the bookstore record
against the harm caused to constitutional interests by
execution of the search warrant."6 The court also
held that "an innocent, third-party bookstore must be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing prior to the
execution of any search warrant that seeks to obtain
its cistomers' book-purchasing records."7 In this
hearing, the court is to apply the test created by the
Colorado Supreme Court.
In applying this test to the Tattered Cover search
warrant, the court looked at the government's three
justifications for wanting the record of the suspect's
purchase: (1) to prove that the suspect had the
necessary incus rea to be prosecuted for the
manufacture of methamphetamine, (2) to prove that
the suspect lived in the bedroom where the meth lab
and books were found and (3) to connect the suspect
to the crime. Analyzing each one separately, the
court held that the government showed no
sufficiently compelling interest to outweigh the
potential chilling effect on the right to buy books
anonymously.
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The government argued that the
information sought was only a
business record, that they could not
care less what the suspect read, and
that it could be used to establish a
state of rnind. They contended that a
book purchase is no different than a
hardware purchase record when it
comes to a criminal investigation. I
fundamentally disagree.
Entering books into evidence that
are found at a crime scene is one
thing. Seeking out who bought what
from a bookstore is another.
Purchasing, borrowing or "reading a
book is not a crime. "4 To edge closer
to using a customer's book purchase
records as an acceptable way of
determining criminal behavior is
disquieting at best, and downright
frightening at worst. Whether as a
reporter seeking information, an
iconoclast harmlessly pushing the
envelope of societal acceptance, or
even someone potentially
contemplating illegal behavior,
reading is not a crime.
The Tattered Cover is appreciative
of the thoughtful consideration Judge
Phillips gave to his decision. While
we are in disagreement with part of
that decision, we could not agree
more with the chilling effect that he
addressed when speech is thwarted.
Judge Philips stated: "It is clear that
the First Amendment of the
Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas,
regardless of social worth, and to
receive such information without
government intrusion or
obsenation" 5 He went on to quote
the late Supreme Court Justice
Douglas on the necessity for such
protection:
Once the government can
demand of a publisher the names
of the purchasers of his
publications, the free press as we
know it disappears. Then the
spectre of a government agent
will look over the shoulder of
everyone who reads. The
purchase of a book or pamphlet
today may result in a subpoena
tomorrow. Fear of criticism goes
with every person into the
bookstall, The subtle,
imponderable pressures of the
orthodox lay hold. Some will fear
to read what is unpopular, what
the powers-that-be dislike. When
the light of publicity may reach
any Student, any teacher, inquiry
will be discouraged. The books
and pamphlets that are critical of
the administration, that preach an
unpopular policy in domestic or
foreign affairs, that are in
disrepute in the orthodox school
of thought will be suspect and
subject to investigation. The press
and its readers will pay a heavy
price in harassment. But that will
be minor in comparison with the
menace of the shadow which
government will cast over
literature that does not follow the
dominant party line. If the lady
from Toledo can be required to
disclose what she read yesterday
and what she will read tomorrow,
fear will take the place of freedom
in the libraries, bookstores, and
homes of the land. Through the
harassment of hearings,
investigation, reports, and
subpoenas government will hold
a club over speech and over the
press.
6
When they heard about this case,
hundreds of outr customers took the
time to call or write to us in support
of our stand, underscoring this
message and raising their own
concerns about privacy and the
chilling effect on the Fi st
Amendment of requiring bookstores
to tmrn over to the police information
regarding the purchases of
customers,
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When the trial court held that officers could seize the
record of the purchase that was delivered in the
maile, but denied them the right to confiscate other
records of the same customer, the Tattered Cover
appealed.
In its decision, the Colorado Supreme Court
explained "how the First Amendment and Article II,
Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution safeguard the
right of the public to buy and read books
anonymously, free from governmental intrusion.' 5
Accordingly, the court developed a test for whether
law enforcement officials may seek to seize the book
purchase records of an innocent, third-party
bookstore in order to gather evidence against a
customer. The test requires the government to
demonstrate a compelling need for the information
sought. "The court must then balance the law
enforcement officials' need for the bookstore record
against the harm caused to constitutional interests by
execution of the search warrant."6 The court also
held that "an innocent, third-party bookstore must be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing prior to the
execution of any search warrant that seeks to obtain
its cistomers' book-purchasing records."7 In this
hearing, the court is to apply the test created by the
Colorado Supreme Court.
In applying this test to the Tattered Cover search
warrant, the court looked at the government's three
justifications for wanting the record of the suspect's
purchase: (1) to prove that the suspect had the
necessary incus rea to be prosecuted for the
manufacture of methamphetamine, (2) to prove that
the suspect lived in the bedroom where the meth lab
and books were found and (3) to connect the suspect
to the crime. Analyzing each one separately, the
court held that the government showed no
sufficiently compelling interest to outweigh the
potential chilling effect on the right to buy books
anonymously.
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people before and after me. A single
individual cannot appreciate the full
effect of widespread personal
searches of everyday American
travelers.
In contrast, the security benefits
that appear to flow from the searches
seem quite tangible. I board the
plane with the knowledge that I pose
no risk, and the belief that those
around me pose no risk either, since
they all endured the same scrutiny as
I did. Then, after the flight goes
smoothly, the safe landing reinforces
the notion that security measures
increase my safety. Of course, the
many things that I failed to perceive
are precisely the things that would
undermine my confidence in security
measures. For example, I may not
have realized that the metal detector
through which my fellow passengers
and I passed had been inadvertently
unplugged. 62 I may not have noticed
one of my fellow passengers
boarding the plane despite the fact
that his driver's license did not match
the name on his ticket. 63 Nor might I
understand that such oversights are
inevitable in passenger checks and
baggage scans, because the "signal
rate" - the frequency with which
terrorists or impostors appear at the
gate or weapons appear in the
baggage - is so low. 64 Instead, I see
only the safe result, which confirms
my perception that security measures
produce tangible benefits, or more
specifically, that they avert tangible
harms.
The distortion of individual
perception in favor of security is
obviously heightened in the wake of
September 11. In today's climate,
with physical and emotional scars
from terrorist attacks still present on
the landscape and in our lives, the
perceived tangible benefits of
security measures are magnified in
the eyes of many. For that reason, we
should not be surprised at the surface
appeal of suggesting that we sacrifice
"a little " privacy to preserve the
tangible benefits of security. An
important task for privacy advocates
is to focus attention on how even
seemingly limited intrusions on
privacy can have consequences that
reach far beyond the limited context
in which they are proposed.
II. REVEALING THE TANGIBLE AS
INTANGIBLE
F inally, I suggest that the tangible-
versus-intangible framework is
misleading. Measures alleged to yield
tangible security benefits in fact serve
many intangible purposes.
Admittedly, in the wake of
September 11, it is difficult to
imagine a more tangible concern
than the destructive effects of a
terrorist attack. Many responses to
these attacks, however, are not
merely aimed at preventing such
tangible harms. Instead, they serve in
large measure to preserve merely the
perception of security - the intangible
notion that our government can, in
fact, protect us from terrorism.
Jeffrey Rosen's investigation of
Britain's experience with terrorism
and video surveillance illustrates
how security measures can serve
predominantly intangible concerns.
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In the wake of two IRA bombings in
London's financial district, the
government responded by installing
surveillance cameras at the city's
entry points. 66 Fear of terrorism
continued, and the cameras -closed
circuit TV, or "CCTV" - multiplied
beyond anyone's expectations, both
in London and throughout Britain.
67
Under Prime Minister John Major, the
government devoted "more than
three-quarters of its crime-prevention
budget to encourage local authorities
to install CCTV."(6 R "[By 1998, 440 city
centers" had surveillance camera
networks.69 Rosen's report estimates
that "there are 2.5 million
surveillance cameras in Britain," and
that 300 different cameras
photograph the average Briton every
day.
70
How many terrorists has Britain
caught using this pervasive
surveillance network? None.
7 1
"Although the cameras in Britain
were initially justified as a way of
combating terrorism, they soon came
to serve a very different function. The
cameras are designed not to produce
arrests but to make people feel that
they are being watched at all
times."72 And the people monitoring
the cameras are most likely to focus
on unconventional behavior in
public, young men (especially if they
are dark skinned), and attractive
young women.73 Cameras in London
are most productive tracking "car
thieves and traffic offenders. 'The
technology here is geared up to
terrorism,"' said London's press
officer.74 "'The fact that we're getting
ordinary people -burglars stealing
cars -as a result of it is sort of a
bonus. 75 But there is no evidence
that the cameras have prevented
terrorism or other serious crime.
76
The national ID card debate offers
another timely illustration of the
intangible nature of security
concerns. Despite all best intentions,
a national ID card will not prevent
terrorism. Most countries have
national ID cards or ID numbers,
7 7
and yet terrorism is a problem across
the globe. September 11 hijacker
Khalid AI-Midhar was on the INS's
"watch list" of potential terrorists for
nearly a year before the attacks, yet
he boarded one of the hijacked
flights using a ticket he bought in his
own name.7 8 Seven of the hijackers
obtained fraudulent IDs from the
State of Virginia.7 9 Even more
disturbingly, the INS recently notified
a Florida flight school that it had
approved student visas for Mohamet
Atta and Marwan Alshehhi -six
months afterAtta and Alshehhi
carried out the September 11 attacks,
and in the midst of one of the most
important and publicized law
enforcement investigations in
history.80 Moreover, at Boston's
Logan Airport, from which one of the
September 11 flights originated, a
man recently passed through two
airport security checkpoints despite
the fact that the name on his
government-issued ID did not match
the name on his ticket.8 '
Nonetheless, in the wake of the
attacks, the American public threw its
support behind a national ID card.
Seventy percent of respondents to a
Pew Research Center poll supported
a "must carry" card -a card that the
government would require us to
carry on our person at all times and
"show a police officer on request."8 2
Perhaps most disturbingly, 49% of
respondents to a CNN/USA
Today/Gallup poll supported a
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special national ID card that only
Arab-Americans would be required
to cany.8
3
Now, did the public suddenly
review empirical evidence suggesting
that national ID cards prevent
terrorism? Certainly not. This was a
reflexive response to the perception
of vulnerability. The public needed
to believe that there was something
the government could do to prevent
this type of attack In the wake of
September 11, fear and self-delusion
are empowered to drive the debate
over security proposals. Larry Ellison
claims that people need not give up
their privacy, only their "illusions" of
privacy.8 4 In the privacy-versus-
security debate, howcver, privacy
advocates often find themselves
opposing efforts to preserve the mere
illusion of security.
It is not enough, however, to point
out the intangible nature of the
security interest. That alone is
unlikely to change the debate,
precisely because people want, at
some level, to believe that
government can protect them against
foreign threats. Government, too, has
an essential interest in preserving this
perception.
Accordingly, privacy advocates
must also identify the tangible effects
of preserving privacy against
government intrusion. Speaking to a
class at Harvard's John F. Kennedy
School of Government in the fall of
2000, Simson Garfinkel said that
privacy advocates need to show
"where the bodies are buried."5 I
take him to mean that privacy
advocates will make relatively little
progress until they can show specific,
tangible harms flowing from
intrusions on privacy. His comment
recognizes the tangible-versus-
intangible perception that privacy
advocates often confront.
Garfinkel's point finds support in
the patchwork of privacy laws on the
books today. In the few areas where
we have found metaphorical "buried
bodies," Congress has offered a
healthy measure of privacy
protection, albeit in the most narrow
of circumstances. For example,
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act in the wake of the
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1989 stalking and murder of actress
Rebecca Schaeffer by a deranged fan
who found her address through the
department of motor vehicles.
86
Similarly, Congress passed the Video
Privacy Protection Act after Judge
Robert Bork's confirmation hearings,
during which a Washington Times
reporter shamelessly obtained copies
of Judge Bork's video store rental
records.
8 7
Privacy advocates, then, must
emphasize the tangible
consequences of what some would
dismiss as intangible aspects of
privacy - those related to autonomy,
to freedom of association and
expression, and to personal and
political identity. Joanna Malamud
Smith notes that systematic
deprivation of privacy by
government is a hallmark of
oppressive, totalitarian regimes.
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Describing abuses in Nazi-occupied
France, cold war East Germany, and
the Soviet Union, Smith observes
that:
Constantly spying and then
confronting people with
what are often petty




... . [Elven when one
shakes real pursuers, it is
often hard to rid oneself of
the feeling of being
watched - which is why
surveillance is an extremely
powerful way to control
people. 89
Smith quotes a memoir of a woman
who lived under Stalinism: "'An
existence like this leaves its mark. We
all became slightly unbalanced
mentally -not exactly ill, but not
normal either: suspicious,
mendacious, confused and inhibited
in our speech .... "'90 Such
campaigns are nothing less than
state-run terrorism.91 Viewed from
this perspective, privacy seems less
an intangible abstraction than it does
an instrumental value that produces
tangible effects essential to a free
citizenry.
Nor are deliberate assaults on
privacy confined to totalitarian states.
Smith also notes that the U.S.
government has spied on dissenters
such as Emma Goldman, the
Wobblies, Malcolm X, and Martin
Luther King, Jr.92 Smith recounts the
FBI's attempts to force King to
commit suicide by sending him and
his wife videotapes of King's sexual
infidelities. 93 "Along with the videos,
King received an anonymous letter.
Knowing that he had attempted
suicide as a twelve-year-old child, the
writer, an FBI agent, encouraged
King to end his life."94 J. Edgar
Hoover used the FBI's surveillance
capabilities for his personal gain.
One Hoover biographer tells the
story of a magazine publisher who
was planning an expos6 on Hoover
and the FBI.95 "Hoover struck first,
viciously. Favored newspaper
contacts all over the country received
a plain brown envelope with no
return address. Inside was a packet
of photographs showing the
publisher's wife engaged in fellatio
with her black chauffeur."96 Thus,
invasions of privacy empower the
invader to control information and
quell dissent.
IV. CONCLUSION
T oday, police in Washington, D.C.
are building a centralized
network of surveillance cameras that
will blanket the District Qf
Columbia. 97 This unprecedented
initiative operates within the
cryptically named "Synchronized
Operations Command Complex" (the
"SOCC"). 98 In the SOCC's Joint
Operation Command Center, fifty
workers monitor a wall of video
screens hooked up to surveillance
cameras. 99 The network already
includes 200 cameras in public
schools.' 0 0 The SOCC will soon add
another 200 in subways and parks.10'
It will also link the video from
surveillance cameras that monitor
intersections for drivers who run red
lights, and from private cameras in
banks, retail stores, hotels, and
apartment buildings.10 2 According to
the director of the project, "I don't
think there's really a limit on the
feeds it can take. We're trying to build
. the capability to tap into not only
video but databases and systems
across the region."' 0 3
A man living under a
similar surveillance
network in Britain
observed: I am gay and I
might want to kiss my
boyfriend in Victoria
Square at 2 in the morning.
I would not kiss my
boyfriend now. I am aware
that it has altered the way I
might behave. Something
like that might be regarded
as an offense against public
decency.104
Despite this, the man maintains that
"the benefits of the cameras
outweighed the costs, because
'thousands of people feel safer. "105
As William Safire asks: "Is this the
kind of world we want16
Policymakers are now deciding the
fate of the D.C. video surveillance
network, in addition to countless
other security measures. If they
accept uncritically the tangible-
versus-intangible framework, their
decision may be foreordained. The
framework suggests a simple
question: Which is more costly -the
destruction from a terrorist attack on
our capitol, or the discomfort that a
commuter, tourist, or student might
feel when passing innocently before
a surveillance camera?
This essay has tried to illuminate
what really lies on either side of the
scale. First, the framework's short-
term temporal focus necessarily
excludes the future uses of such a
surveillance network. Even today,
the project is considering linking not
only surveillance cameras, but also
"databases and systems across the
region. 1'7 The potential uses of
centralized video surveillance and
databases are unlimited, as are the
long-term privacy intrusions of such
expanded uses.
Second, the factual context in
which the question is posed
necessarily suggests the answer. We
are left to imagine a known terrorist
riding the Metro or walking across
the Capitol Mall en route to his target.
Even if one understands as a
conceptual matter that the privacy
consequences of pervasive
surveillance will be widespread, it is
difficult to measure such seemingly
intangible harms against the prospect
of another devastating terrorist
attack. To accept the limited context
in which the framework places the
issue is to determine the outcome of
the decision.
Finally, even if the surveillance
system employed facial recognition
technology that was 100% accurate -
an extremely unlikely possibility 08 -
it could not prevent terrorist attacks.
Only two of the nineteen September
11 hijackers were on the terrorist
watch list; the rest were unknown to
intelligence or law enforcement
officials before the attacks. 1°9 To
catch even those two with facial
recognition technology, the
government would have needed not
only their names, but also digital
images of their faces. Like the
pervasive surveillance network in
Britain, centralized surveillance in
D.C. would be better suited to
making people feel safe rather than
actually stopping terrorists.
So the question that policymakers
Must in fact decide is far more
complex than the tangible-versus-
intangible framework would suggest.
The security side of the scale is much
less substantial than many would
suspect, because it is both
empirically suspect and comprised in
large part of mere perceptions of
security. Similarly, the privacy side is
weightier than the framework would
admit, because it includes the long-
term effects that unintrded
conseqtuences will have on privacy,
and because it considers the effect
that security measures will have on
the entire community, rather than on
a single individual passing a
checkpoint Moreover the privacy
side of the scale holds far more than
mere abstractions. Instead, intrusions
on privacy can change behavior,
control information, and deter
political and cultural dissent, This
more comprehensive way of
approaching the security-versus-
privacy debate makes decision-
makers far more likely to protect
privacy.
In an important address to the
nation, President Bush warned,
"Freedom and fear are at war." it in
that context, Bush equated freedom
with America, and fear with the
Taliban and At Qacda. In the
aftermath of September I], however,
privacy values arte safeguarding our
freedom, while some security
proposals seek mainly to alleviate
our fear. Freedom and fear are
indeed at war. Let us not sacrifice the
former by indulging the later.
The author is a Climenko/Thayer
Lecturer on Law at tarvard Law
School. Before joining Harvard, he
taught as an Adjunct Professor at
Boston College Law School, and
practiced in the litigation
department of the Boston law firm
Bingham Dana. The ideas in Part I
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from the author's forthcoming
article, Reasonable Expectations and
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been in regular public use at the time
that it was used to scan Kyllo's home,
Kyllo's failure to take precautions
against the device would be proof of
his lack of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the heat coming off his
house. Just as Ciraolo's case would
have come out very differently 100
years ago (when airplanes were
unknown) than today, so Kyllo's case
might come out very differently 10
years from now when the use of
thermal imaging technology
becomes better known to the public.
This leads me back to my original
thesis. What all of these cases
demonstrate is that if an individual
has allowed private actors to look
into areas that would otherwise be
private, he has invited the
government in as well. Even if others
were invited in for a narrow and
specific purpose, the individual has
run the risk that her trust will be
abused. Similarly, even if one has
behaved passively, not conveying or
showing information to anyone, but
simply failing to take precautions
against intrusions by others, she has
likely lost an expectation of privacy
in the area she has carelessly
exposed. Furthermore, precautions
that might be sufficient to protect an
expectation of privacy in one era -
for example, protecting the four sides
but not the roof of a shed from public
view - will be deemed insufficient
in another.
This is why I argue that privacy vis-
a-vis private actors is crucial in
defining the contours of Fourth
Amendment law. In recent years,
technological changes have made
surveillance easier, cheaper, and
much more pervasive. For example,
a recent report indicated that more
than one third of the United States
work force is subject to workplace
monitoring of their web use and e-
mails. 29 Microsoft, which makes the
vast majority of the operating systems
in the world, placed code in its
Windows XP operating system that
records the titles of DVDs watched
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on an individual's computer and
transmits this information back to the
company "in a way that allows the
company to match individuals with
their music and movie choices.3°
Night vision goggles, long-distance
microphones, and personal tracking
devices can all be purchased by
members of the public on the
Internet for under $1,000. 31 While it
was once possible to defeat nosy
neighbors, prying employers, or
avaricious marketers simply by
shutting the door and keeping your
voice down, such precautions are
simply insufficient today.
As these examples illustrate and as
many have written, much of this new
surveillance technology has been
adopted not by the government,
32
but by the so-called Little Brothers -
advertisers, employers and other
private snoops, who many argue
pose a greater threat to privacy than
is posed by government's Big
Brother. 33 What has been less
understood, however, is that the
more power the Little Brothers gain,
the more power Big Brother gains.
Every time a Little Brother gains
access to an area previously
forbidden to him, it becomes easier
for Big Brother to later claim that a
defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy has been lost.
Thus, those of us interested in the
amount of government intervention
into our private lives should be
deeply concerned with the extent to
which others are allowed in. If we
allow our employers to read our e-
mails, we cannot very well complain
when the government does so as
well. If we allow our software
companies to learn what movies we
are watching, we cannot complain
when the government does so as
well. Yet we cannot do anything to
eliminate the technologies that are
making privacy more fleeting;
technological fxes - enciyption,
wiretap blocking, etc. - will only
lead to new and different
technological responses by those
who would invade our privacy. What
is needed is a legal response, one
that makes actionable the use of
technology by private actors to
obtain information that an individual
has taken steps to keep private.
If it is a violation of statute for
private actors to gain access to
information in which an individual
has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, if those whose privacy has
been invaded can bring a private
cause of action akin to trespass
against those who have invaded their
privacy, then privacy can be
preserved even in the face of
technological change. just as the
possibility that private actors might
break into your house and rifle
through your things does not allow
the government to freely break in
and snoop around, so the tortious
privacy invasion of a third party will
not give the government carte
blanche to snoop. So long as third
party privacy invasions violate no
laws, however, they will only
embolden those in government who
seek greater access to private
information and will make it more
difficult for any of us to claim that we
should be protected from
government attempts to get at this
information
The current war against terrorism
has energized civil liberties groups to
respond to governmental attempts to
extend surveillance of citizens and
non-citizens alike. Of course, these
attempts to control the worst
excesses of government are laudable.
But if civil libertarians wait until the
government acts to invade privacy,
they will have lost the battle before it
has even begun.
Sam Kamin is an assistant professor
of law at the University of Denver
where he teaches Criminal Law,
Criminal Procedure. and the Death
Penalty. He is currently completing
a book on the death penalty
decisions of the California Supreme
CoUirt.
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monitoring policy, the employee
consents to the employer's
monitoring of the content of all
electronic communications sent,
received, or stored by the system;
5. When using the electronic
communications system, employees
should always keep in mind that
others may view their
communications, therefore
employees should use discretion
when sending e-mail and making
Web visits;
6. Employees are not authorized to
use any computer password unless
the password is revealed to the
employer;
7. Personal use of the employer's
electronic communications system is
not permitted;
8. The following are impermissible
uses of the system: transmission of
sexually oriented or ethnically
derogatory materials, unauthorized
distribution of trade secrets or
confidential information, and
unauthorized copying of copyrighted
material;
9. Any violation of the policy may
subject the employee to discipline,
up through and including
termination;
A different electronic monitoring
policy should be put in place by
employers with less concern about
potential abuse and a philosophy
that their corporate mission will
benefit from a workforce who can
communicate freely by e-mail or over
the Internet. This type of policy
would guarantee the privacy of
certain communications while
preserving the employer's ability to
police the system and to punish
abusers. A policy embodying this
approach might include the
following elements:
1. The types of personal uses that are
permissible and impermissible;
2. The amount of personal time
allowed;
3. The time of day that personal use
is permitted;
4. That permissible, personal e-mail
and Internet use will not be
monitored absent justification for
doing so;
5. The security measures that will be
taken to protect the privacy of
personal e-mail and Internet use;
6. An explanation of the type of
monitoring technology used to
prevent impermissible personal use;
7. How frequently employees will be
monitored;
8. The consequences of violating the
policy.
There is one caveat for an employer
who opts for this "privacy-as-a-
benefit" approach. A failure to honor
the policy might open the employer
to liability for tortiously intruding
upon the private space created by the
employer or for breach of an implied
contract.
Regardless of the type of policy
the employer decides to adopt, a
document retention/destruction
policy should accompany any
electronic monitoring policy. The
former policy should be designed to
assist the employer in managing the
enormous quantity of information
stored in its computer systems. At the
same time, this policy should reduce
the cost of responding to "electronic
discovery" and reduce the risk that a
"smoking-gun" e-mail will remain
stored on the employer's system. The
policy should address the following:
1. Classifications of data compatible
with search capabilities;
2. Segregation of privileged
communications and trade secrets;
3. The period for data retention,
bearing in mind the type of data in
question and any applicable legal
requirements;
4. Strict limits on the retention of
personal e-mail;
5. Application of the policy to all
corporate computers (e.g., local,
network, and back-up storage) and
to computers of employees leaving
the company.
Document destruction, no matter
how well intentioned, almost
inevitably will spur allegations of bad
faith when litigation does arise. To
deter such allegations, the policy
should be developed and
implemented long before litigation is
on the horizon, In addition, the
employer should maintain all
documents bearing upon the creation
and implementation of the policy.
Finally, the policy should be
consistently enforced, and




continues to use a growing array of
communications tools to the benefit
of employers. Some of these tools,
like e-mail and the Irternet,
contemporaneously create
unprecedented risks for employers,
The existing statutory regime and
accompanying judicial construction
impose few limits on workplace
surveillance of e-mail and Internet
use. Nonetheless, employers should
avoid the temptation of spying on
their employees without notice.
Surreptitious monitoring has no
deterrent value and breeds
resentment and discomfort upon
discovery. Instead, each employer
should give notice to its workforce of
the method and scope of electronic
monitoring by promulgating a policy
tailored for the employer's particular
workplace.
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Just as the Fourth Amendment
protects peoples' reasonable
expectations of privacy from
governmental intrusion, so to does
this common law tort protect the
private individual from the prying
eyes, ears, and senses of others, both
public and private.
In order to "prevail on a claim of
intrusion of seclusion as a violation
of one's privacy, a plaintiff must
show that another has intentionally
intruded, physically or otherwise,
upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude, and that such intrusion
would be considered offensive by a
reasonable person."70 In the
employer/employee context, the
protection afforded an employee
from intrusion by his employer is
determined by balancing the
employee's reasonable expectation
of privacy in the area against the




When an employee's working
relationship with the employer is
terminated, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, the employer has a
major business interest at stake. Is the
employee wrongfully taking some of
the employer's property with them as
they leave (such as customer and
supplier lists, equipment, trade
secrets, supplies, etc.)? This is
particularly alarming to the company
owner when the employee's parting
has been a less than happy scene.
Therefore, the employer's interest in
what is in the terminated employee's
workspace is a legitimate one.7 2
Other People Having Access to the
Employee's Office
When others have access to the
office of the employee being
searched, it would be difficult for that
employee to restrict access by other
people to his work area. If the
employee cannot keep others out of
his area, he cannot reasonably expect
to have privacy in his work area.
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This issue was, perhaps, carried to
extended lengths when, in 1992, a
Florida federal court in Pottingerv
City of Miami,74 held that a homeless
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person had a subjective expectation
of privacy regarding their property,
including their bedroll and other
personal belongings, when they slept
in public areas. 75 However, the court
did deny that there was an
expectation of privacy to sleep and
eat in public, and, therefore, the city
may arrest them for these activities
without violating their privacy
rights.76 Accordingly, others having
access to an area greatly diminishes
the ability of anyone working in that
area to claim a valid privacy
interest.7 7 If there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy, then without
any other prohibition, the search can
validly take place.
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Shared Offices With Other
Workers
New Jersey considered the issue of
workers sharing a common work
space and found that, from an
objective viewpoint, a worker
sharing locked work space cannot
reasonably have an expectation of
privacy where other workmen have
access to the same work space.
79
This view is shared by most state
and federal courts, which have
addressed the issue in the Fourth
Amendment context. 8 0 In fact, the
United States Supreme Court says
that, "what a person knowingly
exposes to the public" is not subject
to constitutional protection. 81 Again,
as stated above, what can be
perceived with ones own unaided
senses, when lawfully in a place
where they have a right to be
present, is not an illegal search.
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In the employer/employee
context, if an employee is insensitive
to his surroundings and who might
be present to observe or overhear,
that employee should not be able to
later claim that it was improper for
someone to see or overhear what he
did or said. Accordingly, even if the
employee had a subjective
expectation of privacy in his office
space, the employee's expectation
would not be reasonably grounded.
Locked Desk or Computer
If an employee has the only key to
his desk and keeps it locked, that
situation is essentially the same as
where the employee has the only
password to the company provided
computer, which he uses. Again, we
must look to the circumstances of the
work environment. In United States v.
Speights,83 the court reviewed a case
involving a police officer that kept an
illegal sawed-off shotgun in his
personally assigned locked locker in
the police station dressing room.' 4 In
this case, the court noted that the
police department did not have any
regulation or notice that the police
lockers were subject to unannounced
searches at any time.' 5 While the
lockers were infrequently checked
for cleanliness, these checks had
occurred only three or four times in
the preceding twelve years.' 6 The
police officers were permitted to
keep personal iterms in their lockers
and were allowed to use their own
personal padlock to secure the
contents of their assigned locker.
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There was no requirement that an
extra key to that padlock be given to
the police chief or any other
supervisor.8 Under these specific
circumstances, the court held that the
officer did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy and the
warrantless search was violative of
his constitutional rights. 89
The same logic incorporated by the
court in Speights would apply in a
non-governmental situation. For
example, in K-Mart Corp. Store No.
7441 v. Trotti,9' the court stated that
where "the employee purchases and
uses his own lock on the'lockers,
with the employer's knowledge, the
[jury] is justified in concluding that
the employee manifested, and the
employer recognized, an expectation
that the locker and its contents would
be free from intrusion and
interference." 9 1
On the other hand, a warrantless
search of a deputy sheriffs locker
was upheld where the locks given
the deputies had both keys and
combinations, but the comnander
kept a master key and the
combinations to all locks.92 While the
deputies could change the keys and
combinations at will, copies of the
new keys and new combinations had
to be given to the commander. 93
Would the approach adopted in the
above-cited cases also apply to a
computer? If the employee is
permitted to have his own password,
and that password is not required to
be given to his supervisor, then tile
employee could reasonably expect
privacy as to what he kept on the
company owned computer that he
was using (assuming this employee is
the only person assigned to use that
computer).
Sending the Computer Out for
Repair
What protection would an
employee have when he sends out
his company-owned computer to be
repaired? What if management
temporarily took the computer to
install new software or modify the
configuration? What expectation of
privacy would the employee have at
that time?
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in
Deemer v. Commonwealth,
94
addressed an analogous situation.
Film was taken to a commercial
developer to be processed.95 As the
processing company developed the
film, the photos clearly depicted a
crime taking place.9 6 Police were
notified and the culprit was
prosecuted. 97 The defendant filed a
motion to suppress the photos
because he had been taking film to
that location for five years and never
experienced interference before.98
Apparently, he argued that the
processing company acted as his
agent in the developing process. 99
The court, noting that the defendant
lost any expectation of privacy when
he delivered the film for processing,
rejected this argument. 1 0 The rolls of
film here were delivered to a
commercial entity whose
responsibility was to visually
examine the prints in the
development processi 01 The
defendant, the court stated, knew or
should have known this.102
In like circumstances, an employee
could not reasonably complain that a
computer technician observed
improper materials on his company-
owned computer when the
technician was updating,
reconfiguring, or otherwise working
on the computer. While it might be
said that in Deemer, the employee
initiated the action that led to the
viewing of the photos, 10 3 this would
not be true when a company
technician comes to the employee's
computer (if the work was done at
the behest of the employer and not
the employee). Nevertheless, the
employee should reasonably
anticipate that the employer could, at




Unlike many other forms of
communication, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to totally erase from a
computer hard drive the
communications sent out from that
computer.10 4 Recently, software has
been developed which enables an
employer to see what has been done
on a computer in the past.
105
Software, like Investigator, is now
commercially available to read a hard
drive, thereby telling of the nefarious
deeds done by the employee. 106 The
computer itself incriminates the
worker. 107
That an employer may, from time-
to-time, conduct a random search of
an employee's possessions on the
job, could arguably give the
employer the right to review e-mails
from one employee to another or
otherwise see what an employee has
done on the company-owned
computer in the ordinary course of
business. 08 For instance, if an
employee is not at work due to
illness, it may be necessary for the
employer to review what messages
were sent by that employee (to
ensure the continuity of workflow
until the worker is able to return to
the job). While federal law might not
prohibit this action, some state laws
may nevertheless still consider this as
offensive and illegal. 109 Part of the
issue may be the manner in which
the employer views employee's
thoughts and actions. Viewing what
went out electronically in e-mail or
hearing voice-mail messages left for
the employee can sometimes be
treated differently than monitoring a
telephonic (or actual) conversation
between workers.
For example, Wal-Mart Stores
learned this in Desilets v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Jnc.,1 ° when the company
was held liable for eavesdropping on
employees in violation of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1 9 68 .Ii
n Title III of this
act prohibits interception, disclosure,
and intentional use of private
conversations,' 12 and Wal-Mart







Employees' use of the Internet or
company intranet to send harassing,
sexually suggestive, or racially
motivated messages can be very
costly for a company that does not
prevent or stop it." 4 For example,
Chevron paid out $2.2 million dollars
to settle claims for failing to prevent
the circulation of an e-mail message
describing 25 reasons why beer is
better than women. 1 5 Accordingly,
companies have a duty to stop and
also prevent improper messaging
because failing to do so can result in
hefty penalties for the company.16
Employers Terminating
Employees
Recently, there have been a
number of employers disciplining
and terminating employees for
improper use of the Internet. 117 For
example, the New York Times fired
over twenty employees and Xerox
Corporation fired forty for
unauthorized use of the Internet. 18
'T hese employees were terminated
for sending offensive e-mail
messages and/or viewing Internet
pornographic materials at work.'1i9
Lawsuits by Employees
Where employees have brought
lawsuits against their employers or
former employers, the legal
foundations have been based on the
following theories: the tort of
invasion of privacy, discrimination
statutes, Fourth Amendment
pirotections regarding search and
seizure, First Amendment guarantee
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of freedom of speech, Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, and familiar torts
such as defamation, negligence, and
intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 120 The success that these
employees meet in the judicial system
is varied. Perhaps most importantly,
the policy of the employer (in effect at
the time of the communication)
prohibiting such conduct was a major
factor on the outcome of the cases.1
21
Other important factors are
circumstances of the communication,
the intent and attempt of the employee
to keep the communication privileged
and away from the employer's
knowledge, and the means used for
the communication itself (telephone or
emaiD.
Theft of Time
A safer course of action for the
company to take when discharging
employees for unauthorized use of the
internet, telephone, and other
communications means is to discharge
the employee for not working during
the time she was improperly using the
Internet, telephone, or other
communication.
The damage to the company is
obvious. Necessary work is not getting
done, yet the employee is still being
compensated. Furthermore, useless e-
mails sent to a large number of
employees can overtax the company
servers, thereby causing a meltdown of
the internal communications system. 122
The company may have to pay
overtime in order for the employee to
accomplish what he should have been
doing during regular work hours. The
list could go on, but these grounds
would be considered sufficient for a
court to uphold a firing of an
employee for improper usage of the
Internet or intranet.
Employers' Policies
One hurdle that a company must
overcome to have its "monitoring of
employee's conduct" held proper is
the various federal and state statutes
requiring a person's consent before his
conversations can be monitored or
recorded.1 23 The employer should give
advance notice to all employees that
conversations, e-mails, and use of the
Internet will be monitored. In order to
better protect itself, the company
should have each employee sign a
consent form allowing the company to
monitor the employee's use of the
Internet, telephone, and other
company assets. "Notification and
consent negate an expectation of
privacy and usually protects
companies from liability under such
federal statutes as Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 and the Federal
Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, governing interstate
communications, as well as common
law invasion of privacy charges."'
124
Union Organizing Activities
One exception to the right of an
employer to prohibit employees' use
of the Internet for other than company
purposes is the right of a union to use
the company's Internet. 125 Federal
labor laws (National Labor Relations
Act, and others) protect the union and
its members' right to use certain
company facilities to discuss matters




As held by the United States Supreme
Court in O 'Conner v. Ortega,'
2 7
"employees' expectations of privacy in
their offices, desks, and file cabinets...
may be reduced by virtue of actual
office practices and procedures, or by
legitimate regulation, "128 The Court
went on to state that, "offices may be
so open to fellow employees or the
public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable. Given the great variety of
work environments.., the question
whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be
addressed on a case-by-case basis."
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While it is hoped that employers will
always make the correct decisions
regarding the monitoring of
employees, the complexity of laws
related to protecting the privacy of
individuals often causes confusion on
behalf of companies conducting
employee searches. This study
examined some of the complexities
involved and some possible
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